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|Title:||Fisheries Self-management under ITQs|
|Citation:||Marine Resource Economics vol. 22 no. 4 p. 373-390|
|Publisher:||MRE Foundation, Inc|
|Type:||Articles in periodicals and books|
|Abstract:||In spite of a successful introduction of individual transferable quotas in many fisheries, governments continue to intensively manage these fisheries. Setting and enforcing sensible fisheries management rules is, of course, crucial for a good economic performance of the fishing activity. On the other hand, it is well known that governments, due to fundamental problems of information and incentives, tend to be inefficient providers of services in general. Indeed, the fisheries management conducted by many governments has been found to be both ineffective and expensive. In this paper it is shown that that under an ITQ system, the holders of ITQs are well placed to conduct the necessary fisheries management functions themselves. Moreover, there are many indications that they are able to provide these services substantially more efficiently than the government. It is further shown that the ITQ holders are able to co-ordinate their interests with those of other users of fish stocks, such as recreational fishermen and conservationists, in an economically efficient manner.|
|JRC Institute:||Institute for the Protection and Security of the Citizen|
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