Title: Applying the PR&PP Methodology for a Qualitative Assessment of A Misuse Scenario in a Notional Generation IV Example Sodium Fast Reactor. Assessing Design Variations
Citation: Proceedings of Global 2009 p. 2421-2430
Publisher: Omnipress
Publication Year: 2009
JRC Publication N°: JRC50665
URI: https://www.sfen.fr/index.php/plain_site/global_2009
Type: Contributions to Conferences
Abstract: The Generation IV International Forum (GIF) Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PR&PP) Working Group has developed a methodology for the PR&PP evaluation of advanced nuclear energy systems. The methodology is organised as a progressive approach applying alternative methods at different levels of thoroughness as more design information becomes available and research improves the depth of technical knowledge. The GIF Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PR&PP) Working Group developed a notional sodium cooled fast neutron nuclear reactor, named the Example Sodium Fast Reactor (ESFR), for use in developing and testing the methodology. The ESFR is a hypothetical nuclear energy system consisting of four sodium-cooled fast reactors of medium size, co-located with an on-site dry fuel storage facility and a Fuel Cycle Facility with pyrochemical processing of the spent fuel and re-fabrication of new ESFR fuel elements. The baseline design is an actinide burner, with LWR spent fuel elements as feed material processed on the site. In the years 2007 and 2008 the GIF PR&PP Working Group performed a case study designed to both test the methodology and demonstrate how it can provide useful feedback to designers even during pre-conceptual design. The Study analysed the response of the entire ESFR system to different proliferation and theft strategies. Three proliferation threats were considered: Concealed diversion, Concealed Misuse and Abrogation. An overt theft threat was also studied. One of the objectives of the case study is to confirm the capability of the methodology to capture PR&PP differences among varied design configurations. To this aim Design Variations (DV) have been also defined corresponding respectively to a) a small variation of the baseline design (DV0), b) a deep burner configuration (DV1), c) a self sufficient core (DV2), and c) a breeder configuration (DV3). This paper builds on the approach followed for the qualitative assessment of the ESFR baseline design for a misuse scenario, and presents both the approach and the results of the assessment for the design variations DV0 and DV1. The results are then critically compared with those previously obtained for the baseline design and lessons learned are derived both on the system designs and on the methodology.
JRC Institute:Institute for the Protection and Security of the Citizen

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