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|Title:||EURATOM's contribution to the IAEA Safeguards by Design process|
|Authors:||SEVINI Filippo; PEERANI Paolo; JANSSENS Willem; COJAZZI Giacomo; BOELLA Maurizio; KOUTSOYANNOPOULOS Christos; CHARE Peter; KILLEEN Thomas|
|Citation:||Proceedings of INMM 51st annual meeting p. 1-8|
|Publisher:||INMM - Institute of Nuclear Materials Management|
|Type:||Articles in periodicals and books|
|Abstract:||Besides the implementation of Integrated Safeguards which allows a more efficient use of inspection resources, other actions can be taken to ease safeguards implementation, such as the ¿Safeguards by Design¿ (SBD) process, which consists in taking into account very early in the design phase the features that facilitate the implementation of international safeguards. The overall safeguarding process can thus be made more effective and efficient, with benefits to all the involved stake-holders. The SBD process requires an understanding of proliferation resistance by designers and operators as well as its underlying principles, with an aim of improving the procedures of interaction between SSAC (or RSAC) and IAEA. The resulting design of a facility is indeed an optimal combination of Safety, Security and Safeguards requirements; expected benefits; reduction of costs and reduction of associated risks. As theoretical support, relevant studies and methodologies are produced by the Proliferation Resistance & Physical Protection Working Group of GEN-IV, including the safeguardability concept, and IAEA INPRO. In this context, at the end of 2008, the IAEA launched a new task on ¿Guidance for Designers and Operators and Measures to facilitate the implementation of Safeguards at Future Nuclear Cycle Facilities¿, with contributions by EURATOM and other MS Support Programmes. Besides an always present aim of improving safeguards implementation, the main driving force for this activity is the foreseen growth in the number of nuclear power generating facilities, and the corresponding increase in other fuel cycle activities, such as fuel fabrication and enrichment. However, at the same time, the IAEA is not expected to see its resources increase at the same rate, and will have to face the retirement of experienced inspectors. This paper will develop on the contents of the first high level guidelines document of the IAEA Safeguards by Design series provided by the EURATOM¿s Support Programme and on a view on the next steps.|
|JRC Institute:||Nuclear Safety and Security|
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