Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
|Title:||Regulatory and ownership determinants of unbundling regime choice for European electricity transmission utilities|
|Authors:||MELETIOU ALEXIS; CAMBINI CARLO; MASERA MARCELO|
|Citation:||UTILITIES POLICY vol. 50 p. 13-25|
|Publisher:||ELSEVIER SCI LTD|
|Type:||Articles in periodicals and books|
|Abstract:||One of the fundamental provisions of the European electricity directives is the so-called unbundling of structures and functions. Vertical disintegration with Full Unbundling (ownership unbundling or independent system operation) is considered an important step toward electricity market restructuring. While Full Unbundling (FU) models appear to be the most prevalent, several European countries adhered solely to less stringent forms of unbundling. Using a dataset of the 35 major electricity transmission utilities in Europe, this study provides an econometric analysis to understand the individual effect of regulation and ownership structure on the decision to adopt more stringent unbundling regimes. The overall results show that incentive-based or hybrid regulatory schemes and private ownership, are associated with a higher probability that a country will opt for FU.|
|JRC Directorate:||Energy, Transport and Climate|
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.
Items in repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.