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|Title:||Some ESARDA Parties' experience with Additional Protocol export control declarations|
|Authors:||SEVINI Filippo; HAMALAINEN M.; VINCZE A.; DAVAINIS M.; RIVILLAS FERNANDEZ S.; HILDINGSSON L.|
|Citation:||Proceedings of ESARDA 33rd Annual Meeting - Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Material Management, Budapest, Hungary, 16-20 May 2011 p. 1-9|
|Publisher:||Publications Office of the European Union|
|Type:||Articles in periodicals and books|
|Abstract:||The Additional Protocol to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/540) foresees a series of provisions which are the basis for Integrated Safeguards. For this reason, it is the legal bridge between traditional and strengthened safeguards, where export control officially appears as an additional barrier to proliferation. Besides the introduction of short notice or unannounced random inspections, and complementary accesses, the AP also requires States to provide the IAEA with declarations concerning the presence of any of the fifteen nuclear fuel cycle activities listed in Annex I, as well as a summary of exports of items listed in Annex II, derived from the Nuclear Suppliers Group trigger list. Information about imports is instead due only upon specific request by the IAEA. The paper will present the experience of some ESARDA members in complying with AP requirements for export control, outlining the possible issue of technical, information and timeliness nature, providing some suggestions for improvements. The paper will also address the significance of export control to the Information Driven Safeguards.|
|JRC Institute:||Institute for Transuranium Elements|
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