Abstract

Effective migration management needs to be underpinned by a realistic understanding of the drivers and dynamics of migration and should incorporate lessons learnt about the effects and effectiveness of past migration policies. This study draws policy implications from the analysis of the evolution of European post-war migrations. It examines the effects of internal border opening combined with the ongoing convergence of immigration rules and visa requirements in Europe. Based on the insight that migration is driven by structural factors that often lie beyond the reach of migration policies, the second part of the study looks closely at structural factors that shape migration in both origin and destination countries and assesses the extent to which policies are able to address these factors. Two key areas are analysed in more detail: the level of development in countries of origin and the structure of labour demand in destination countries. The study shows the importance of understanding the impacts of ‘non-migration’ policies on long-term patterns and trends of migration. This is particularly relevant when the effects of economic, foreign, trade, development, agricultural or fisheries policies are potentially inconsistent with the political desire to control or curb migration.
# European Migrations

## Dynamics, Drivers, and the Role of Policies

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Executive summary
Effective migration management needs to be underpinned by a realistic understanding of the drivers and dynamics of migration. It should also take into account the role of both migration and 'non-migration' policies in shaping migration flows. Post-war Europe has transformed from a region of net emigration to that of net immigration and there are lessons to be learnt about the effects and effectiveness of different types of policies in that period. Together with the analysis of trends and drivers of migration processes, these are essential insights for better anticipation vis-à-vis possible future changes in European migration patterns presented in the study.

The study first explores the main phases of post-war Europe’s immigration history. As European countries underwent economic and demographic changes in the post-war period, the West and North European 'core’ that attracted large numbers of migrant workers expanded to incorporate also Southern European countries that were an important source of migrant labour in the 1950s and 1960s. Despite the economic slow-down and the discontinuation of European guest worker programmes in the early 1970s, non-European migrants continued to arrive, partly driven by family migration. The economic restructuring and growing liberalisation of labour markets in the mid-1970s, 1980s and 1990s resulted in increased segmented labour demand for both lower skilled precarious workers and highly skilled workers, predominantly in the service sector. The historical overview indicates that demand for foreign labour has become a structural feature of European labour markets and has persisted despite economic recessions and rise in unemployment in many destination countries.

Since the early 1990s, European regions have undergone important transitions. Southern European countries have firmly established themselves as destination countries whereas Central and Eastern Europe emerged as both a new source of migrant labour and to some extent also a destination for non-European migrants. The 2008 economic crisis demonstrated similar effect on non-European migration flows as the 1973 Oil Crisis. There has been some decline in immigration to Europe but the rate of returns has been lower than expected, particularly among non-European immigrants. The return ratio was higher for
intra-European migrants with free mobility rights. This exemplifies that free-movement migration reacts more strongly to business cycles, whereas migrants who face more stringent immigration restrictions may prefer to ‘stay put’ despite decline in economic opportunities.

Post-war migration regimes in Europe are partly characterized by internal border openings that increase mobility rights of EU citizens as well as convergence on immigration rules and visa regimes that aim at regulating and restricting access of non-EU nationals. Broadly speaking, the internal opening generate increased but lower-than-anticipated volumes of intra-EU migration across Europe while the alignment of EU states on visa and border controls does not coincide with a systematic decrease of immigration of non-EU citizens. These measures tend to reduce return, interrupt circulation and encourage permanent settlement and subsequent family migration.

This study defies the idea that migration policies have been ineffective, as the vast majority of migrants continue to migrate within the law. There are nonetheless limits to what migration policies can achieve vis-à-vis other structural factors that influence migration processes. The difficulties in reconciling the demand for migrant labour with the wish to reduce inflows and to encourage migrant returns and circulation are one such example. One of the key messages of the study is that migration policies only have a limited effect on the structural factors that drive migration. Decision-makers therefore need to reach beyond migration policies in order to more effectively regulate migration processes.

The second part of the study looks closely at structural factors that shape migration in both origin and destination countries and examine the extent to which polices are able to address these factors. Two areas are of particular importance here: the level of development in countries of origin and the structure of labour demand in destination countries.

Firstly, and contrary to popular belief, most migrants do not move from the poorest areas and countries to the wealthiest regions. Rather, human and economic development initially expands human mobility and therefore has the tendency to increase emigration because it increases people’s capabilities and aspirations to migrate. This explains why middle-income rather than poorest countries tend to generate the highest numbers of emigrants. This implies that policies driven by the assumption that development in low-income origin countries will stem migration flows are fundamentally misguided. They are more likely to increase rather than decrease emigration in the short to medium term. In
addition, careful assessment of the migration implications of the effects of trade agreements, agricultural and fisheries policies and development cooperation on employment and livelihood conditions needs to be incorporated into migration policies vis-à-vis countries of origin.

Secondly, labour demand in destination countries is a key migration determinant, as shown by the high correlation between migration and business cycles. Family migration, which constitutes a high proportion of immigration to Europe, should also be seen largely as an indirect consequence of labour migration. Even at times of growing unemployment, the highly segmented nature of European labour markets sustains demand for migrant labour, both in the low-status manual jobs that native workers tend to shun as well as in the medium- and high-skilled sectors where the domestic education systems are not generating enough qualified labour. To be more effective, migration policies therefore need to be coherent with economic and social policies. For example, the dominant trend of the last decades towards economic liberalization and the wish to boost economic growth seems incompatible with the political desire for less migration. Furthermore, ‘non-migration’ policy areas such as health care, child and elderly care and education also affect the structure of labour demand, including labour from abroad. If there is a mismatch between migration policies and socioeconomic policies, this is likely to sustain or even increase the demand for irregular and exploitable migrant labour.

The last part of the study highlights several unintended effects of migration policies and documents them with empirical examples:

1) Migration restrictions can divert migrants via other regular or irregular routes and destinations.

2) Migration policies can reorient migration flows towards other regular or irregular channels by prompting migrants towards different legal categories (e.g. from a labour migrant towards a family migrant or an asylum-seeker).

3) Migration policies can affect the timing and volume of migration (e.g. ‘now or never’ migration).

4) Migration restrictions can encourage permanent settlement by interrupting migrants’ circulatory movements and by discouraging their return for fear of not being able to come back.
Such unanticipated effects need to be better accounted for in future policymaking and its evaluation because they can reduce the long-term effectiveness of migration policies and, in certain cases, can make them counterproductive. These effects seem particularly strong if significant migrant communities have settled in destination countries and their social networks facilitate the continuation of migration.

Overall, more research is needed to understand complex links between socioeconomic and labour market policies and migration patterns. Moreover, with the expansion of migration agendas into policy areas such as foreign and security policy, trade, development cooperation, agriculture or fisheries, there is an urgent need to examine the impacts of 'non-migration' policies on migration patterns and trends.

Introduction

Migration is a hotly debated yet surprisingly poorly understood phenomenon. This certainly applies to European migration, where the debate is often dominated by media images and accompanying political rhetoric that Europe is facing an unprecedented or even existential crisis as a consequence of the mass arrival of asylum seekers and unauthorized migrants on Europe’s southern shores. In this context, migration to Europe is often represented as the result of war, poverty, population growth and climate change in African and Middle Eastern origin countries. However, such ideas and the accompanying political and academic narratives are based on fear and myth rather than fact and empirical analysis. Popular and scientific ideas about migration are often based on out-dated push-pull models, which are misleading in terms of their analysis of the causes and nature of migration processes.

This analysis will thus go beyond the analysis of migration policies alone, based on the insight that migration is driven by structural factors that often lie beyond the reach of migration policies, such as economic and labour market policies (for instance in shaping the structure of labour demand in European countries), welfare and social policies (for instance in affecting social security arrangements, which can indirectly influence migration motivations), as well as foreign, trade and aid policies, which can play an indirect, but significant role in affecting migration from and to non-EU countries.

Migration is driven by structural factors that often lie beyond the reach of migration policies.
While states and citizens have a legitimate desire to regulate migration, such regulation can only be effective if it is based on a realistic understanding of the nature and drivers of migration. In order to achieve a more realistic understanding of migration, we need to rethink migration as an intrinsic part of larger processes of development and social transformation in origin and destination societies. This implies that migration is an *inevitable* complement of development and change, and that addressing problems associated to migration requires addressing those broader processes. Therefore, migration policies alone generally have limited effects on long-term migration processes unless they are accompanied by other policies, for instance macro-economic and labour market policies, which match their objectives.

There is also a need to disaggregate rather abstract concepts such as ‘development’ to analyse how their different sub-dimensions – such as economic growth, political changes such as democratization, labour market segmentation, inequality, social security, education and technology – affect migration processes on their own account and in interaction with other migration determinants. This will be the focus of this paper. Such an analysis provides the necessary understanding to make an assessment of the ability of migration policies to regulate migration.

The resulting improved understanding of recent migration trends and their drivers may also help us to develop future scenarios for migration within, from and towards Europe. From such understanding, we can gain theoretical and empirical insights into possible continuities and discontinuities of European migration for the future. To provide such insights, this paper analyses the dynamics and drivers of European migrations between 1950 and 2015 and, on this basis, it will assess the past, current and future role of policies in affecting trends and patterns of migration. Because of the limited scope of this study, the emphasis will be on a ‘big picture’ analysis of European migration trends and the identification of (migration and ’non-migration’) policy areas that seem to matter most in terms of their influence on migration processes. This knowledge will hopefully improve the capacity of the EU and EU member states to anticipate and be prepared for future change and to design economic and social policies that are more likely to lead to desired migration outcomes.

**Changing contexts and the evolution of European migration**

Since the end of World War II, European migration has undergone fundamental changes. Unlike what many people think, global migration has not accelerated, with migrants
representing a remarkable stable 3 per cent of the world population over the past decades (Czaika and de Haas 2014). The main change has been directional in the form of a ‘global migration reversal’, in which the position of Europe on the global migration map has undergone a radical change. While for centuries Europeans have been moving outward through conquering, colonizing, and settling in lands elsewhere on the globe, while subjugating, killing or enslaving native populations, from a European perspective the dominant direction of world migration was partly reversed in the second half of the twentieth century.

While they do often not see themselves as immigration societies immigration rates in many European countries now match or exceed those of the USA or other classical immigration countries.

Under the influence of decolonization, demographic change, rapid economic growth and the creation of the European Union as a free trade and migration zone, Europe has emerged as a major global migration destination. While migration of Europeans to the Americas and Oceania rapidly declined in the 1960s and 1970s (Figure A1 in annex), Western European countries started to attract increasing number of migrants, mainly from former colonies and countries located on the European periphery. While they do generally not see themselves as immigration societies, immigration rates in many European countries now match or exceed those of the USA or other classical immigration countries. This had implications for global migration, as the drying up of Europe as a source of immigrants in the 1950s and 1960s, increased the share of Latin Americans, Asians, and to some extent Africans, in migration to major immigration countries such as the United States, Canada, Argentina, Australia and New Zealand.

Four phases of the post-war European migration transition

There have been four main phases in the European migration transition (see (Castles, de Haas and Miller 2014), which are closely linked to different phases of economic development and concomitant changes in economic ideology, the changing structure of European labour demand, demographic changes and, last but not least, the twin processes of European integration and enlargement.

1st phase: 1945 – 1970s

In the first phase, the chief economic strategy of large-scale enterprises was to concentrate post-War investment and expansion of production in the existing highly developed countries
in Europe (Castles and Kosack 1973). Partly aided by the US Marshall programme, this resulted in high economic growth and increasing sectoral shortages of low skilled migrant labour, also because demographic change and increased education levels contributed to a decreasing domestic labour supply for such jobs (Castles, de Haas and Miller 2014).

As a result, large numbers of migrant workers were recruited from less developed countries in the Mediterranean region as well as from Ireland (to the UK) and Finland (to Sweden) into the industrial core of Western Europe which included (West-) Germany, northern Italy, Switzerland, Austria, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, the UK (England), Denmark and Sweden. In the post-War decades Mediterranean workers were mainly recruited from southern European countries including Portugal, Spain, Italy, former Yugoslavia and Greece. From the 1960s, as most of these countries entered their own migration transitions as a result of ageing and economic growth, German, Belgium, Dutch, French and Scandinavian employers started to increasingly recruit workers from Turkey, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia as well as from particular former colonies, such as Senegal and Mali (to France) and the Caribbean (to the UK (cf. Peach 1968)). In other terms, with the gradually southward expansion of the ‘European core’, also the ‘labour frontier’ – the imaginary line separating emigration from immigration countries (cf. Skeldon 1997) – shifted southward and further overseas.

Gradual southward expansion of the ‘European core’ shifted the ‘labour frontier’ separating emigration from immigration countries southward and further overseas.

The end of this phase was marked by the Oil Crisis of 1973, which led to a recruitment freeze but was also the onset of a series of economic recessions, which lasted far into the 1980s. Along with falling birth rates and rising labour costs in wealthy countries, this gave impetus to a restructuring of the world economy, involving capital investment in new industrial areas in developing countries, altered patterns of world trade, and introduction of new technologies (Castles, de Haas and Miller 2014).

2nd phase: mid-1970s – mid-1990s
The second phase coincided with an increasing prevalence of neoliberal economic policies dominated by economic deregulation, ‘flexibilization’ of labour markets (increasing the scope for temporary recruitment of migrant workers), suspension of state subsidies for sectors such as mining, shipyards and heavy industry, privatisation of state companies, less
progressive taxation and increasing economic inequality (Piketty 2014), as well as the austerity-driven partial erosion of social security arrangements.

These political and economic changes contributed to the mass dismissal of factory and mine workers, including many former ‘guestworkers’ and other labour migrants. In this period, industrial production was partly relocated to low-wage countries. However, the recruitment freeze did not lead to the anticipated large-scale return of workers but, paradoxically, rather encouraged their permanent settlement, since the prospect of border closure and general uncertainty encouraged many migrant workers to stay on the safe side of the border and bring over their families (De Mas 1990; Entzinger 1985). Family reunion and new marriages between the ‘second generation’ and spouses living in origin communities are important factors in explaining why migration from the Maghreb, Turkey and other origin countries continued at relatively high levels even during period of recessions. However, mass unemployment and segregation contributed to the long-term marginalization of significant portions of these immigrant populations as well as the ‘second generation’.

The growing bifurcation of labour market led to a resumption of the demand for lower skilled ‘precarious’ labour while the growth in specialized service jobs led to an increasing demand for highly skilled migrant workers.

From the mid-1980s, economic growth resumed. The rapid growth of the service sectors would draw in more and more low and high skilled migrant workers, while labour demand in sectors such as agriculture and construction was maintained. However, with the structural (and inevitable) economic shifts towards service-based economies, industrial labour demand did not recover, further contributing to the long-term unemployment of low skilled migrant workers (Castles, de Haas and Miller 2014). The growing bifurcation of labour market led to a resumption of demand of lower skilled ‘precarious’ labour in agriculture and the formal and informal service sectors, including an increasing demand for female domestic workers and cleaners – partly because growing numbers of native women entered the skilled labour force. At the same time, the growth in specialized service jobs led to an increasing demand for highly skilled migrant workers. This gave a further impetus to further facilitate intra-EU labour mobility. Although the right to free labour migration was already established since 1968 (Goedings 2008), one of the central aims of the Maastricht treaty (1992), the concomitant establishment of the European Union and the notion of European citizenship as well as EU enlargements is to encourage free labour mobility, which
governments generally saw as beneficial for economic growth in destination and origin countries (Kindleberger 1965).

3rd phase: mid-1990s - 2008

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 heralded the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rest of the communist Warsaw Pact, the generally peaceful establishment of democratic governments in Central and Eastern Europe as well as the German reunification over the early 1990s. The immediate effect of the fall of the Berlin Wall was to precipitate temporary migrations of asylum seekers seeking refuge in Western Europe. This marked the beginning of a third phase of the post-WWII evolution of European migration systems, which lasted until the Global Economic Crisis of 2008. It was a period of further economic liberalization coupled with the inclusion of Central and Eastern Europe in the free European migration area (Castles, de Haas and Miller 2014).

Central and Eastern European countries emerged as important new source regions of migrants for Western and Southern Europe and some became transit and immigration countries in their own right. Europe’s southern and western peripheries firmly established themselves as destination countries.

This phase thus saw the unanticipated opening up of a new ‘labour frontier’ in Central and Eastern Europe: Poland, Ukraine, Albania, Romania and Bulgaria and the Baltic republics emerged as important new source regions of migrants for Western and Southern Europe (cf. Baganha and Fonseca 2004; Kosić and Triandafyllidou 2004a), but also became transit and immigration countries in their own right. This period was also marked by renewed economic growth and the rise of new migration destinations on Europe’s southern and western peripheries, with particularly Ireland, Italy and Spain attracting many migrants from Eastern Europe, North and West Africa and Latin America. This is an important change from the period until 1990, when non-EU migration to the EU was dominated by migration from Turkey and the Maghreb. These developments coincided with further European integration, the establishment of the borderless Schengen zone and the concomitant reinforcement of border controls at the EU’s external borders. By the 1990s, particularly Spain and Italy had completed their migration transitions and had firmly established themselves as destination countries.
The global economic crisis (GEC) in 2008 seems to mark the – at least temporary – end of this period of rapid economic growth and EU enlargement, and a fourth phase of European migration characterized by a consolidation and stabilization of intra-EU migration and a higher-than-expected continuation of immigration of non-EU nationals. Initially, the GEC led to decreasing migration within and towards the EU. Nevertheless, and in parallel to the experience after the 1973 Oil Crisis, this decline in immigration has been relatively modest, and the anticipated mass return has not occurred. The tendency to stay put and not to return has been particularly high among migrants from non-EU countries such as Ecuador and Morocco, partly out of fear that they were not able to re-migrate (BBC/MPI 2010; Castles, de Haas and Miller 2014). For intra-European migrants, return ratios have generally been higher, highlighting the fact that the absence of migration barriers tends to stimulate return and circulation and suggesting that migration restrictions have the tendency to interrupt circulation and push migrants into permanent settlement.

Figure 1. Migration to EU25 countries

Source: DEMIG C2C database, International Migration Institute, University of Oxford, see de Haas, Vezzoli and Villares-Varela 2018

1 Excluding the UK, for which no origin-country specific data was available.
The largest effect of the crisis was on intra-EU migration and migration from non-EU25 European countries, which initially slowed down, while several particularly crisis-hit countries such as Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland saw increasing emigration. This partly led to increasing South-North migration with increasing movement of Spaniards, Portuguese, Italians to northern Europe, although this primarily concerns circular migration. Between 2007 to 2012 migration to EU countries declined, which primarily reflected decreasing intra-EU migration (OECD 2011). This confirms that free-movement migration reacts rather directly to business cycles (cf. Czaika and Haas 2016). Yet also non-EU immigration declined, and in 2012 legal permanent migration from third countries to Europe was slightly lower than legal permanent migration to the United States (OECD 2014).

The largest effect of the crisis was on intra-EU migration and migration from non-EU25 European countries, which initially slowed down, while several particularly crisis-hit countries such as Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland saw increasing emigration.

Starting in 2012, and particularly since 2015, both intra-EU (East-West and also, to some extent, South-North) and extra-EU migration have rebounded, mainly as a consequence of resumed economic growth and falling unemployment in North-West Europe. According to Eurostat data, in 2015 total intra-EU migration was 1.4 million while total legal migration from non-EU countries was 2.4 million. While Romania and Poland are the most important origin countries for intra-EU migration, Ukraine and Syria have risen as main non-European origin countries for first residence permits issued in 2016. The fact that intra-EU migration and extra-EU immigration have not declined as much as expected and have rebounded to pre-crisis levels reflects the structural demand for migrant labour in the segmented labour markets of the EU, the fact that refugee and family migration are less affected by economic trends as well as the growing importance of humanitarian and student migration. The fact that intra-EU migration and extra-EU immigration have not declined as much as expected and have rebounded to pre-crisis levels reflects the structural demand for migrant labour in the segmented labour markets of the EU.

From 2015, migration debates in Europe became increasingly dominated by the growing migration of Syrian and other refugees entering from Turkey and Greece into Europe as well continued ‘boat migration’ and smuggling from North Africa. Although it
seems a new phenomenon, trans-Mediterranean boat migration had already started in 1991 and increased in significance over subsequent decades as a consequence of increasing immigration restrictions and border surveillance. In 2015, almost 1.3 million asylum seekers came to Europe, with Syrians and Afghans representing about 25% and 16% of applications. Germany alone registered 440,000 formal asylum applications and more than one million pre-registrations (OECD 2016). Since the 2016 asylum applications have decreased coinciding with increasing border controls and the relative waning of the scale and levels of conflicts in origin countries.

**Policy implications**

The past seven decades of European migration history have yielded the following policy implications:

1. The demand for migrant workers is structurally embedded into liberalized European labour markets explaining the continuation of substantial labour immigration even in times of economic recessions;
2. Despite initial post-accession increases, free migration within an enlarged EU has remained lower than anticipated and has substituted migration from outside the EU only to a limited degree.
3. Free intra-EU mobility is more circulatory and reactive to business cycles compared to policy-constrained migration from outside the EU, which has a higher tendency to gain a permanent character through the postponement and cancellation of migrants’ return plans;
4. Family migration tends to gain in importance in times of economic recession, particularly as a consequence of non-EU labour migrants deciding to settle instead of return.

**The effects of internal opening of borders on population mobility in the European Union**

The fear of uncontrolled mass immigration as a result of open-border policies plays a major role in European migration policy debates. The process of EU enlargement is an interesting ‘quasi-natural experiment’ to study the short- and long-term consequences of open border regimes on population mobility.
The process of internal opening

The European Union has gone through a process of internal opening since 1951 when Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands founded the European Coal and Steel Community, and in 1957, the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community. In seven successive accession waves from 1973 to 2013, the EU has expanded to its current 28 members (de Haas, Vezzoli and Villares-Varela 2018).²

Fears of mass immigration upon accession of new member countries have motivated the imposition of temporary immigration restrictions during transitional periods, whereby citizens of new member states did not instantly acquire full rights of residence and work in other member states (de Haas, Vezzoli and Villares-Varela 2018). In fact, it was not until 1968 when a council regulation was implemented establishing full rights for free movement within the European Community for citizens of its members (then Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) as well as forbidding all forms of discrimination in the labour market. Worries about potential ‘massive flows from Italy to the other five founding countries’ of the European Economic Community (Goedings, 1998: 7) partly explain why it took many years to establish this free movement zone.

This pattern would repeat itself during later enlargement rounds. After joining the EU in 1981, Greek citizens had to wait until 1988 to acquire full working rights and be protected against labour market discrimination in other member countries. Spain and Portugal joined in 1986 but restrictions in the access to the labour market applied until 1991. On the other hand, Austria, Finland and Sweden were not confronted with any mobility or labour right restrictions when they joined the EU in 1995. The removal of restrictions for Cyprus and Malta in 2004 implied immediate access to the Union’s labour market. Yet for the other Eastern and Central European new member states of the 2004 enlargement round, access to the labour market was granted straightaway only in the United Kingdom, Ireland and Sweden. These new member countries had to wait until 2006 to have full mobility rights for Greece, Finland, Iceland, Italy and Spain. Workers from Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia received full rights in 2007 in

² This enlargement process started with the accession of Denmark, Ireland and the UK in 1973. Greece joined the EEC in 1981 and was followed by Spain and Portugal in 1986. Austria, Finland, and Sweden became EU members in 1995, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia in 2004, and Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. Finally, in 2013 Croatia joined the EU.
Luxembourg and Netherlands, in 2008 in France, in 2009 in Denmark, and 2011 in Austria and Germany (de Haas, Vezzoli and Villares-Varela 2018).

Upon joining the EU in 2007, citizens from Bulgaria and Romania gained immediate full work right for Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Sweden, but they had to wait until 2009 for free access to the labour markets of Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Portugal, Spain; until 2012 for Ireland, Italy and Norway, and until 2014 for Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK. The 2013 accession of Croatia follows the same pattern of a gradual removal of labour restrictions. The 2004 enlargement countries welcomed its citizens since the accession date, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Spain did so in 2015 and the UK should open its borders to them in 2018 (de Haas, Vezzoli and Villares-Varela 2018).

In general, the data shows that fears of mass migration turned out to be largely unwarranted, as migration did stabilize after an initial post-opening increase. This pattern would repeat itself several times with the introduction of free labour migration following the EU enlargement process (de Haas, Vezzoli and Villares-Varela 2018). In some cases, such as with the accession of Spain, Portugal and Greece, there was no increase at all, as migration networks had already been established and economic and political conditions in origin countries were improving rapidly. The only exception in this pattern was when only a few EU countries granted full migration rights to new member states. In this case, migration from some of the new accession states tended to concentrate heavily on the countries with open border regimes, particularly when destination country economies were flourishing. This was highlighted by the post-2006 surge in Eastern and Central European migration to the UK.

The data shows that fears of post-accession mass migration turned out to be largely unwarranted, as migration did stabilize after an initial post-opening increase.
Figure 2. Migration to EU15 countries from CEE countries, 1975-2009

Source: DEMIG C2C, International Migration Institute, University of Oxford, see de Haas, Vezzoli and Villares-Varela (2018)

Drawing on data from the DEMIG C2C database on bilateral migration from and to European countries over the 1946-2011 period, a recent study (de Haas, Vezzoli and Villares-Varela 2018) showed that the removal of migration barriers can lead to temporary migration surges, particularly when economic gaps between countries are large and origin countries have weak social security systems (Kureková 2013). However, in general, as figure 4 illustrates for Poland, Romania and Bulgaria, post-border opening migration increases tend to be temporary, generally lasting a few years, after which levels of migration tends to consolidate at lower levels and become more circulatory (de Haas, Vezzoli and Villares-Varela 2018). Migration tends to consolidate at lower levels when potential migrants gain trust that borders will remain open, which may often lead them to postpone or cancel
migration plans. Under such open border circumstances, after an initial post-liberalization surge, migration tend to become increasingly circular, with migration levels closely correlating with economic opportunities in destination countries. This pattern has become typical for (free) migration within the European Union. So, in the longer term, the impacts of border openings seem to have relatively limited effects on net immigration.

However, on the national and local level the impact of post-liberalization migration surges can be significant. The unanticipated high level of Polish and other Eastern European migration to the UK (cf. Kubal 2012) is a particular case in point. A combination of high labour demand, the UK being one of the free countries immediately granting full labour rights and the existence of settled Polish communities explains this phenomenon. Although these migrations tend to be strongly circular, they turned out to be much higher than initially forecasted. The data also shows that emigration levels and post-accession increases have been relatively low or even absent for other accession countries such as Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia. Although this may partly reflect under-registration and the absence of the UK from this data, this seems to partly corroborate Kurekova’s argument that levels of emigration have generally been lower in countries which retained relatively better levels of post-Communist social security (cf. Kurekova 2013, see further below).

These diverse experiences also show the pitfalls of taking ‘extreme’ cases such as Polish-UK migration as representative for the general post-accession experiences, which have been much more mixed. This also suggest that expectations that intra-EU mobility could form a substitute for non-EU immigration was based on rather naïve assumptions on the potential of intra-EU mobility and the institutional, cultural and language barriers that may explain why this migration did generally not reach the anticipated levels.

**Convergence of immigration rules and visa requirements**

Alongside the process of internal opening of labour mobility, the European Union member states have been converging on common rules with regards to visa requirements for non-EU citizens. This is particularly applicable for the common travel rules necessitated by the establishment of the Schengen zone. The 1985 signature of the Schengen Agreement would lead to a borderless European Area in 1995, which included all then EU members, except for the United Kingdom and Ireland, which opted out. Since then, all new EU members as well as non-EU members Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and joined the Schengen area.
Together with the gradual process of EU expansion, this contributed to a growing integration of European migration systems, a radical expansion of the European free migration space, and, to some extent, a diversification of immigrant populations. This expansion is a continuous process, and includes non-EU members and (potential) accession states such as Albania, FYROM (Macedonia), Moldova, Montenegro, and in the future perhaps also countries such as Turkey, Tunisia and Morocco, for whom free access to the European mobility space is a key condition for fully collaborating with EU’s external border policies and particularly the outsourcing or ‘externalization’ of border controls.

**Development of common immigration rules, particularly the alignment of countries with regards to visa regimes has not stopped non-EU immigration and partly explains the decreasing return ratios to non-European origins.**

This process of the internal opening up of the European free mobility space alongside the creation of the Schengen zone coincides with the development of common immigration rules, particularly around the alignment of countries with regards to visa regimes. As figures A1, A2, A3 and A4 in the annex show, this has not stopped non-EU immigration, but may partly explain the decreasing return ratios to non-European origins, which is visible in these figures, particularly with regards to migration from Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean (de Haas, Vezzoli and Villares-Varela 2018). This seems to

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Source: DEMIG C2C database, International Migration Institute, University of Oxford, see de Haas, Vezzoli and Villares-Varela 2018

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Figure 3. Percentage of countries requiring visa to enter EU9 by continent of nationality of the travellers, 1973-2013
corroborate micro-empirical evidence from survey data. For instance, the tendency to return amongst Senegalese migrants in Europe has decreased as border regimes and immigration regulations have become more restrictive over the past decades (cf. Flahaux 2014).

**Policy implications**

In sum, Europe’s experiences with the twin processes of internal opening and enlargement and external closure had yielded the following policy insights:

1. The lifting of immigration restrictions for citizens of substantially poorer countries is likely to lead to initial emigration hikes lasting a few years, after which migration levels consolidate at lower levels and migration becomes more circulatory.

2. If only some countries liberalize migration while other maintain temporary restrictions, this is likely to lead to a geographical concentration of migration to free-entry countries, particularly if those offer significant economic opportunities (such as in the case of the UK).

3. The lifting of immigration restrictions will only have limited effects if migrant networks have already been established and origin countries provide economic opportunities. In fact, free migration may encourage migrants to return temporarily or permanently or to start circulating.

4. While the lifting of immigration restrictions greatly increases cross-border non-migratory mobility for work, business and tourism as well as temporary and circular migration, the long-term effects on net migration seem more ambiguous as free border regimes tends to simultaneously increase immigration and return.

5. Visa regimes and other immigration restrictions tend to decrease return rates and increase the permanent character of non-EU immigration. This can undermine the effectiveness of immigration policies and exposes fundamental dilemmas for politicians who wish to simultaneously limit immigration and stimulate circulation and the return of migrants. These two wishes can be difficult to reconcile, particularly when significant migrant communities have settled in destination countries, in which case migrant networks tend to facilitate the continuation of migration.
Drivers of migration: theoretical considerations and policy implications

This section will put the preceding overview of Europe in a broader perspective by seeking theoretical explanations for the observed trends and patterns. Such understanding of drivers of past European migration will also increase our ability to develop scenarios for future European migrations rooted in an in-depth analysis of the evolution of underlying migration drivers.

Developmental drivers of migration

While the question “why do people migrate?” seems easy to answer at first sight, the migration realities on the ground show the need for a more complex answer. On the one hand, it seems reasonable to assume that most people migrate hoping to find better conditions or opportunities, such as jobs, higher wages, safety, or freedom from violence or persecution. This is the implicit assumption underlying the ‘push-pull’ models, which see migration as the result of people making rational cost-benefit calculations. However, this type of basic explanations, while intuitively attractive, does not really help us to understand the complexity of real-world migration. For instance, why do most migrants not move between the poorest and wealthiest countries? Why do most migrants move from sparsely to densely populated areas? Why do many people never leave, or go back to, origin areas? Why do the wealthy and educated move more than the poor and the illiterate? And, last but not least, why do middle-income – and not the poorest – countries have the highest emigration rates?

Most migrants do not move from the poorest to the wealthiest countries, and the poorest countries tend to have lower levels of emigration than middle-income and wealthier countries.

Neoclassical migration theories assume that people migrate to maximise their income or wellbeing (Harris and Todaro 1970; Massey et al. 1998; Todaro 1969) and that migration is a (temporary) response to development ‘disequilibria’ between origin and destination countries, and will decline through a process of wage convergence. However, migration has been a constant factor in the history of humankind and is not a temporary by-product of capitalist development. Furthermore, the wage convergence assumption ignores how power asymmetries often sustain economic inequalities. Both push-pull and neoclassical models fail to provide insight into the social, economic and political processes...
that have generated the spatial wage and opportunity gaps to which migration is supposedly a response. It is therefore not surprising that the predictions of push-pull models and neoclassical theories are fundamentally at odds with what is seen in real life migration patterns. Indeed, most migrants do not move from the poorest to the wealthiest countries, and the poorest countries tend to have lower levels of emigration than middle-income and wealthier countries (de Haas 2010)(see figure 4).

This is consistent with ‘migration transition theories’ that argue that human and economic development initially lead to a general expansion of human mobility and migration (Skeldon 1990; Skeldon 1997; Zelinsky 1971). Analyses of historical and contemporary data show that human and economic development is initially associated with increasing emigration (Clemens 2014; de Haas 2010; Hatton and Williamson 1998; Skeldon 1997; Zelinsky 1971).

Figure 4. The non-linear relation between development and migration

In order to provide a more nuanced and realistic understanding of migration, it is useful to conceptualize migration as a function of people’s capabilities and aspirations to move within a given set of geographical opportunity structures (cf. Carling 2002; de Haas 2003). This provides a better understanding of how macro-structural change affects trends and patterns of migration in complex and sometimes counterintuitive ways. Processes of human and economic development typically expand people’s access to material resources,
social networks and knowledge. At the same time, improvements in infrastructure and transportation, which usually accompany development, make travel less costly and risky.

We can therefore say that development generally increases people's capabilities to migrate over increasingly larger distances, but it does not necessarily lead to migration. Migration aspirations depend on people's more general life aspirations, as well as their perceptions of life 'here' and 'there'. Both are subjective and likely to change under the influence of development processes. Improved access to information, images and lifestyles conveyed through education and media tend to broaden people's mental horizons, change their perceptions of the 'good life', and increase material aspirations. For instance, education often leads people to abandon agrarian lifestyles and make them aspire for a job in the service sector and a life in urban areas or abroad. For instance, a survey by International Labour Organization conducted in broad range of developing countries in the world showed that development and increasing education inevitably lead to people aspiring and searching for jobs in the urban sector within and outside their own countries (Elder et al. 2015).

The crux is that as long as aspirations in origin areas increase faster than the local opportunities, this will motivate people to migrate, primarily to towns and cities, but also to some extent abroad, particularly among the relatively better off (see de Haas 2014b). Once sizeable migrant communities have settled, social networks tend to reduce the costs and risks of migrating, with settled migrants frequently functioning as 'bridgeheads'. Theories on migrant networks and the formation of migration systems have taught us that this can make migration partly self-perpetuating (Choldin 1973; MacDonald and Macdonald 1964; Massey et al. 1998). The emergence of migration systems inextricably linking origin and destination societies through reciprocal flows of people, money, goods and ideas therefore tend to give migration processes their own momentum (Bakewell, de Haas and Kubal 2011; Fawcett 1989; Gurak and Caces 1992; Mabogunje 1970). If this coincides with migration-boosting development in origin societies countries, this can continue to facilitate migration over formally closed borders, often to the frustration of policy makers (Castles 2004). Thus, as societies get wealthier, overall emigration aspirations are likely to decrease because more people can imagine a future within their own country, while immigration is likely to increase. The transformation of Italy and Spain from major emigration countries to prime European destination countries since the 1970s are powerful examples of such migration transitions.

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3 Also known as material, social and human (or cultural) capital.
The emergence of migration systems that link origin and destination societies through reciprocal flows of people, money, goods and ideas tend to give migration processes their own momentum which can continue to facilitate migration even over formally closed borders.

The concept of migration transitions should be distinguished from the theory of the migration hump. While transition theory focuses on long-term associations between development and migration, the idea of the migration hump primarily refers to short to medium-term hikes in emigration in the wake of trade reforms and other economic shocks, such as free trade agreements or the post-communist reforms in Central and Eastern Europe and Russia. Within the context of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Martin (1993) and Martin and Taylor (1996) argued that adjustment to new economic market conditions is never instantaneous. While the negative impacts of liberalisation (particularly on unemployment in previously protected sectors such as agriculture) are often immediate; the expansion of production even in sectors potentially favoured by trade reforms always takes time (Martin and Taylor, 1996: 52). So, we can expect more short-term migration even if the long-term effects of free trade would be beneficial. The same analyses can be applied to the (temporary or long-term) economic dislocations caused by post-Communist reform (particularly in countries with weak social security systems) and the profound socioeconomic consequences of EU accession. This is an additional explanation of the largely temporary nature of post-accession emigration surges, which should therefore not be misinterpreted as a reverse migration transition on a structural level.

When countries gain a high-income status, emigration aspirations tend to decline and societies start to attract more immigrants. In the resulting migration transition, countries then transform from countries of net emigration to countries of net immigration. This non-linear relation between development and levels of emigration explains why middle-income (and even lower high income-) countries, such as Mexico, Morocco and the Philippines, tend to be the world’s most important emigration countries. For instance, the most important origin countries for EU-bound migration over the post-WWII era have typically been middle-income countries, initially on the western and southern fringes of Europe and, since the late 1960s, increasingly in North Africa, the Middle East and Eastern Europe (de Haas 2010). In comparison, migration from low-income countries such as in sub-Saharan Africa and South and South-East Asia has been relatively low.
Conversely, going against popular perceptions of a ‘continent on the move’, the best available data show that sub-Saharan Africa, which includes some of the poorest countries in the world, is the least migratory region of the world (Flahaux and De Haas 2016). In a 2014 study, Clemens (2014) has identified the average tipping point level at per capita incomes of USD 7,000-8,000 per year after which a country tends to transition from an emigration to an immigration country. While the exact level of this tipping point is highly dependent on other migration determinants, available evidence clearly confirms the idea that development in poor societies will boost rather than decrease migration. Based on this model, further economic and human development in countries like Morocco, Turkey and Ukraine is likely to decrease emigration levels, while development in relatively stable and economically growing countries in sub-Saharan Africa such as Ghana, Senegal, Nigeria and Ethiopia (and perhaps also Egypt in North Africa) is likely to increase their emigration potential.

Going against popular perceptions of a ‘continent on the move’, available data suggest that sub-Saharan Africa, which includes some of the poorest countries in the world, is the least migratory region of the world.

This implies that such countries may increasingly replace Maghreb and Middle Eastern countries as sources of lower skilled labour for EU countries as well as Maghreb and Middle Eastern countries. This effect may be further exacerbated by increasing education and skill levels among populations of recent sources of non-EU labour. Once incomes are above a certain absolute levels and families enjoy a certain level of social security, emigration propensities tend to go down. This may partly explain the lower-than-anticipated levels of intra-EU migration and the largely temporary nature of post-accession surges from CEE countries as well as the fact that EU enlargement and concomitant free mobility has not substituted migration of non-EU citizens to the EU. From a migration transition perspective, the emigration potential of accession countries is limited. This is becoming increasingly relevant in a context in which former accession countries such as Poland are becoming increasingly important migration destinations in their own right. This makes it likely that European core countries will continue to attract significant numbers of non-EU migrants in the short- to medium term, particularly under conditions of continued economic growth.
The emigration potential of accession countries is limited. Many are gradually becoming migration destinations in their own right. This makes it likely that European core countries will continue to attract significant numbers of non-EU migrants.

According to migration transition theory, any form of development in the poorest countries of the world is likely to lead to accelerating (rural-to-urban) internal migration as well as emigration, which defies dominant analyses in policy and many academic circles. This suggests that we need explanations that do not confuse individual factors or motivations to move (which, indeed, often refer to better opportunities) with macro-structural explanations of migration processes, which contradict push-pull models. This shows the need to rethink migration as a constituent part of broader development and change, rather than as the sum of individual responses to given geographical opportunity gaps.

**Policy implications**

Empirical and theoretical insights into ‘migration transitions’ imply that the ‘development instead of migration’ policies may have unintended effects. EU migration policies have acquired an ‘external dimension’ that combine the outsourcing of migration controls to origin and transit countries with ‘prevention policies’ (Boswell 2003, de Haas 2007) which aim to decrease migration through the promotion of origin country development. Also EU development policies (EU-Africa, EU-ACP Partnership agreements (EPAs), Regional Economic Partnership Agreements (REPAs)) often contain implicit or explicit migration prevention components. However, the assumptions under such ‘development instead of migration’ policies are fundamentally flawed, because evidence strongly suggests that development in low-income countries increases people’s capabilities and aspirations to migrate and is therefore likely to lead an increase in emigration, at least in the medium term. Under unfavourable conditions, trade, aid and remittances can be complements to, rather than substitutes for, migration also in the longer term, even in middle-income countries, as the examples of continuing migration from Mexico, Morocco and the Philippines illustrate (Castles and Delgado Wise 2008; Martin and Taylor 1996).

**The structure of labour demand in destination countries**

While development in origin countries tends to initially increase aspiration and capabilities to migrate, the structure of labour demand in destination countries is another fundamental migration driver. In general, the high correlation between business cycles (periods of high and low economic growth) (see figure 5 for Germany) and immigration in Europe suggests
that labour demand is probably the most important migration determinant, all the more because family migration is often a consequence of labour migration. This does not mean that factors such as conflict in origin countries do not play a role, but refugees only represent a fraction (generally not higher than 10 per cent) of all international migrants. While development in origin countries tends to enable people to migrate, the availability of concrete economic opportunities in destination countries generally determine whether prospective migrants will actually move. The implication for Europe is that patterns of future economic growth and labour market policies matter greatly in shaping future migration within, from and towards Europe.

Destination country labour demand is the most important migration determinant; all the more because family migration is often an indirect consequence of labour migration.

Figure 5. Germany’s GDP growth and net migration, 1970-2015

![Graph showing Germany's GDP growth and net migration, 1970-2015.](https://example.com/diagram.png)

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (migration), World Development Indicators, World Bank (GDP growth)

The segmentation of labour markets is a second key mechanism through which the growing structural complexity of labour markets drives migration, even in the absence of wage gaps and even in time of high unemployment. Dual (or segmented) labour market theory helps to understand how the demand for high- and low skilled immigrant labour is structurally embedded in modern economies and, particularly, to understand why migrants

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4 The post-2014 divergence in trends is largely explained by increasing immigration of asylum seekers.
find reason to pick up apparently unattractive jobs that native workers often refuse to do, and are motivated to go through tireless efforts to obtain documents or to pay smugglers to cross borders illegally in order to obtain these jobs.

Piore (1979), the pioneer of dual labour market theory, refuted the idea that immigration is caused by ‘push’ factors in origin societies (such as low wage or unemployment) or wage gaps, but by a chronic – and largely unavoidable – need for migrant workers in destination countries. He did not so much deny that wage gaps and unemployment may motivate individual migrants, but argued that such factors are insufficient conditions for migration to occur, because most people would not move in the absence of concrete job prospects. Piore argued that the built-in demand for migrant labour stems from the fundamental characteristics of modern industrialized economies: institutional obstacles to make low skilled jobs more attractive by increasing wages (also known as structural inflation); motivational problems preventing native workers to accept low-status, ‘dead-end’ jobs even if the pay is reasonable; decreasing domestic labour supply because of falling birth rates, increasing education and increased participation of women in the formal labour market (Castles, de Haas and Miller 2014; Massey et al. 1993). Social status considerations help to explain why native workers often shun arduous, low-status manual jobs at the bottom of occupational hierarchies even in case of high unemployment and reasonable pay.

The main reason why migrants are willing to do such jobs and do often not see them as degrading is because their primary social group of reference is their family and community of origin. As long as the primary social reference group remains the origin community, migrants are therefore less likely to be bothered by the low social status of jobs. However, with the passing of time, when migrants settle and family reunification occurs, origin community ties may wane and the prime reference group may shift to destination societies. Settled migrants as well as their offspring may therefore become less motivated to do such jobs, which can then create a demand for new groups of labour migrants.

From this perspective the structure of labour demand in destination societies is a prime migration driver. International labour migration seems to be mainly caused by structural demand within advanced economies for both high- and low skilled manual workers to carry out production tasks (e.g. assembly line work or garment manufacture) and to staff service enterprises (catering, cleaning, care, etc.). Changes in the economic and labour market structure of receiving countries drive the demand for a varied set of labour
skills. While demands of manufacturing industries in Europe were met by immigration of manual workers until the early 1970s, the growing importance of the tertiary sector has triggered a demand for both high- and low skilled service sector workers over recent decades. This explains why migration to the European Union has continued despite earlier expectations to the contrary and despite often significant levels of unemployment in destination countries.

Although many international corporations have partly or entirely moved production processes to low-wage countries, not all work processes, particularly in the service sectors and in construction, can be outsourced, mechanized or automatized (Castles, de Haas and Miller 2014). Domestic work, catering and intensive horticulture are key examples. Domestic supply for low skilled labour has dramatically decreased because many women have entered the formal labour market and youngsters continue education for much longer, which explains why employers have increasingly relied on low skilled migrant labour. Together with neoliberal economic policies, this has contributed to the emergence of a growing gulf between the highly paid core workers in finance, management and research (primary market), and poorly paid workers, often migrants (secondary market), who service their needs (Piore 1979; Sassen 2001).

Workers in the primary labour market are positively selected on the basis of human capital, but also often through membership of the majority ethnic group, male gender and, in the case of migrants, regular legal status. Conversely, those in the secondary labour market are disadvantaged by low levels of education (or a lack of recognition of their degrees and vocational training, as well as by gender, race, minority status and/or migrant legal status). The growth of the secondary sector has been reinforced through neoliberal reforms and the concomitant de-regularization of labour markets (Castles, de Haas and Miller 2014). Segmented labour market theory is also useful to understand how migration can continue even under circumstances of high unemployment and how the irregular status of migrants may actually serve employers’ interests, as it creates a vulnerable and usually docile workforce. From this perspective, public racism, xenophobic discourses by politicians and restrictive immigration policies not only fulfil a symbolic function (such as to rally voters), but actually serve to facilitate and legitimize exploitation of migrants on the labour market by depriving them of their basic rights.
Migration can continue even under circumstances of high unemployment and the irregular status of migrants may actually serve employers’ interests, as it creates a vulnerable and usually docile workforce.

From this perspective, rather than stopping migration, the primary effect of crackdowns on irregular migration and increased border and internal surveillance is to make undocumented workers more vulnerable to exploitation. For instance, in their study on the effects of internal surveillance on irregular migrants in northern Europe in relation to migrants’ counterstrategies to avoid detection and expulsion, Broeders and Engbersen (2007) found that the resulting cat and mouse game between the state and irregular migrants seems to result in a serious threat to migrants’ room to manoeuvre and further increases their dependence on informal, and increasingly criminal, networks and institutions.

Policy implications

The increasing structural complexity of labour markets and increasing levels of educational and occupational specialization in Europe tend to boost migration and non-migratory mobility (the latter particularly through commuting). Depending on economic and labour market policies, the degree of bifurcation of labour markets between a formal and an informal sector increases the likelihood of substantial immigration or irregular worker to work in low-status and arduous ‘migrant jobs’ in the informal sector. In more regulated labour markets with strong government oversight (for instance on labour laws) and welfare provisions, irregular migration (particularly of care workers) is likely to be more limited.

Labour market policies are therefore important indirect migration drivers since they affect the degree to which temporary recruitment of labour is possible, workers’ rights are protected, workplace abuses are prevented, and unauthorized labour is tolerated in practice. For instance, in the UK the level of labour inspections is much lower than in, for instance, Germany. Lax government oversight of such practices can lead to situations of irregular migration, overstaying or ‘semi-compliance’ (employment of migrants who are legally resident but working in violation of employment restrictions – (see Ruhs and Anderson 2010)) and semi-legality (Kubal 2013), which is very common, particularly in liberalized economic systems such as the UK (cf. Kubal 2012; Ruhs and Anderson 2010) or in countries with large informal sectors, such as in southern Europe (cf. Ambrosini 2001; Reyneri 2001).
There is a strong interconnection between migration and labour market policies. Ineffective implementation in one of the areas easily creates situations of ‘semi-compliance’.

For instance, a study on Polish and Albanian migrants in Italy found that immigration bureaucrats adopted inconsistent and highly personalized policy implementation, creating an informal social and institutional environment that on the one hand prevented migrants from regularizing their status, but on the other hand gave migrants the opportunity to improve their living and working conditions (Kosic and Triandafyllidou 2004b). This highlights the strong interconnections between migration and labour market policies, in which ineffective implementation easily creates situations of ‘semi-compliance’ (Ruhs and Anderson 2010).

The structure of labour demand and, hence, immigration is also affected by health care, childcare and elderly care policies. This explains why even severely crisis-hit countries like Italy and Spain continue to experience relatively high levels of immigration of care workers. In destination countries, welfare regimes also interact with migration by raising different demands for foreign labour. For instance, decreasing availability of Italian domestic workers in Italy and a rather unsuccessful expansion of public social services provided by the state in the 1960s-1970s, increased demand for foreign domestic workers. Additional regulations that made foreign domestic labour highly flexible made foreign workers an attractive source of domestic services provisions (Sciortino 2004). The Italian case also shows the interconnectedness between welfare provisions for elderly care and migration, whereby the reliance on foreign labour, once established, allows the state not to reform its elderly care system (Van Hooren 2008).

The increasing demand for care workers has been a major factor in explaining continued migration of regular and irregular (increasingly female) workers towards EU countries. The demand for such skills may further increase in the future.

Care policies seem to be particularly relevant as indirect migration drivers, since jobs like nursing, childcare, elderly care, cleaning and other domestic jobs can often not, or only partially, be automatized. The increasing demand for care workers has been a major factor in explaining continued migration of regular and irregular (increasingly female) workers towards EU countries, and the demand for such skills may further increase in the future.
However, the level and structure of this labour market demand is likely to be affected by the level to which governments will provide subsidized provisions for child and elderly care. A low level or decrease in public funding is likely to increase demand for informal care workers, as this is already the case in southern Europe and the UK.

**Educational policies** affect the future domestic supply of skills, and, indirectly potential future skill scarcity. Because of labour market segmentation, high specialization levels and institutional constraints, these cannot automatically be solved by rising wages. In such cases, skill shortages are likely to create a demand for foreign workers and concomitant employers’ lobbies to allow or tolerate their immigration. A good example is the migration of health care workers (Martineau, Decker and Bundred 2004). For instance, already since its early days of existence the British National Health Service recruited foreign nurses and doctors from the British Caribbean and Africa (cf. Eastwood et al. 2005). This dependence on foreign health care workers partly results from, and may also perpetuate (in an interesting parallel with domestic and personal care workers in the Italian example) inadequate supply of UK-trained health care workers.

**Other drivers of migration and their policy relevance**

**Trade, agricultural and fisheries policies**

In order to assess the impacts of EU’s trade, agricultural and fisheries policies on employment of workers, artisans, peasants and fishers in origin countries, it is important to look beyond national averages such as ‘GDP growth’. Average levels of GDP conceal large differences across countries in terms of income inequality and do not take into consideration levels of employment in different economic sectors. Theoretically, income inequality has ambiguous effects on migration propensities. While it may increase migration aspirations amongst the lower income groups, lower incomes may deprive people from the capabilities to migrate, particularly across borders, in which case they become ‘involuntarily immobile’ (see also Carling 2002). By contrast, if inequality and average income levels increases simultaneously, this might boost development-driven emigration hikes.⁵

For instance, cheap food imports resulting from free trade agreements may put peasants and small farmers out of business, parallel to the effects of NAFTA (cf. Otero 2011; ⁵ Theoretically, countries with high levels of income inequality should be relatively attractive for skilled migrants (as they can expect to earn higher incomes and pay lower taxes) while countries with more compressed wage structures should be more attractive for lower skilled migrants. However, this has never been proven empirically and depends on the interaction with other migration drivers.)
This also suggests that the EU’s Common Agricultural Policies (CAPs), which subsidize European agricultural production and make it more difficult for non-EU farmers to compete in international markets, have important indirect effect in undermining peasants’ livelihoods in origin countries. This may indirectly encourage them to migrate to cities or abroad to search for a better living.

**Agricultural Policies and fisheries agreements, which make it more difficult for non-EU peasants to compete in international markets and for small-scale fishers to make a living can motivate people to emigrate.**

Similar indirect, but potentially important, links exist between the fisheries agreements with third countries in North and West Africa and migration dynamics. For instance, in 1979 Senegal signed a fisheries agreement with the European Community which granted rights and established fees for EU vessels to fish in Senegalese waters. By the 1990s, a general overexploitation of fish stocks was observed (Binet, Failler and Thorpe 2012), which has at least partly been linked to overfishing by industrial trawlers linked to the European Union as well as to China and Russia (LaFraniere 2008). Although Senegal stopped signing fisheries agreements with the EU in 2006, in 2010-2012 the Senegalese government allegedly granted fishing licenses to European and Russian fishing vessels and in 2015, the EU and Senegal signed a Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement that allowed up to 38 EU boats to fish in Senegalese waters for a payment of EUR8.69 million by the EU to Senegal. As earning a living from fishing has become increasingly difficult, artisan fishermen are resorting to take longer and more costly journey to faraway fishing grounds, while some of them have turned towards irregular migration, either as providers of transport or as migrants themselves (Binet, Failler and Thorpe 2012). Curiously, as fishers migrated irregularly to the Canaries, the Senegalese government was granted European funds in an attempt at reintegrating young repatriated (deported) Senegalese migrants into local rural development programs (Binet, Failler and Thorpe 2012: 10). Although it would be misleading to attribute increasing emigration mainly to such factors, they seem to have further encouraged emigration in addition to other factors such as increasing education, infrastructure and urbanization.

**Welfare and social security**

As already illustrated on the case of migrant domestic workers, welfare provisions and social security provisions may affect migration in complex ways. On the destination country level, there is an extensive literature on the ‘welfare magnet’, the idea that countries with
generous welfare systems attract a higher number of, particularly lower skilled, migrants. There is no solid evidence to support this hypothesis (Giulietti 2014; Gordon and Handler 1999; Kurekova 2013; Levine and Zimmerman 1999; UNDP 2009). In comparison, there is a lack of studies that examine the potential role of welfare provision and social security in origin countries in retaining migrants. According to the New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) theory (Stark 1991; Taylor 1999) which argues that migration in poor countries is part of risk-diversifying household strategies, such factors should have an emigration-dampening effect (cf. Massey et al. 1993). The few studies that have examined this indeed seem to suggest that welfare provisions (such as income transfers, access to public health care and education) can indeed retain potential emigrants. The historical study by Khoudour-Casteras (2008) and more recent work by Kurekova (2013) (on migration from Central and Eastern European EU accession countries) and Mahendra (forthcoming) (on Indonesian and global migration data) seem to confirm this idea. Social security policies therefore have a considerable potential to affect migration indirectly.

**Studies that examined the role of welfare provision and social security in origin countries in retaining migrants suggest that welfare provisions (such as income transfers, access to public health care and education) can retain potential emigrants, particularly in the short term.**

**Education**

Education is an important motivation for and a driver of migration (cf. Elder et al. 2015; Levy and Wadycki 1974; Schewel 2014). Rising levels of education typically go along with increasingly complex divisions of labour and the geographical expanse of labour markets. While this increases overall levels of migratory and non-migratory mobility in societies, the extent to which this increases internal and international migration depends on opportunities in region and countries of origin. Education also tends to increase people’s material and other life aspirations, which can be an additional explanation for the paradox of increasing emigration under conditions of rapid development, particularly if there is an increasing gap between education-driven rising aspirations and the availability of jobs that can match those aspirations. This is often the case of middle-income countries experiencing a ‘youth bulge’.

**Education tends to increase people’s material and other life aspirations, which can be an additional explanation for increasing emigration under conditions of rapid development.**
Infrastructure and technological change

Infrastructure development and technological change have theoretically ambiguous impacts on the movement of people. Although it is often assumed that technological progress increases migration, easier transportation and communication may enable people to commute or work from home, while outsourcing and trade may also partly reduce the need to migrate. In modern times, technological progress has certainly boosted non-migratory mobility – such as commuting, tourism and business travel – but its impact on residential migration is rather ambiguous. The idea that technology may also allow people to stay and that non-migratory mobility may partly take away the need for migrating was already raised by Zelinsky (1971) and may also be confirmed by decreasing levels of internal migration in countries such as Japan, the United States and the Netherlands (see figure 6) as well as comparatively low levels of intra-EU migration. On the other hand, such declining internal migration tendencies may indicate the exhaustion of traditional rural domestic sources of low skilled labour, which may partly reinforce the (growing) demand for foreign labour. However, depending on policies and technological progress, labour shortages may also prompt further automation of production and services.

Technological progress has certainly boosted non-migratory mobility but its impacts on residential migration are rather ambiguous as it may also partly reduce the need to migrate.
Political freedoms, conflict and violence
Intuitively, political oppression, conflict and violence should lead to increased (refugee and other) emigration. However, from a theoretical point of view the effects are much more ambiguous. While it seems sensible to argue that authoritarianism, repression, violence and overall insecurity increase migration aspirations, the same factors may also deprive people from the capabilities of moving or make them prefer to stay in order to protect family and community members (de Haas 2010). Authoritarian states also seem to have a greater capacity to allow large-scale immigration of migrant workers while giving them few rights, because they can ignore human rights as well as popular demands for less immigration (Ruhs and Martin 2008; Ruhs 2013). This can explain the frequent absence of a strong statistical correlation between the level of political authoritarianism and emigration levels and a positive effect of authoritarianism on levels of immigration (cf. de Haas 2010). For instance, wealthy member countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council tend to combine extremely high levels of immigration with high levels of authoritarianism. On the other hand, despite, or as a result of, decades of political oppression, a country like Ethiopia had one of the lowest levels of international emigration amongst African countries.
High levels of authoritarianism do not necessarily lead to more emigration or lower immigration. Authoritarianism can increase migration aspirations but can at the same time decrease migration capabilities. Authoritarian states also seem to have a greater capacity to allow large-scale immigration of migrant workers while denying them various rights, because they can ignore human rights as well as popular demands for less immigration.

It seems rather a combination of violent conflict and the absence or collapse of central state power that tends to lead to high levels of (refugee and other) emigration. This corroborates that foreign and military policies are key migration drivers, particularly with regards to future refugee migration. The EU and its member states have taken a rather pragmatic approach in collaborating with ‘strongmen’ and autocratic governments in the Middle East and Africa who routinely violate human rights of their citizens and foreigners on their territory. While such policies are often defended from the viewpoint that these governments provide stability, the long term consequences of such policies can be adverse as the long-term consequences of decades of mounting frustrations among new generations of disenfranchised, unemployed and politically excluded youth can lead to violent eruptions and, potentially, civil War, as the Arab Spring, and particularly, the case of Syria have recently illustrated (cf. Fargues 2017). For instance, it should be thought through what the long-term consequences may be of the *de facto* support by EU states to the military regime in Egypt. Also support by EU member states for military interventions in countries like Iraq and Afghanistan or in the battle against ISIS has contributed to displacement and refugee movements. The long-term humanitarian interest to prevent new conflict and displacement could be an incentive for the EU to increase its efforts to support equitable development, encourage democratic governance and actively prevent conflict in Africa and the Middle East.

**Demographic structure and population size**

Demographic factors are often assumed to have a large effect on migration but empirical evidence has struggled to find a direct link (de Haas 2010). This is because the effect of demographic factors is largely indirect, and mediated by other economic and political factors. We actually do not see the highest emigration propensities in the countries with the fastest population growth, but in countries where birth rates have been falling sharply, such as Maghreb countries and Turkey. Young adults tend to have a high migration propensity, and middle-income countries that go through economic transitions often also go through
demographic transitions marked by rapidly falling birth rates. In such countries, past high fertility is translated in a 'youth bulge’, a high proportion of relatively well-educated young adults, which often find their high aspirations frustrated by sluggish growth, high inequality and political oppression. This can further spark increasing emigration alongside development processes. However, this is not an automatic link, as whether people will migrate will eventually depend on local opportunities and opportunities abroad. Some countries with a large youth bulge (e.g., Gulf countries) see low emigration and some countries with ageing populations (e.g., many CEE countries) see high emigration. It is thus important not to fall into the trap of deterministic, Malthusian thinking.

The effect of demographic factors is largely indirect, and mediated by other economic and political factors. The highest emigration propensities are not typical for the countries with the fastest population growth, but for those countries where birth rates have been falling sharply and which face a large ‘youth bulge’.

Large countries with larger population tend to contain more migration within their own borders. This creates the ‘statistical artefact’ that, if we control for other migration determinants, there is a negative correlation between population size and emigration and immigration rates (de Haas 2010). Countries with small population sizes are less likely to have urban agglomerations where particularly skilled workers tend to find employment. This increases the likelihood that what is essentially rural-urban migration involves border crossing. This partly explains that large countries like China, India or Nigeria have actually very low emigration compared to their total population: most migration is contained within borders. Small states such as Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Belgium are almost bound to have high levels of ‘migratory interaction’ with other countries. This is somehow analogous to economic growth in larger countries such as the US and Germany, which is primarily dependent on domestic demand while trade is a much more important factor for smaller countries. However, despite their large population sizes, countries like Germany and the United Kingdom have comparable levels of immigration and immigrant diversity to those of smaller countries such as the Netherlands and Belgium.

The effects and effectiveness of migration policies
While migration policies are obviously an important migration determinant, the effectiveness of such policies is highly contested: Are borders largely ‘beyond control’ (see
Bhagwati 2003) or are migration policies rather effective? How do migration regulations shape migrants’ strategies? To what extent are origin and destination states able to ‘steer’ migration, and what limits the power of governments and states to ‘manage’ migration? Under what circumstances are they successful, and under which circumstances do they miss their target, or are even counterproductive, for instance by encouraging irregular migration, smuggling, interrupting circulation and pushing migrants into permanent settlement? These are crucial questions to answer if governments wish to make migration policies more effective while protecting the human rights and safety of migrants and refugees.

Until recently, surprisingly few studies actually tried to measure the effects of migration policies, partly as a result of the absence of adequate data on migration and policies. One of the few exceptions is Hatton (2009), who investigated the determinants of asylum migration and concluded that the decline of asylum applications over the 2000s in the industrialized countries of Europe, North America and Australasia was largely caused by the decline of violence and terror in origin countries, and that more restrictive policies account for only about a third of the decline in applications since 2001. In another study explaining increasing migration to the UK since the 1970s, Hatton (2005) found that besides improved economic performance of the UK relative to overseas destinations as well as immigration policies at home and abroad, rising economic inequality had an even larger effect on increasing immigration, which is consistent with the idea that ‘neoliberal’ economic policies increase the demand for migrant labour in segmented labour markets.

Until recently, surprisingly few studies actually tried to measure the effects of migration policies, partly as a result of the absence of adequate data on migration and policies.

This corroborates the importance of looking beyond migration policies if governments want to be more effective in influencing trends and patterns of migration. Recent studies have quantified migration policy effects using bilateral (country-to-country) migration data covering large ranges of countries and long time periods (Czaika and Haas 2016; Mayda 2010; Ortega and Peri 2013). de Haas (2011) identified four ‘substitution effects’ which can limit the effectiveness of immigration and emigration restrictions: 1) **spatial substitution** through the diversion of migration via other legal or irregular routes or destinations; 2) **categorical substitution** through a reorientation towards other legal or illegal channels; 3) **inter-temporal substitution** affecting the timing of migration such as ‘now or never migration’ in the expectation or fear of future tightening of policies; and 4) **reverse**
flow substitution if immigration restrictions interrupt circulation by discouraging return migration and encouraging permanent settlement, making the effect of entry restrictions on net migration and the growth of migrant communities ambiguous (see de Haas 2011).

Spatial substitution effects
Spatial substitution effects may occur through the diversion of migration to countries with less restrictive regulations or towards new, often more dangerous migration routes. Several studies have indicated the existence of spatial substitution effects for asylum, family and irregular migration to Europe (Grütters 2003). The experience of 25 years of failed attempts to stop trans-Mediterranean boat migration is a case in point (de Haas 2008). Until 1991, Moroccans did not need a visa to enter southern European countries such as Spain and Italy. The introduction of visas under ‘Schengen’ pressure to establish common border policies was the onset of irregular boat migration. When Spanish coastguards started to patrol more intensively along the southern Spanish coast and the Spanish exclave cities of Ceuta and Melilla on North African soil, this led to a diversification of maritime crossing points and an unintended increase in the EU areas that must be monitored to ‘combat’ irregular migration.

In reaction to intensified border patrolling in the Strait of Gibraltar, Maghrebi and sub-Saharan migrants started to cross the sea from more eastern places on the Moroccan coast to mainland Spain; from the Tunisian coast to Italian islands such as Lampedusa; from Libya to Italy and Malta; from Algeria to Spain. After 1999, migrants in Morocco have increasingly moved southward to the Western Sahara in order to get to the Canary Islands.

European pressure on North African states to patrol their own southern borders and ‘crack down’ on irregular migration led to further diversification of overland migration routes through the Sahara as well as maritime crossing points (Barros et al. 2002; Boubakri 2004; Bredeloup and Pliez 2005; Carling, Gallagher and Horwood 2015; Collyer 2016; Perkowski 2016; van Reekum 2016). Increasing surveillance in the Strait of Gibraltar and elsewhere has led to professionalization of smuggling methods, with smugglers using larger and faster custom-made boats and zodiacs instead of fishing boats (Carling 2007). There has also been an increase in the number of minors and pregnant women attempting to cross, who are generally more difficult to expel (Barbulescu and Grugel 2016). The huge length of land and maritime borders make it virtually impossible to prevent people from crossing.
The introduction of visas under ‘Schengen’, more intense border patrols and increased European pressure on North African states to patrol their own southern borders together led to diversification of both overland migration routes and maritime crossing points.

Categorical substitution effects
Categorical substitution effects may occur due to a reorientation towards other legal or illegal channels when entry through one particular channel becomes more difficult. For instance, the lack of immigration channels for low skilled labour migrants has compelled migration through family, asylum or student migration channels by people who basically migrated to work (Harris 2002; Massey 2004). This has happened after European countries decreased opportunities for low skilled labour immigration from former 'guest-worker' countries (Castles 2004; Czaika and Hobolth 2014; van Liempt and Doomernik 2006; Van Liempt 2007). A similar categorical substitution happened when southern European countries introduced visas for Maghreb nationals, which heralded a shift from labour to family migration. Restrictions can also divert migration in irregular channels. In a study of migration to 29 European states in 2001-2011 period, Czaika and Hobolth (2014) found that while restrictive asylum policies do reduce the number of persons claiming protection, a ten per cent increase in asylum raises the number of (apprehended) irregular migrants by about three per cent. According to these estimates, a ten per cent increase in short-stay visa rejections led to a five per cent increase in irregular migration.

The lack of immigration channels for low skilled labour migrants has compelled migration through family, asylum or student migration channels by people who basically migrated to work.

Inter-temporal substitution effects
Inter-temporal substitution or ‘now or never migration’ may occur if migration surges in the expectation of a future tightening of migration regulations. For instance, when the Federal Republic of Germany tried to discourage family reunification in the late 1970s, family migration to the Federal Republic increased, since many migrants feared that, eventually, family reunification might be forbidden completely (Entzinger 1985). There was a surge in West Indian migration to the UK before 1962, when restrictions were introduced with the Commonwealth Immigrants Act (Peach 1968). The long-term effect of such restrictions may thus be limited or even become counterproductive, if the long-term effect is outperformed
by the pre-measure surge in inflows. For instance, the Netherlands government pushed for Surinamese independence in 1975 primarily because it was seen as a way to prevent migration. However, this prompted about 40 per cent of the Surinamese population to emigrate before visas were introduced in 1980 (van Amersfoort 2011; Vezzoli 2015).

The ‘now or never migration’ may occur if migration surges in the expectation of a future tightening of migration regulations. The long-term effect of such restrictions may thus be limited if it is outperformed by the pre-measure surge in inflows.

Not only impending migration restrictions, but also migration liberalizations can generate temporary migration surges, which may be partly driven by a ‘now or never’ mentality caused by uncertainty whether the measure is only temporary. We have already mentioned the post-Berlin Wall and post-EU accession migration surges. Another example is the implementation by Ecuador of universal visa freedom in 20 June 2008, which was partially reversed on 1 December 2008 and 3 September 2010 in partial reaction to the 28-30% on average increase of immigration from newly visa-exempted countries, particularly from China (Acosta Arcarazo and Freier 2015; Freier 2013). As the EU enlargement experiences shows, such increases tend to be temporary, particularly when potential migrants gain trust that borders will remain open, stilling ‘beat the ban’ panic reactions.

Reverse flow substitution effects
Reverse flow substitution effects occur if immigration restrictions decrease return migration, interrupt circulation and push migrants into permanent settlement. This is probably the most important but often ignored downside of immigration restrictions. This phenomenon has been described for Turkish and Moroccan ‘guest worker’ migration to north-west Europe, where many temporary workers ended up settling after the post 1973 recruitment ban (Castles, de Haas and Miller 2014; Entzinger 1985). It can also explain why immigration restrictions imposed by southern European countries for non-EU citizens in the 1990s and 2000s interrupted circulation and accelerated the permanent settlement and rapid growth of immigrant communities consisting of workers and their families from countries such as Morocco, Tunisia, Senegal and Ecuador. For instance, before 1991 many Moroccans travelled back and forth to Spain to work as seasonal and temporary workers. The introduction of visa requirements in 1991 set in motion the phenomenon of illegal boat migration, and triggered permanent settlement of Moroccan labourers in Spain, which subsequently triggered large-scale family migration, and the rapid growth of the
Moroccan migrant population to over 700,000 in the 2000s (Cohen and Berriane 2011; de Haas 2014; Huntoon 1998).

**Immigration restrictions tend to simultaneously decrease immigration and return migration, interrupt circulation and push migrants into permanent settlement.**

If migration restrictions decrease inflows but simultaneously also decrease return flows, their effect on net inflows becomes ambiguous. This was confirmed by a recent formal quantitative test of reverse substitution effects (Czaika and de Haas 2014), which found robust evidence that visas simultaneously decrease immigration and emigration from and to particular origin countries. It also found that, on average, the immigration-reducing effect of visa restrictions was largely or entirely counterbalanced by their emigration (return) reducing effect. The study also found that while liberalizing measures often have immediate effects, the effects of restrictions may be smaller and tend to take more time to materialize. Therefore, migration policy change in a liberal direction does not have the reverse (‘mirror’) effects of a policy change in the opposite, more restrictive, direction. After the introduction of visa requirements, levels of immigration decline only gradually, and even after a decade immigration and emigration are still at significantly higher levels compared to the long-term average levels of migration in visa-required migration corridors (Czaika and de Haas 2014). The strong migration-facilitating function of migrant networks (Beine, Docquier and Özden 2011; Fawcett 1989) largely explains these lagged, partial and sometimes wholly counterproductive effects of entry restrictions.

**Studies show that decrease in immigration from particular origin countries following the introduction of visa can be counterbalanced by reduction in return rates to those same countries.**

Conversely, migration movements seem to respond almost immediately to the removal of visas, with levels of immigration and emigration reaching the long-term average levels of visa-free corridors after one to three years, after which they temporarily ‘overshoot’ these levels for a number of years (Czaika and de Haas 2014). This may indicate

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6 This study was part of the ERC-funded DEMIG (Determinants of International Migration) project, which drew on an unprecedented dataset containing longitudinal bilateral (country-to-country) migration data reported by 38 (predominantly OECD) countries on immigration and emigration from and to about 190 origin countries between 1973 and 2011 (covering over 90,000 bilateral dyad-years).
the existence of temporal substitution effects upon visa removal, with some people engaging in ‘now or never’ migration out of fear of a reintroduction migration restrictions (see also Acosta Arcarazo and Freier 2015), but also because people who had aspired to migrate for years but were blocked in situations of ‘involuntary immobility’ (cf. Carling 2002) will now seize this opportunity.

**Policy implications**

Scientific evidence shows the following migration policy paradox: While migration barriers can create an obsession with migrating amongst young people who feel deprived of their mobility rights, attitudes towards migration in countries or territories with open access to Europe, tend to be more relaxed, emigration tends to be at lower levels and more circular. While internal liberalization of mobility has increased intra-EU circular migration, ‘external closure’ through the imposition of visa regimes for non-EU citizens and accompanying measures such as carrier sanction and intensified border surveillance has interrupted circulation by pushing non-EU migrants into permanent settlement (see also Castles, de Haas and Miller 2014). This resonates with the study on Caribbean migration by Vezzoli (2015), who found that emigration rates have not only been high but have grown exponentially in countries who lost free migration rights because of independence from their European colonizers. At the same time, migration is decelerating in countries which have never gained independence, such as French Guiana and the Dutch and French Antilles (see Flahaux and Vezzoli 2017 Forthcoming).

**Mobility partnerships and other migration deals with third countries should be preceded by an analysis of potential trade-offs and should carefully assess potential unintended migration effects.**

The frequent occurrence of substitution effects highlights that collaboration in migration and asylum policies between the EU and non-EU states, such as through mobility partnerships (e.g. Morocco, Mauritania) or other ‘migration deals’ (such as the one with Turkey) can potentially affect migration trends, but their implementation should be preceded by a careful analysis of the trade-offs involved. These can generate unintended migration (‘substitution’) effects such as encourage smuggling, irregular migration, divert migration routes, push migrants into permanent settlement or prevent their return. There can also be potential backlash and long-term reputational effects when migrants and refugees are used as a negotiation chip with autocratic regimes. A particular case in point are the migration deals concluded with Gaddafi’s Libya and his subsequent involvement in
the ‘fight against irregular’ migration that emboldened his position and caused increased suffering amongst migrants and refugees (see Paoletti 2010).

Conclusions and key messages

Governments should look beyond migration policies if they want to increase their ability to effectively regulate migration. The structure of labour demand is a key migration driver.

This study highlighted that the future of European migration primarily depends on factors that, at first sight, may seem to have not much to do with migration. This also means that governments should look beyond migration policies if they want to increase their ability to effectively regulate migration. Structural changes in European societies such as economic growth, population ageing, increasing education, increasing formal workforce participation of women, increasing specialization and the segmentation of labour market, explain why Europe has transformed from an emigration to an immigration region. Labour market forces, in particular, explain the continuous demand for EU and non-EU migrant labour and also explain why politicians often respond to pressure by employers to facilitate legal immigration. Although this demand fluctuates with business cycles, it is important to emphasize that the demand for migrant labour is structural. This means that this demand can be primarily influenced through economic, social and labour market policies, as these affect the future structure of labour demand.

Development in origin countries will initially increase people’s capabilities and aspirations to migrate.

As for the origin country causes of migration, there is increasing evidence that development through increasing income, education, media and infrastructure in low-income countries is initially likely to increase people’s capabilities and aspirations to migrate. Economic and human development in middle-income countries may decrease emigration tendencies, and such transformations may already be underway in Turkey and countries such as Morocco and Tunisia. Main origin countries may well change, particularly if important origin countries in the Maghreb and Turkey become destination countries in their own right. This may cause a further south- and eastward shift of the European ‘labour frontier’, possibly causing increasing labour and family migration from countries such as Egypt and West African countries. However, the extent to which this will happen primarily depends on future economic growth and labour market dynamics in European destination countries. It also depends on the potentially destabilizing effects of EU’s external trade and foreign policies,
for instance on the viability of the agricultural sectors and peasant livelihoods in non-EU countries. So, while immigration is likely to continue as long as some level of growth in the EU persists, the real question is therefore where future migrants will come from and go to. This will ultimately depend on political stability, economic policy and concomitant structural shifts in labour market dynamics in both origin and destination countries.

Migration policies overall are quite effective but there are limits to what they can achieve.

Does the evidence show that migration policies fail and borders are beyond control? The answer is no. In Europe, the political media attention for Mediterranean ‘boat migration’ and irregular border crossings easily create a distorted and misleading image that irregular migration is now the rule rather than the exception. This contributes to an image of a general migration policy failure. In fact, most policies are quite effective. After all, the large majority of migrants move within the law and irregular migration is a relatively limited phenomenon. The best available evidence suggest that less than one out of ten migrants in Europe has no residency status (cf. Düvell 2009), although this proportion varies across countries.

The evidence rather shows that there are clear limits to what policies can achieve. Immigration is neither a flow that can be turned on and off like a tap nor are admission policies generally designed to do so. After all, modern immigration policies aim to influence the selection and timing of migration rather than volumes of migration (Bjerre et al. 2014; de Haas, Natter and Vezzoli 2016). Through the implementation of sophisticated admission criteria with regards to employment and income immigration levels to most European countries tend to strongly correlate with business cycles. After all, in times of strong economic growth more migrants are likely to find jobs and thus obtain work permits. This shows the built-in economic logic of selective immigration policies. Much migration is directly and indirectly (much of family migration is a ‘derivative’ of the movement of workers) driven by labour demand. Contrary to popular beliefs, migration is not an uncontrolled phenomenon mainly driven by forces of poverty and violence in origin countries.

Migration policies need to be coherent with economic, social and other policies to avoid unintended consequences.

However, if the aims of migration policies are incoherent with (or juxtaposed to) the migration implications of economic, social and other policies, migration policies are unlikely
to be very effective, or may actually have unintended, often counterproductive effects. For example, immigration restrictions and border patrolling can lock temporary labour migrants up on the European side of the border, discourage their return and stimulate their permanent settlement. The 25 years of European efforts to seal off its Mediterranean border ever since Spain and Italy introduced visas for North Africans around 1991 serve as an illustration of this dynamic. It encouraged irregular migration (primarily of prospective workers, but recently also of asylum seekers), created a market for smuggling and increased death toll. This has led to a diversification of terrestrial and maritime crossing points and an expansion of the ‘area to patrol’ by border control agencies, which now spans the entire Mediterranean, parts of the Western Atlantic coasts and the Sahara Desert (Collyer 2008; Crawley et al. 2016; de Haas 2007; Hamood 2006). This shows that, to a significant extent, the root causes of such migrations lie beyond the reach of migration policies, and this highlights the need to root our understanding of such migrations in deeper transformations taking place in Europe and origin countries.

**Settled migrant communities create self-perpetuating network effects and limit the power of migration policies in steering future migration flows.**

Policies that ignore migration realities on the ground may fulfil an important symbolic and electoral function, but tend to be ineffective, particularly in the longer term. The evidence also suggests that governments and politicians should be careful not to re-create ‘guest-worker’ illusions if they want to attract temporary workers: once a certain number of migrants have settled at the destination and viable communities have formed, restrictions are unlikely to stop migration, and may actually accelerate migration and permanent settlement. So, governments have the biggest influence on migration at the start of the migration process. The more settled migrant communities are the more self-perpetuating network effects kick in and governments loose effective power in ‘steering’ migration. Particularly on the short- to medium run, the net effect of restrictions seems to be that more migrants decide to stay on the safe side of the border and to regroup their families, leading to accelerated growth of immigrant communities, which is often the opposite of what policies are meant to achieve. This migration policy paradox creates significant dilemmas for migration policy makers.

**More open migration systems tend to produce circulatory movements.**

The biggest influence of policies seems to be in whether to open a legal migration channel or not. Once it is open, and migration systems and migrant networks have been established, it
is very difficult to stop people moving through established migration corridors, and migration restrictions, if introduced without careful consideration of their effects, may turn out to be counterproductive. The evidence does also not suggest that that governments cannot and should not control migration, but it rather shows that liberal immigration regimes do not necessarily lead to mass migration and that ill-conceived migration policies can be counter-productive. Free migration is often strongly circulatory, as we see with intra-EU migration. The more restrictive entry policies are the more migrants want to stay. Such unintended effects create fundamental dilemmas for policy makers, which have to balance the wish to control migration with the wish to prevent substitution effects taking over and potentially weakening their ability to monitor and influence population movements.

**More research is needed into the effects of 'non-migration' policies on migration, especially to better understand the links between trade agreements, socioeconomic and labour market policies and migration patterns.**

This analysis also exposes the biggest gap in empirical knowledge: While the bulk of migration research has focused on analysing migration trends and the effects of migration policies, there is hardly any empirical work that explores the ways in which 'non-migration' policies such as macro-economic, social security, labour market, care, education, trade and foreign policies affect migration indirectly. Such research is urgently needed, in order to improve our understanding of what seems one of the biggest paradoxes of liberalization: The political desire for less migration seems incompatible with the trend towards economic liberalization and desire to maximize economic growth. The erosion of labour rights, the rise of flexible work and the privatization of formerly state-owned companies in recent decades have significantly increased the demand for migrant labour in Europe. The heated migration debates in Britain and the U.S. – both strongly liberalized market economies facing persistently high levels of immigration – seem powerful illustrations of this 'liberalization paradox'.

From this perspective, the most effective way to regulate labour immigration seems to affect labour demand, through economic and trade policies and through enforcement of labour law to prevent irregular work. However, more research is needed to better understand the links between socioeconomic and labour market policies and migration patterns. Likewise, there is an urgent need for better research on the effects of trade agreements of the EU with third countries on peasants’ livelihoods and the knock-on effects
this may have on their migration. This highlights the importance of looking beyond migration policies. For instance, as the analyses of post-accession migration has shown, emigration patterns differ widely across the CEE countries, and the explanation of this should be partly sought into differences in wealth, political systems and social security in those countries. Likewise, levels and patterns of immigration differ across Western European countries, and explanations for this have to be sought beyond the domain of migration policies per se.
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Annex

Figure A1. North American migration to and from EU12

Source: DEMIG C2C database, see de Haas, Hein, Simona Vezzoli, and Maria Villares-Varela 2018

Figure A2. Asian migration to and from EU12

Source: DEMIG C2C database, see de Haas, Hein, Simona Vezzoli, and Maria Villares-Varela 2018
Figure A3. African migration to and from EU12

Source: DEMIG C2C database, see de Haas, Hein, Simona Vezzoli, and Maria Villares-Varela 2018

Figure A4. Latin American-Caribbean migration to and from EU12

Source: DEMIG C2C database, see de Haas, Hein, Simona Vezzoli, and Maria Villares-Varela 2018
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