European Commission

JRC SCIENCE FOR POLICY REPORT

Immigration and trust in the EU

A territorial analysis of voting behaviour and attitudes



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

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Executive summary

This report, inspired by the work of DG REGIO on the Geography of Discontent, adopts a territorial perspective in analysing across all Member States opinions and voting in relation to immigration and trust in the EU.

As indicated recently in the mission letter on Democracy and Demography for the new Commission, deep changes in European society have led to a loss of faith in democracy for some individuals across Europe. This report responds to the mandate included in the mission letter of analysing the impact of demographic change in areas and regions that may be disproportionately affected by these dynamics.

Among the processes of demographic change, the study specifically looks at the concentration of migrants in the local context. It examines disaffection towards the EU and negative positions towards immigration from the two lenses of attitudes recorded in Eurobarometer surveys and the geographical patterns of voting.

The main conclusions of the report are that attitudes towards immigration and trust in the EU are associated and voting for parties with restrictive views on migration is better explained by socio-economic factors than the presence of migrants at local level.

The structure of the report is the following. Chapter one considers attitudes towards immigration and the EU, using Eurobarometer data. Chapter two provides descriptive analyses of the share of votes in the 2014 and 2019 European Parliament elections at different geographical scales for the entire EU. Chapter three further explores the relationship between voting and the local presence of migrants at the more refined geographical scales of municipalities in the case of Italy and of neighbourhoods in the case of the Netherlands.

Key findings of each chapter are:

The relationship between salience of and attitudes towards immigration, and attitudes towards the EU

- When considering the time series of Eurobarometer surveys between 2011 and 2019, the shares of those mentioning immigration as one of the most important issues for the EU reached a peak during the so-called asylum and refugee crisis in all Member States in 2015/16. This is in contrast with what respondents thought to be most important for their countries – where immigration featured less prominently – and for themselves personally – where immigration barely emerged.
- The salience of migration tends to be mentioned alongside with economic-related concerns before 2015, while afterwards it goes along either with economic and security concerns (such as terrorism), depending on the Member State considered.
- Confirming previous insights from the literature, after controlling for socio-economic characteristics such as age, education, and level of employment, a clear and robust connection ties attitudes towards immigration with those towards the EU in all EU28 countries. This is in contrast with a mixed pattern of association between salience of immigration and attitudes towards the EU.
- While there is some evidence of rural-urban divides in attitudes towards immigration and Euroscepticism in some Member States, regression analyses suggest that self-reported degree of urbanisation and attitudes towards the EU are not systematically associated after taking into account the individual characteristics of the respondents.

From attitudes to votes. A territorial analysis of the EP elections of 2014 and 2019 in the EU

- The comparison of EU electoral data for the 2014 and 2019 EP elections shows that parties with restrictive views on migration increased their support in a minority of Member States.

- At country level, it is difficult to recognise a clear-cut association between the voting patterns and the share of migrants across Europe. Some Member States recorded high share of votes for parties with restrictive stances on migration despite having low shares of migrants; other Member States display relatively high shares of migrants and moderate shares of votes for parties favouring restrictive measures on migration.
- At provincial and local administrative levels, both negative and positive associations emerge between high presence of migrants and voting for parties favouring restrictive measures on migration.

The importance of the residential environment in the relationship between electoral outcomes and the presence of immigrants. The case studies of Italy and the Netherlands

- In the case of the EP election of 2019 in Italy, data at municipal level indicate that high shares of votes for parties favouring restrictive measures on migration are associated with low population density and low income rather than with the level and change of the share of migrants.
- The analysis of the 2010 general elections in the Netherlands at the level of neighbourhoods confirms that economic and sociodemographic factors such as the age structure of the residing population, low education, and low income, explain the support for the local anti-immigration party better than the presence of migrants.
- Both in the case of Italy and the Netherlands, when the local presence of migrants is considered together with local conditions and population density, its relationship with voting changes. More precisely, in areas that are relatively less populated or with lower levels of income, a positive and statistically significant association emerges between higher presence of migrants and voting for parties favouring restrictive measures on migration.

Chapter 1. The relationship between salience of and attitudes towards immigration, and attitudes towards the EU

This chapter investigates whether and how salience of and attitudes towards immigration are related to attitudes towards the EU, on the basis of Eurobarometer data. The evolution of both salience and attitudes towards immigration and the EU, as well as the differences among EU Member States (MS), are accounted for in the entire chapter. Indeed, the analysis relies on several Eurobarometer waves, starting from November 2011 up until the June 2019 wave. Moreover, opinions are investigated separately for each EU MS.

The chapter first draws a distinction between salience of and attitudes towards immigration based on Eurobarometer data, to reflect the insight that what may be perceived by respondents as most important may be different from attitudes towards a given issue. In practice, we investigate whether the salience of immigration (i.e. the consideration that immigration is among the most important issues for the EU, for the country, or the survey respondent) and trust in the EU are related. Second, after having sketched the individual profiles of people trusting the EU, we investigate how people's attitudes towards immigration from third countries relate to trust in the EU. Particular attention is placed on whether there is a divide in attitudes towards immigration between rural and urban areas in EU MS. Third, we move from the individual to the regional perspective by looking at data from the Flash Eurobarometer surveys. The analysis not only maps the salience of immigration for EU regions but also explores the relationship between salience of immigration and trust in the EU at the regional level. The inclusion in the analysis of information regarding respondents' self-reported level of urbanisation and the regional level analysis are, combined, the ways in which this chapter tackles the territorial dimension of salience of and attitudes towards immigration, on the one hand, and attitudes towards the EU, on the other.

Euroscepticism and attitudes towards immigration: what does the academic literature say?

The academic literature has long discussed the link between opposition to immigration and scepticism towards the EU[1] (Hobolt et al. 2011; Vreese and Boomgaarden 2005; Toshkov and Kortenska 2015; de Vreese 2017; Stockemer et al. 2018; Daniel et al. 2019). In a very general sense, one may explain this relationship with the ever-expanding remit of EU action over the past decades. In other words, the more the EU has taken on new policies and competences, the likelier it has become that it encroaches individuals' multiple identities. People who are very attached to their national identity (Hooghe and Marks 2005), or who negatively perceive other cultures (McLaren 2001), tend to regard negatively the EU. While the link between opposition to immigration and scepticism regarding the EU has long been identified, recent studies have investigated whether the recent crises have had any effect on this relationship. Results are ambiguous though. While Nicoli and Reinl found "a significant effect of migration flows on Eurosceptic parties"

[1] The academic literature has measured salience of and attitudes towards immigration in many different ways, and the same applies to attitudes towards the EU. While we present results only for trust in the EU, we replicate the analysis also for other forms of "regime support" (Hobolt and de Vries 2016a) to the EU, such as the image of the EU, and satisfaction with EU democracy.

success'[2] (Nicoli and Reinl 2019, 25), Daniel et al observe that "the crisis increased neither anti-immigrants sentiments nor critical attitudes toward the EU and did not reinforce the link between rejection of immigrants and rejection of the EU" (Daniel et al. 2019, 1).

Overall, several individual characteristics have been shown to be related to both support for the EU and attitudes towards immigration, inter alia education (Hakhverdian et al. 2013; Hobolt and de Vries 2016b), labour market status and occupation (Pardos-Prado and Xena 2019; Valentino et al. 2017; Polavieja 2016; Cavallaro and Zanetti 2019), or age (Guinaudeau and Schnatterer 2019; Jeannet 2018; Schotte and Winkler 2018).

Attitudes towards both immigration and the EU may depend upon the perceived level of urbanisation in several ways. One such way posits that because immigrants tend to be concentrated overwhelmingly in urban areas, rural areas do not experience the kind of positive contact that could improve tolerance, openness and common understanding, resulting in more negative attitudes (Czaika and Di Lillo 2018). Another possibility is that, because highly educated tend to gravitate and move towards urban areas because of comparatively higher job opportunities suitable to their skills, a sort of negative selection operates whereby rural areas lose highly educated residents to the benefit of more urbanised ones (Maxwell 2019). As a result, the well-known connection between education and attitudes towards immigration skews urban centres towards more positive attitude in the aggregate, and rural areas towards more negative ones.

While local and contextual factors have long been recognised as important factors in shaping opinions on the EU (Brinegar and Jolly 2005), a few studies have taken a regional perspective (Markaki and Longhi 2013; Czaika and Di Lillo 2018; Schlueter and Wagner 2008a; Nicoli and Reinl 2019; Lubbers and Scheepers 2007). These studies tend to analyse aggregate opinions at different regional levels (generally, NUTS2 and/or NUTS1[3]) while including regional socio-economic controls, which can influence opinions towards immigration and/or attitudes towards the EU, such as average GDP per capita or share of educational levels. Overall, these studies tend to find statistically significant relationships between regional variations and attitudes towards either the EU or immigration.

Descriptive analysis of the trends in trust in the EU, and in salience of and attitudes towards immigration

In short, this section finds that EU support and attitudes towards immigration have unevenly fluctuated across MS, but salience of immigration have witnessed the steepest changes.

[2] The authors add that the effect is stronger in regions "where labour markets are characterised by a high unemployment rate, and weaker in highly urbanised regions" (Nicoli and Reinl 2019, 25).
[3] According to Eurostat, the "NUTS classification (Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics) is a hierarchical system for dividing up the economic territory of the EU" for statistical purpose. More details on the full list of NUTS, at all levels, is available here https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/nuts/background (accessed on 11 December 2019).

Trust in the EU

In most EU countries, the share[4] of respondents trusting[5] the EU has fluctuated considerably during the last decade (Figure 1). Despite this ample variation across countries and in time, the trend in most countries is upward since 2012 after a severe drop during the euro-zone crisis (Hobolt and Wratil 2015). We can also notice that in a number of countries (Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia) trust in the EU has been – almost always – higher than trust towards any other national institution (national parliament and government) (Figure 19 in the Annex).

Figure 1. Trust in the EU



Source: Standard Eurobarometer, November 2011 - June 2019[6].
Note: due to uneven coding in the original data, "Don't know" are discarded. Weighted observations.

[4] The original Eurobarometer question reads: "I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain media and Institutions. For each of the following media and institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it. The European Union". The possible answers are "Tend to trust" and "Tend not to trust", "DK". Since data on the "don't know" answers are not consistently available, we dropped them throughout the analysis. The shares are calculated as the rate of respondents by country-wave. Observations are weighted.
[5] While we present results only for *trust in the EU*, we replicate the analysis also for other forms of *regime support* to the EU, such as the *image of the EU*, and *satisfaction with EU democracy.* While trust in the EU is a binary variable, Image of the EU and satisfaction with EU democracy are ordinal variables which allows for more nuanced analysis. We opted to show only the variable on trust as we believed it was easier to understand in terms of analysis, it is more consistent through time (i.e. it is present in all waves we consider here), and is also widely reported also in Eurobarometer official publications. That being said, the results of the analysis largely overlap disregarding the choice for the dependent variable.
[6] The full list of the Eurobarometer surveys used in the report is in Annex 3.

Attitudes towards immigration

When considering attitudes towards immigration from third countries[7] (Figure 2) – available in the Standard Eurobarometer since 2014 – a mixed picture emerges. In some countries (e.g. Austria, France, Greece), attitudes towards immigration from outside the EU have remained quite stable over the period considered, while in other MS attitudes have substantially changed (e.g. Spain, Ireland, Luxembourg, UK). This is partly in line with other studies, which have found that attitudes towards immigration are rather stable, particularly if compared to high variability of salience of immigration (see next sub-section) (Dennison and Geddes 2019).

Figure 2. Attitudes towards immigration from outside the EU

Source: Standard Eurobarometer, November 2014 - November 2018.
Notes: Due to uneven coding in the original data, "Don't know" are discarded. Weighted observations.

Salience

Since 2010[8], the Standard Eurobarometer has asked whether immigration is one of the two most important issues for respondents at the personal, country, and EU level[9]. In the political science literature, these questions have been regarded as capturing *issue salience* (Dennison 2019; Hatton 2017). This subsection briefly illustrates the trends for these

[7] Here we present attitudes towards immigration from outside the EU, but we replicate the analysis also for other attitudinal questions. The question reads "Please tell me whether each of the following statements evokes a positive or negative feeling for you. Immigration of people from outside the EU".
[8] Prior to that year, the Standard Eurobarometer was asking whether immigration was one of the two most important issues only at the *country* level. In addition, the Flash Eurobarometer asked whether immigration was one of the two most important issues at the *regional* level in 2012, 2015, and 2018.
[9] Respectively, the three questions read "What do you think are the two most important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) at the moment?"; "And personally, what are the two most important issues you are facing at the moment?"; "What do you think are the two most important issues facing the EU at the moment?".

questions since 2011. The shares[10] of those mentioning immigration as one of the most important EU issues reached a peak during the so-called asylum and refugee crisis in all Member States around 2015, for all three levels considered (Figure 3). However, most people in all MS seem to be regard immigration as an EU issue more than a country one and decisively more than a personal one (Dennison 2019, 439). It should also be noted that salience of immigration has witnessed very different fluctuations compared to the salience of other issues – such as taxation and inflation, both in terms of amplitude of changes as well as the levels where issues seem to matter the most[11] (Figure 21).

Figure 3. Salience of immigration at the personal, country, and EU level



Source: Standard Eurobarometer, November 2011 - June 2019.
Notes: Due to uneven coding in the original data, "Don't know" discarded. Weighted observations.

Besides immigration, the Eurobarometer has information on the salience of other issues. Indeed, in the surveys, respondents are asked to indicate the *two most important issues that they personally, their country, and the EU are facing*. While the graphs before have focused on one answer only (i.e. on those respondents reporting immigration as one of the two most important issues), Figure 4 takes both answers into account. In other words, the graph plots, for some selected MS, the most frequent pairs of issues that respondents considered as salient in the EU. This more refined piece of information allows us to have a more complete view of public perceptions on a variety of issues and monitor their evolution. It also more carefully reflects the fact that the overwhelming majority[12] of respondents do indicate two issues when interviewed. When looking at these figures, one

[10] This is calculated as the share of respondents by country-wave that mentioned "Immigration" as one of the two most salient issues for them. Observations are weighted.
[11] Additionally, if we compare the distribution of the other two economic issues, where we can observe that inflation and taxation are much higher when it comes to respondents' personal concerns, but feature very low among the issues they perceive to matter at the EU level.
[12] In the case of salience at the EU level, over 85% of the sample provided two answers, and about 14% provided only one answer.

must bear in mind that we do not know whether the respondents see these two issues as entangled, or as two separate issues that are capturing their attention at that moment in time. In addition, we do not know whether they prioritise one over the other.

Several patterns emerge when looking at salience at the EU level, which are shortly exemplified in Figure 4 for the two MS that are also analysed in Chapter 3, namely Italy and the Netherlands. First, economic-related concerns were the most important issues before 2015 (such as *economic-unemployment*, *economic-MS finances*). This is likely to be a medium-term consequence of the 2007-08 financial and economic crisis, which has been recognised in previous studies (Börzel 2016) as well as Eurobarometer reports (for instance, see European Commission 2016).

Second, the salience of immigration at the EU level has gained importance since 2015. While Figure 3 showed that this rise is recorded particularly at the EU level and, for some MS, also at the country level, it is interesting to see whether other issue arose at the same time. Considering pairs of issues together reveals how member states' public opinions are more multifaceted and nuanced than a focus on a single issue at the time may suggest. Figure 4 shows that there is some variation among these two countries, and this is even more apparent when all EU MS are considered (in the Annex, see from Figure 22 to Figure 24).

In the case of Italy, unemployment concerns persisted throughout the period considered, but while before 2015 that was mentioned frequently alongside the "economic situation", after 2015 it was more frequently selected in parallel with immigration. What emerged as a new issue is terrorism, again picked alongside immigration.

In the Netherlands, the "state of finances" and "economic situation" featured prominently amongst citizens' concerns throughout the period considered. Before 2015 these two issues were very frequently mentioned together by Dutch respondents, but after 2015 immigration emerged and was often selected alongside them. Other security-related issues such as terrorism do not emerge as prominently as in the case of Italy.

Figure 4. Salience of issue-pairs in selected EU countries



Source: Standard Eurobarometer, November 2011 - June 2019.
Notes: Weighted observations. The graph is a heat-map of the relative frequency of each pair (in rows), by country (facets) and wave (in columns). It ranges from blue – standing for low frequencies – to red – meaning higher frequencies.
For presentational reasons, what is displayed in the report is a much shorter version of the entire set of possible pairs by year and level (namely, personal, country, and the EU). There are between 16 and 18 issues for each level, which result in between 120 and 153 possible pairs per level. Visualising such a crowded space for all Eurobarometer waves assembled here and all MS is not feasible on paper. To visualise a portion of the results, we [1] subset these pairs to only those which were available for all waves (currently 19), [2] we dropped the "don't know", "none", and "other" answers, [3] and then took the first five by their means over all waves.

Territorial diversity in salience of and attitudes towards immigration

A central theme of this report is an investigation of whether and to what extent the territorial dimension matters when it comes to public attitudes and voting. In this subsection, we do so in two ways. First, we look at the available NUTS disaggregation included in the Flash Eurobarometer. This survey is designed to be representative at regional level, and we leverage on that fact to check whether salience of immigration vary between regions within each MS. Second, we look at the self-reported level of urbanisation within the Standard Eurobarometer to explore whether we witness a rural/urban divide when it comes to attitudes towards immigration.

The Eurobarometer Flash, designed to be representative at the regional level (either at NUTS1 or NUTS2 regional level, depending on the country), allows us to explore the salience of immigration[13] from a regional perspective. Indeed, analogously to the Standard Eurobarometer, respondents are asked to indicate *the two most important issues their region is facing.* Three survey waves are available – i.e. 2012, 2015 and 2017.

[13] Unfortunately, questions on attitudes towards immigration are not available in the Eurobarometer Flash.

Figure 5 descriptively shows that in some MS there is substantial variation in the salience of immigration depending on the region of the respondents[14] (e.g. Germany, Spain, Italy), whereas in other countries regions do not seem to differ much in that respect. Such gap has also widened over the years in some cases, such as in Germany and Italy between 2012 and 2015, whereas in other MS regions have remained fairly clustered together, such as in Denmark.

We aggregated individual-level observations into regions, and then carried-out a regression analyses to explore the relationship between trust in the EU and salience of immigration. The results suggest that there is no clear association between trust in the EU and salience of immigration (while the salience of economic, education, environmental, health-related regional issues are associated with trust in the EU).

Figure 5. Salience of immigration at the regional level



Source: Flash Eurobarometer, 2012, 2015, 2018.
Notes: points are NUTS. The height of the boxes represents the spread of the distribution (the larger the distance between observations – in this case, NUTS – the longer the box). The width of the boxplots is proportional to the number of observations. They are plotted based on their regional shares of positive answer to the question "What do you think are the two most important issues facing your region at the moment? Immigration". We selected countries with at least 9 regions for each year. Due to uneven coding in the original data, "Don't know" are discarded. Weighted observations.

As mentioned above, we investigate whether territorial diversity matters also by describing differences in attitudes towards immigration between respondents who self-describe as living in rural or urban areas[15]. Figure 6 below present the distribution of those answering

[14] More broadly, the share of respondents thinking that immigration is among the two most important issues in their region ranges between 5% and 70% in 2015.
[15] The Eurobarometer question reads "Would you say you live in a...? Rural area or village; Small or middle sized town; Large town; DK".

that immigration of people from outside the EU evokes a positive feeling[16] for them, by self-reported levels of urbanisation. What emerges is, once again, a very uneven picture across MS. For instance, in Austria, the distance between different perceived levels of urbanisation was very small in 2014, enlarged to nearly 30 percentage points in November 2015, and has remained relatively high since then. In Germany, there were about 17 percentage points at the start of time series, but then narrowed down to few percentage points by early 2016, and then enlarged again in 2018. We also check for percentage points' difference between respondents who self-report living in cities and those living in rural areas when it comes to trust in the EU (Figure 25, in the Annex). Similarly, we record wide gaps in some MS but not all.

Figure 6. Attitudes towards immigration from outside the EU by place of living

Source: Standard Eurobarometer, November 2014 - June 2019.
Notes: Displayed are proportions of respondents answering that immigration evokes very or fairly positive feelings. Due to uneven coding in the original data, "Don't know" are discarded. Weighted observations.

Are salience of and attitudes towards immigration related to trust in the EU?

Briefly, this section finds that while positive attitudes towards immigration are consistently connected to trust in the EU, salience of immigration displays mixed patterns of association

We perform two sets of regression analyses for each EU MS, with trust in the EU as the dependent variable[17]. In the first set, we investigate the relationship between attitudes

[16] Positive feeling are calculated by collapsing those who answer "very" and "fairly positive" to the question "Please tell me whether each of the following statements evokes a positive or negative feeling for you. Immigration of people from outside the EU".
[17] See Annex 3 for full regression tables.

towards immigration from outside the EU and trust in the EU, at the individual level. In the second set, we explore the association between salience of immigration at the EU level and trust in the EU, at both the individual level and regional level[18]. The coefficients of interest for the two sets of models – namely those on attitudes and those on salience - are reported in Figure 7 for each MS. In both sets, we control for individual demographic and socio-economic characteristics, regional factors and time shocks.

Individual profile of those trusting the EU

Overall, the regression analysis confirms previous research concerning the individual profile of those trusting the EU. Highly-educated tend to trust more the EU than the low educated. At EU level, older individuals are less likely to trust the EU than the youngest (aged 15-24). However, when we analyse each MS separately, the relationship between age and trust in the EU profile varies across countries, suggesting that contextual factors and country's history of relationship with the EU play an important role. Turning to the labour market, those who are unemployed and manual workers are less likely to trust the EU as compared to other occupations in employment, while students have most positive views.

Turning to the territorial dimension of trust in the EU, we notice statistically significant differences in trust in the EU with respect to the place of living – namely, rural, small, and large towns – in Greece, Croatia, the Netherlands, Malta, Poland, Sweden, Slovenia, and the UK. In these countries, people living in large town tend to trust the EU more than those living in rural areas. For all other countries, the relationship is not statistically significant when we control for other socio-economic factors, as well as salience of or attitudes towards immigration.

Salience of immigration and trust in the EU

The analysis of the relationship between salience of immigration and trust in the EU yields mixed results, with large differences between countries (right panel of Figure 7 above). Individuals thinking that immigration is salient tend not to trust the EU in Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Hungary, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK. In other countries, the relationship is positive, meaning that individuals who believe that immigration is salient also tend to trust the EU. This is the case in Bulgaria, Cyprus, Spain, Greece, Croatia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Romania. In Belgium, Estonia, Ireland, Italy, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, the relationship is not statistically significant[19].

Comparing the three different levels of salience – personal, country, and EU – we notice that the personal level is seldom if ever significant. This was already suggested by Figure 3, where we observed that personal salience of immigration was very low across MS. In other words, respondents across Europe tend to see immigration as something important at the country level and even more at the EU level, rather than at the personal level. However, it should be noted that while these salience variables are usually statistically significant (except a few cases), the amount of variance they explain is very limited. In

[18] Because of space constraints, we only report here the results for the individual level analysis. The result for the regional level analyses, based on the Flash Eurobarometer, are available upon request.

[19] This holds after controlling for individual demographic and socio-economic controls (education level, occupation), regional factors, and common time shocks or time breaks (the 2015/16 migration crisis). This picture may slightly change depending on the *level* of the question, namely whether it is important at the personal, country, or EU level.

other words, what is gained in understanding trust in the EU by including salience on immigration is not very substantial[20].

Attitudes towards immigration and trust in the EU

The regression analyses show a clear and robust positive relationship between attitudes towards immigration and trust in the EU in all EU28 countries (left panel of Figure 7), whilst controlling for other factors. In other words, having positive perceptions on immigration is positively related with trust in the EU. While below we present only the results related to attitudes towards immigration from outside the EU, we carried out the same regression analysis regarding immigration from the EU, and whether the respondent thinks that immigrants contribute to their country. All these additional analyses confirm that positive attitudes towards immigration are associated with trust in the EU.

Figure 7. Regression coefficients of attitudes and salience, by country



Source: Standard Eurobarometer, November 2011 - November 2018.
Notes: Points are regression coefficients of independent variables related to attitudes towards immigration from outside the EU (left, labelled "Attitudes") and salience of immigration at the EU level (right, labelled "Salience"). The dependent variables in both models is trust in the EU (as a dummy). The linear regressions control for individual characteristics (e.g. gender, education level, occupation), territorial factors (rural/urban, NUTS2), and common time shocks. Due to uneven coding in the original data, "Don't know" are discarded. Weighted observations.

[20] Further details can be found in the Annex.

Conclusions

The following key messages emerge from the analysis of salience of and attitudes towards immigration through Eurobarometer data:

- In line with the existing research, individuals who are better educated, students, young, in employment are more likely to trust the EU, in all MS.
- While salience of immigration in the EU and trust in the EU are not always related, anti-immigration attitudes and trust in the EU are closely related.
  In some countries those having the opinion that immigration is salient tend also to trust the EU, while in other countries the opposite holds, whereas in other still salience of immigration and trust in the EU are not related.
  In all EU MS, individuals having negative attitudes towards immigrants from outside the EU tend not to trust the EU.
- A divide in attitudes towards immigration between rural and urban areas emerges only for some countries.
- Respondents seem to be allocating more importance to immigration at the EU level rather than at the country or personal levels.
  There is rarely if ever any clear relationship between personal importance of immigration and trust in the EU, whereas it is most often the case at the country and even more at the EU level.
- When moving from the individual to the regional perspective, we find that salience of immigration for the regions is not related to trust in the EU.

Chapter 2. From opinions to votes. A territorial analysis of the European Parliament elections of 2014 and 2019 in the EU

In the previous chapter, the report analysed the developments of European public opinion towards two specific political issues: immigration and trust in the EU. In a similar vein, this chapter examines the results of the EP elections of 2014 and 2019, through the prism of the distribution of votes for the competing parties, grouped according to their positioning on migration and EU integration[21]. It should be noted that, while research finds some relation between economic discontent and anti-immigrant views or Euroscepticism, the mechanisms by which attitudes towards specific issues translate into votes, especially for single-issue parties, are not straightforward (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014; Aardal and van Wijnen 2005). Voting behaviour is in fact better understood through a broader set of explanatory variables, including level of education, income and cultural values (Fisher et al. 2018).

This chapter adopts a territorial approach and explores whether any relationship between spatial context and electoral results is appreciable and in what ways. To this end, we build upon the established scholarly traditions of electoral geography and political science to identify the extent to which the local presence of migrants and population density can explain variations across and within countries (J. Agnew 1996; Weaver 2014; Ron Johnston and Pattie 2018).

Placing the analysis of the vote in context

Across Europe, the Great Recession in the second half of the 2000s left anxiety about economic displacement in large shares of the population. In this context, some political movements and parties tapped into population's discontent, competing to offer them voice and representation. In their search for consent, some parties and movements often exacerbated negative public perceptions of immigration and the EU, by singling them out as the most recognizable by-products of globalisation and the main threats to national survival and sovereignty. This type of electoral and identity politics, some observers noted, challenged liberal democracy, contributed to erode the foundation of popular support for established institutions and mainstream parties in favour of 'anti-system', 'populist' parties that profess to represent those who saw – or perceived – a loss of socio-economic status and cultural centrality (Fukuyama 2018; Galston 2018; Gordon 2018; Daigle, Neulen, and Hofeman 2019; Fitzi, Mackert, and Turner 2019; Mounk 2018; Pappas 2019).

When it comes to analysing voting behaviour and electoral data, though, political theory cautions that electoral outcomes are a combination of party loyalties, short-term fluctuations in the voters' choice, influenced by events and issues of particular campaigns and elections, and more structural transformations of the socio-demographic composition of the society (Key, 1955). In particular, the latter factor may set in motion cyclical partisan realignments or reorientations that take time and cannot be captured with static analytical models – i.e. by focusing on a single round of elections. Considering that "election returns merely record periodic readings of the relative magnitudes of streams of attitudes that are undergoing steady expansion or contraction", to draw assumptions and generalisations based on a single election risks to overstate or misconstrue elements whose precise nature has not yet been discerned (Key, 1959, 198). By the same token, electoral analyses that concentrate exclusively on parties that challenge the mainstream political system in contemporary Europe risks to convey equally misleading considerations.

[21] The relative positioning of the parties on the two issues are drawn on the 2014 and 2017 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) https://www.chesdata.eu/our-surveys. A description of the adopted methodology is in the Annex.

Such an approach, in fact, not only suffers from a selection bias; but it tends to uncritically lump together as 'populist', parties and movements that run on different platforms and whose geographical distribution is determined by a set of contextual elements, as well as demand-side and supply-side explanations (Mudde 2004; Pappas 2016; Golder 2016).

In this vein, scholarship has underlined, with increasing empirical evidence, the analytical power of the geographic settings, in order to gain insights on voting patterns. Mostly established in American research, studies adopting a territorial approach to analyse voting behaviour have been increasingly developed in Europe too. A growing body of literature is pinning the analysis on specific areas through time and population change, as well as including the rural and urban dimensions as analytical variables to appreciate the nature of voting patterns. There is no agreement among geographers nor political scientists as to which geographic unit of analysis is "true causally relevant" to analyse the contextual influences (Kwan 2012, 959). However, especially in combination with controls for voter-level characteristics, an analysis of the vote at different level of aggregation, from national to regional to even smaller geographies, such as the basic electoral geography (i.e. district, ward or section) or neighbourhood scale, proved to provide significant contributions in unfolding and detailing variability in the political behaviour (Ethington and McDaniel 2007; Dietz 2002; Ron Johnston and Pattie 2006).

Challenges in providing a comparative analysis of voting for the entire EU

In this chapter, the paper restricts the analysis of the EP votes to the territorial dimension and showcases the potential interpretive value of looking at the voting patterns at different levels of geographic aggregation. The section then offers a few descriptive analyses that compare the variations in the share of votes for the considered parties. We grouped them according to their positioning on immigration and trust in the EU and out them in relation to the shares of migrants and rural-urban characteristics of local administrative units, captured by the variable of population density. It should be noted that, beyond the well-known methodological challenges characterising any work on cross-national electoral data (de Vries 2017), the following empirical analysis carries with it the limitations of the data availability and quality.

The first constraint lies in the lack of an available electoral dataset on the EP elections, harmonised across countries to the smallest electoral geography possible. The adopted solution was to use a ready-made dataset put together by a private provider for the German newspaper *ZEIT ONLINE*, in the framework of the European Commission's project *The Geography of EU Discontent* (Dijkstra, Poelman, and Rodríguez-Pose 2019). The electoral data of the 28 EU MS was divided into municipalities or constituencies and only the share of valid votes for parties that resulted in a parliamentary seat were included[22]. The original data was collected from a number of different sources, not exclusively from the electoral or statistical offices of the considered countries[23]. Second, the acquired dataset was not systematically cross-checked[24], before linking the partial share of votes to spatial units that correspond to Local Administrative Units (LAU) for most of the MS. In addition, the share of considered valid votes was further reduced by selecting only the

[22] See: https://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2019-07/european-election-municipalities-eu-states-results-analysis-map

[23] Additional caveats, as specified in the explanatory note on *ZEIT ONLINE* website, concern possible discrepancies due to rounding, the inclusion of votes from abroad when they are counted in the national capital city or the district of last residence, the process of geocoding of the vote.

[24] Romania is an exception, since the electoral data was processed in-house from official Romanian electoral source at polling station level. For the rest of the provided dataset a simple control was run on the extent to which the aggregate total of valid votes at country level deviated from the one provided in the official sources. See Annex for detail.

parties for which a coding was provided in the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) of 2014 and 2017. We finally applied a threshold to exclude the MS and specific spatial units in which the coverage of total valid votes for the parties included in our datasets was below 70%. Lastly, most of the empirical analysis focused exclusively on the parties whose aggregate expert score provided by CHES ranged from slightly to strongly in favour of restrictive measures on migration and from slight to strong Euroscepticism[25].

With these reservations in mind, the analysis adopted a few methodological precautions that make the comparative mapping and descriptive analyses admissible. To begin with, even though there is no uniform voting system across Europe for the election of the members of the EP - each MS is free to choose their specific electoral geography (i.e. a single constituency for the entire state or smaller regional constituencies) – EP elections are the only ones that take place at the same time in all MS, use a form of proportional representation system (e.g. Droop quota, d'Hondt system, Single Transferable Vote), and arguably focus on a common political stake across countries. These features may partially mitigate the influence on voting behaviour of specific context related factors such as campaign issues of the moment and/or national electoral systems and rules (Dassonneville, Hooghe, and Lewis-Beck 2017; Richard Johnston 2017; Norris 2004; McLean 2018)[26].

Empirical analysis

As in chapter 1, the positioning on immigration and the EU integration are put in relation with each other. Figure 8 illustrates the positioning of all parties included in the dataset in respect to these two dimensions according to the classification provided by CHES. In addition, we characterise each party through colours according to the left/right political orientation – always according to CHES[27]. Each circle in the figure represents a party and its size is proportional to the share of votes received at the EP elections of 2019.

Having in mind the structural features and caveats that our electoral dataset carries, clarified in the previous paragraph, it is nonetheless worth describing in detail the distribution of parties and corresponding votes of our sampled dataset by each of the four quadrant. It is important to remark that these are descriptive considerations and their capacity to explain the electors' behaviour cannot be overstated. The top left quadrant (from slight to strong Euroscepticism and favourable stances towards migration) hosts 21% of the considered parties, corresponding to a 12% of the included valid votes. The bottom left quadrant (from moderate to strong support to the EU and favourable stances towards migration) captures 23% of parties, corresponding to 31% of the counted votes. The top right quadrant (slight to strong Euroscepticism and slight to strong restrictive

[25] For the positioning on Immigration, the final score of each party was a simple average of the scores assigned for the three questions *'Immigrate_Policy - position on immigration policy'*, *'Multiculturalism position on integration of immigrants and asylum seekers (multiculturalism vs. assimilation)'* and *'Ethnic_Minorities position towards ethnic minorities'* in the Policy Questions section, to have a coarse profiling of the party's position on both immigration and immigrant policies. We considered parties with an average score equal to 5 or above in a scale between 0 and 10 as slightly to strongly in favour of restrictive measures on migration. For the positioning on Euroscepticism, the final score of each party was a simple average of the scores assigned for the two questions on *'Position - overall orientation of the party leadership towards European integration'* and *'EU_Salience - relative salience of European integration in the party's public stance'* in the section General Questions on European Integration. We considered parties with a score equal to 3.5 or above in a scale between 0 and 7 as slightly to strongly Eurosceptic. (Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2017, CODEBOOK March 2018 Version 1.1 and Codebook 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey July 2015 Version 2015.1). For a thorough assessment of the inherent limitations of the CHES see (Ruedin and Morales 2017).

[26] In addition, non-electoral variables for the bivariate analyses were selected trying to maintain a degree of consistency across data sources in terms of year of reference (the closest available to the election date), spatial unit (LAU or lower) and EU coverage.

[27] For the positioning on the left/right spectrum, we adopted the score assigned to each party in the Ideological Questions section for the question *'LRGEN = position of the party in 2014'* (Codebook 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey July 2015 Version 2015.1).

views on migration) numbers 37% of parties and 33% of votes. The bottom right quadrant (moderate to strong support to the EU and light to strong restrictive views on migration) lists 15% of parties, corresponding to 24% of votes. As for the left/right orientation, a clear pattern emerges with right wing parties that are predominant in the right-hand side quadrants and the left wing parties in the left-hand side. In addition, it is evident that parties that CHES positions more distinctly to the extreme right (dark blue) concentrate in the top right quadrant.

Figure 8 Positioning of parties coloured according to their left to right orientation in relation to the dimensions of Euroscepticism and restrictive measures on migration, EP 2019



Sources: ZEIT ONLINE dataset on EP 2019; CHES 2014 and 2017. Notes: each symbol correspond to a party. The sum of the share of votes in the four quadrants totals 100% since it includes only votes for which there is a known classification of the party in CHES. See Annex 2 for more details on data sources and coverage.

In the European public sphere, most discussion and most of the quantitative electoral research have been focusing around the relative success of 'anti-immigrant parties' in response to the so called 'EU migrant and refugee crisis' (Dustmann, Vasiljeva, and Piil Damm 2019; Otto and Steinhardt 2014; Sørensen 2016; Valdez 2014; Steinmayr 2016; Bratti et al. 2017). Partially following this trend, Figure 9 illustrates how the share of votes for the sampled parties, positioned from slightly to strongly in favour of restrictive measures on migration, has changed between 2014 and 2019. The graph shows that particularly in three MS (Italy, Poland and Sweden) parties in favour of more restrictive migration measures gained votes in 2019 EP elections compared to 2014 EP elections. Italy recorded the highest increase (from 36% to 57% of the valid votes included in our dataset), followed by Poland (from 42% to 51%) and Sweden (from 41% to 47%). On the other hand, the MS that shows a steeper decrease in the shares of votes for such parties is the UK (from 54% to 39%). In this overview, it is worth mentioning the case of Germany, where the relative growth in votes for parties with restricting views on migration was modest, despite the centrality of the topic in that country's public debate as a consequence of the decision to welcome approximately 1.5 million asylum-seekers in the period 2014-2017, the vast majority of which between July 2015 and February 2016.

Figure 9 Comparison between the shares of votes for parties positioned from slightly to strongly in favour of restrictive measures on migration at the EP 2019 and 2014 elections[28].

Sources: ZEIT ONLINE dataset on EP 2019, EP 2014; CHES 2014 and 2017. Notes: the figure excludes countries where the coverage of votes for parties in both the 2014 and 2019 EP elections classified by CHES was not reaching 70% of the total of valid votes. See Annex 2 for more details on data sources and coverage.

Figure 10 turns the attention to the focus of this report and considers the territorial dimension. The maps offer a visual representation of the distribution of votes in the EP election of 2019 for parties that, according to CHES scoring, are positioned from slightly to strongly in favour of restrictive measures on migration (on the right hand side) and from slight to strong Euroscepticism (on the left hand side).

[28] The share of votes is calculated dividing the votes weighted on the score of each party according to its position on migration divided by the total of valid votes for all parties included in our dataset. In some cases, it was not possible to match electoral data at the same quality level for both EP 2019 and EP 2014. This is why the figure does not includes all MS.

Figure 10 Share of votes for parties positioned from slightly to strongly in favour of restrictive measures on migration and from slight to strong Euroscepticism, EP 2019.



Sources: ZEIT ONLINE dataset on EP 2019, EP 2014; CHES 2014 and 2017. Notes: the maps exclude countries and municipalities where the coverage of votes for parties classified by CHES was not reaching 70% of the total of valid votes. See Annex 2 for more details on data sources and coverage.

The main maps illustrate the same electoral outcomes at the higher spatial resolution of LAU in most MS, whereas the maps in the insert offer the results with data aggregated at national level. The red shading in the map indicates shares above 50% of votes for the parties associated with slightly to strong restrictive views on migration and Euroscepticism. This mapping showcases the value-added of a territorial approach at high spatial resolution. The two different perspectives allow to appreciate the nuances of the voting patterns and the potential of analytical work tailored to place-based factors. In addition, with these visualisations it is possible to glimpse where strong Euroscepticism and support for restrictive measures on migration are associated, thus complementing the descriptive analysis of Figure 9 with a territorial point of view.

In the literature, the majority of studies that survey the impact of immigration on election outcomes, both at national and local level, search for positive correlations between the share of immigrants residing in a territory and an increase in the votes for anti-immigrant parties in the corresponding territorial unit. In this respect, scholarship offers mixed results. The effect of the local ethnic composition on the propensity to vote for anti-immigrant parties has been found to be negative (van Gent, Jansen, and Smits 2014; Rydgren and Ruth 2013), positive (Savelkoul, Laméris, and Tolsma 2017; Enos 2017; Valdez 2014; Green et al. 2016), and inconclusive (de Blok and van der Meer 2018). The remaining of the chapter engages with some of these aspects through simple descriptive analyses, while Chapter 3 deals more in detail with the complexity of the relationship with more formal statistical model for the two case studies of Italy and the Netherlands.

Figure 11 provides an overview at national level for most MS on how the votes for the parties with scores from slightly to strongly in favour of restrictive measures of migration relate to the share of migrants residing. The share of migrants is calculated from official statistics on foreign population at 2018, with a broad distinction between all (left chart) and non-EU migrants (right chart). It therefore puts together countries with different

migration histories, naturalisation rates and composition in the migrant population (specific countries of origin, former colonies etc.). At this level of aggregation, it is extremely speculative to comment on the association between the voting patterns and the share of migrants. Nonetheless, on the one hand, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland appear to have a high share of votes for parties favouring restrictive measures on migration despite a low share of migrants; on the other hand, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus and Germany display considerably higher shares of migrants and a moderate share of votes for parties with restrictive views on migration. Even when considering the share of non-EU migrants only, the change in the patterns is very weak.

Figure 11 Relation between shares of votes for parties positioned from slight to strong restrictive stances on migration and the shares of foreign population (EU and non-EU), EP 2019, National level.



Sources: ZEIT ONLINE dataset on EP 2019, EP 2014; CHES 2014 and 2017; Eurostat migration statistics. Notes: the figure excludes countries where the coverage of votes for parties classified by CHES was not reaching 70% of the total of valid votes. See Annex 2 for more details on data sources and coverage.

Figure 12 illustrates the same distribution of votes at the lower geographical resolution of NUTS3 (i.e. roughly provincial) level. It should be noted that the data about the share of migrants here refers to 2011, which is the most recent year for which there are EU wide statistics on the share of migrants at a subnational level[29].

Overall, the relation between share of migrants at provincial level and the share of parties with restrictive views on migration appears to be negative (left hand side). However, when the same relation is analysed by single MS, both positive and negative relations emerge. This diversity of sign in the relations hints to the fact that even at a provincial level of analysis it is not possible to draw a uniform conclusion about a negative or positive association between the presence of migrants and the voting for the selected parties across EU MS.

[29] In this respect, the two graphs showcase the limitations that are currently entailed in the types of data available across countries.

Figure 12 Relation between shares of votes for parties positioned from slight to strong restrictive stances on migration and the shares of foreign-born population (both EU and non-EU), EP 2019, NUTS3 level.



Sources: ZEIT ONLINE dataset on EP 2019, EP 2014; CHES 2014 and 2017; Eurostat 2011 Census statistics. Notes: the figure excludes countries where the coverage of votes for parties classified by CHES was not reaching 70% of the total of valid votes. See Annex 2 for more details on data sources and coverage.

In Figure 13 we explore the relation at the even lower level of resolution of LAU (roughly corresponding to municipal level). The analysis is restricted to countries where data on the presence of migrants was available at this level. The figure represents median values of the share of votes at the EP 2014 and EP 2019 across LAU, grouped into bins for the values of shares of migrants[30].

[30] To ensure comparability, median values are reported only for the bins where there are at least 2.5% of the total number of spatial units in each MS.

Figure 13 Median values of the shares of votes for parties from slight to strong restrictive stances on migration by classes of shares of migrants, selection of MS – EP 2019, EP 2014, LAU level.

Sources: ZEIT ONLINE dataset on EP 2019, EP 2014; CHES 2014 and 2017; D4I for the share of migrants. See Annex 2 for more details on data sources and coverage.

In this case, it is possible to notice that Spain, France and Portugal do not show a clear relationship between the shares of migrants at LAU level and the votes for the considered parties. By the same token, a positive relationship emerges in the case of Italy and a negative one in the Netherlands. The patterns remain consistent when looking at the EP election of 2014, which are more closely related to the data on the share of migrants in 2011. This descriptive analysis demonstrates that each MS is characterised by its own dynamics, when considering the interaction between local presence of migrants and electoral outcomes. This observation further reinforces the need for more sophisticated methods of investigation at higher spatial resolution to disentangle the complexity of the relationship between electoral behaviours and the presence, composition and distribution of migrants in a territorial context.

One of the additional angles to consider in our analyses is the rural-urban divide. In this respect, the study of correlations between population density and voting patterns has been long established in electoral geography and political science, consolidating an analytical framework that has become a classic perspective in examining geographical electoral cleavages (Tarrow 1971; Zuckerman 1982; Knutsen 2017; Rodden 2019).

Figure 14 considers if and how, in the areas where the votes were cast, the support for parties positioned from slightly to strongly in favour of restrictive measures on migration changes across different levels of population density[31]. As in Figure 13, the values refer to medians across LAU grouped in bins of population density[32].

[31] We opted for exploring electoral outcomes along the continuous range of population density to detect non-linearities and avoid the arbitrariness linked to fixed threshold for the definition of rural vs town and urban areas. In this respect, we did not adopt any of the available categorical classifications of the Local Administrative Units.
[32] To ensure comparability, median values are reported only for the bins where there are at least 2.5% of the total number of spatial units in each MS.

Figure 14 Median values of the shares of votes for parties positioned from slightly to strongly in favour of restrictive measures on migration by classes of population density, EP 2019, 1km^2 resolution.



Sources: ZEIT ONLINE dataset on EP 2019, EP 2014; CHES 2014 and 2017;(Dijkstra, Poelman, and Rodríguez-Pose 2019) for population density. See Annex 2 for more details on data sources and coverage.

In all considered MS, with the exception of Bulgaria, the prevailing trend is that LAU with low population density are more inclined to vote for parties in favour of restrictive measures on migration compared to their national urban counterparts. In the cases of Austria, France and Sweden, the divide in the voting behaviour is particularly evident. This result is less sharp in the case of Italy and the Netherland. It is worth noting that the trends appear to be consistent for both electoral rounds of EP 2014 and EP 2019.

Conclusion

The following key messages emerge from the territorial analysis of the EP elections of 2019 and 2014:

- The comparison of EU electoral data for the 2019 and 2014 EP elections shows that parties in favour of more restrictive measures on migration increased significantly their support in Italy, Poland and Sweden.
- It is difficult to recognise a clear-cut association between the voting patterns and the share of migrants across Europe, at country level aggregation. Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland have a high share of votes for parties favouring restrictive measures on migration despite a low share of migrants; Austria, Belgium, Cyprus and Germany count high shares of migrants and a moderate share of votes for parties favouring restrictive immigration.
- Both negative and positive associations emerge between high presence of migrants and voting for parties favouring restrictive migration measures, at provincial and local administrative levels.
- A prevailing trend is that areas with low population density are more inclined to vote for parties with restrictive stances on migration compared to their urban counterparts, in all considered MS, with the exception of Bulgaria. In the cases of Austria, France and Sweden the divide in the voting behaviour is particularly evident.

Chapter 3. The importance of the residential environment in the relationship between electoral outcomes and the presence of immigrants. The case studies of Italy and the Netherlands

The previous chapter discussed how place matters when looking at election results in the EU. It did so essentially from the perspective of the variations in the interpretive capacity and type of insight that adopting different spatial units of analysis entails. In particular, the descriptive mapping of the EP 2019 vote showed the limitations in treating territories as a homogeneous unit, in that "relationships between voter characteristics and choices are assumed to be invariant across all of its constituent places" (Johnston and Pattie 2018, 244; see also Johnston et al. 2005). It also illustrated the shortcomings of considering in isolation the presence of migrants as possible driver of voting for parties with restrictive views on migration. In this section, the report further unpacks the potential of a geographical approach to electoral analysis, in particular when it is combined with data concerning socio-demographic features that contribute to structure the context of voters in a given place.

The examination is carried out by analysing the case studies of two MS, in which the availability and detail of the explanatory variables matches the same high spatial resolution of the electoral data. In the first case, the empirical analysis focuses on Italy and investigates the outcomes of the EP 2019 at LAU level. In the second case, a similar work is done for the Netherlands at in sub-local units, which are approximately comparable to the neighbourhood level[33]. Thematically, both cases explore the hypothesis whether the share of resident migrants can be positively or negatively associated with the vote for parties that hold restrictive views on migration and to what extent the result is influenced by characteristics of the surrounding territorial unit.

Theoretical and methodological contributions from academic research

The politicisation of immigration, the political use of xenophobia and the rise of anti-immigrant parties in Europe are hardly a development triggered by the rise in the numbers of asylum seekers in Europe that peaked in 2014-2016, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring and other geopolitical upheavals affecting North and Central African countries, as well as the Middle East. Since at least the mid-1990s, political sociology has dedicated extensive attention to how different concentrations of migrants and growing ethnic diversity have affected the party systems and electoral competition across Europe (Thränhardt 1995; Quillian 1995; Lubbers, Gijsberts, and Scheepers 2002; Stratham 2003; Wilkes, Guppy, and Farris 2007; Odmalm 2014; Wouter van der Brug et al. 2015).

More recently, though, the study of the relationship between voting patterns and the presence of large number of immigrants gained further methodological and theoretical refinement from a cross-fertilisation of disciplines such as political sociology, electoral geography and political economy (Clark and Jones 2013). These recent developments placed the actual spatial distribution of immigrants and the patterns of exposure between them and the electors at the centre of the analytical framework. Most of these contributions test the hypothesis whether high shares of immigrants in a given territorial unit are associated with negative attitudes toward immigration, intentions to vote and/or votes for anti-immigration parties, or whether the reverse is true.

[33] The original data source provided micro-level data, respectively, at polling station level for the electoral data and *buurt* level for the shares of migrants and the other territorial characteristics. See the technical note in the Annex for more detail on how the micro-level data were georeferenced, harmonised and processed.

Scholarship has addressed the question using different theoretical lenses and methodological approaches. Theoretically, the main divide is between studies that rely on the various interpretations of the 'group threat theory' (Blalock 1967; Coser 1972) and the competing theory of 'contact hypothesis' (Pettigrew 1998; Allport 1954) developed by social psychologists. The first theoretical approach suggests that the presence of ethnic minorities would prompt feelings of socio-economic, cultural, symbolic competition in the mainstream majority living in close proximity to them. By the same token, this perceived threat could translate in a higher propensity to vote for parties advocating hard-line anti-immigration policies (Putnam 2007; Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2006). The 'contact hypothesis', on the contrary, posits that exactly the proximity between the mainstream majority and ethnic minorities, especially in small and diverse residential contexts, creates the conditions for a positive interaction, thus reducing the probability to vote for anti-immigration parties (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006). The interdisciplinary literature testing empirically either of these two overarching theories exhibits vast differences in findings, including a non-linear relationship, where both effects exist simultaneously (Savelkoul, Laméris, and Tolsma 2017; Schlueter and Scheepers 2010; Schlueter and Wagner 2008; see also Janssen et al. 2019, 554–56). Suffice to say here, that these different outcomes depend also on how studies are designed, that is the geographical unit of analysis considered, whether they unpack the levels in the concentration of migrants (i.e. high or low) from change (i.e. rapid and large or slow and small inflows), the types of migrants (e.g. EU, non-EU, Muslims, non-western, etc.) as well as the parties that are examined and the choice of the control variables (van Wijk, Bolt, and Johnston 2018; Kaufmann 2017; Edo et al. 2019). However, scholars tend to agree on the consideration that "immigration as political issue operates through national communication systems and debates while contact and habituation to immigrants work on the local level" (Weber 2015, 116).

A second major distinction concerns the types of data used to investigate the attitudes towards immigrants, voting intentions and electoral support for anti-immigration parties from a territorial perspective. One approach privileges individual-level panel surveys and data on the assumption that, when interested in understanding individual opinions or acts such as voting, this is the only option available to control for individual-level characteristics. However, individual-level surveys carry the limitations, according to their critics, that the representativeness of their samples at local and sub-local level is inadequate and, for privacy-related issues, they usually do not include detailed identifiers of residential locations. The alternative approach relies on aggregated-level register data on voting. The main criticism to this choice is that, with this type of data, crucial information about individuals is lost and the risk of ecological fallacy is particularly high – i.e. inferring that features detected at the aggregate level can be applied to the individuals. In response, supporters of this strategy argue that ecological analyses are best suited to study the geographical patterns and contextual factors that might explain political behaviour. However, in addition to a minorities of scholars that have started to combine individual level survey data and register data (Janssen et al. 2019), both data landscape have undergone significant improvement, with aggregate electoral data becoming available at increasingly granular degree, such as polling stations, and panel surveys providing geo-coding that links the individual data with spatial context information (Cebolla-Boado and Jiménez-Buedo 2011; Kaufmann and Harris 2015). Crucially "it is not the level of the data (aggregate or individual) that makes the quality of the findings, but the rigor in implementing and interpreting the analysis" (Russo 2018, 491).

The 2019 European Election in Italy: A municipal-level analysis of the vote for parties with restrictive views on migration

There is an established tradition of spatial-contextual analyses of electoral and political

behaviour in Italy (J. A. Agnew 1994; Shin and Agnew 2002; Giuliani 2018; Riera and Russo 2016), as well as studies of how immigration progressively gained a central role in defining party identities, political agendas and governmental activities (Geddes 2008; Campani 1993; van Spanje 2010). More recently, the territorial approach has been applied to understand more specifically the weight of immigration in the Italian electoral results (Abbondanza and Bailo 2018; Barone et al. 2016; Bratti et al. 2017). In recent years, immigration-related issues profiled centrally in Italy's election campaigns (Tintori 2018). As remarked in Chapter 2, Italy was one of the MS where parties in favour of more restrictive measures on migration gained more votes in 2019 EP elections compared to 2014 EP elections (see Figure 9). Historically, the party that has consistently and more prominently dedicated its political platform to reducing immigration and immigrant rights is the League (*Lega*, formerly, Northern League) (Bull 2010). At the EP 2019 elections, the League made its largest advance for share of votes obtained since the party exists (34.3%, compared to 6.6% in the EP 2014 elections and 17.4% in the 2018 National elections). News reports pointed out that data at a provincial level showed that the electoral success of the League was not linked to the size of the immigrant population, but was positively correlated with a high change in the proportions of migrants (Mancino 2019).

In this specific context, it is worth looking more broadly and deeper at the relationship between the percentage of votes for the parties weighted by CHES on the basis of their position on migration and the percentage of immigrant residents at a higher spatial resolution. The analysis employs electoral data of the EP 2019 at LAU level, that is at the level of Municipality, in combination with other socio-demographic data at the same spatial unit. The source for the electoral data is the same used in Chapter 2, whereas the percentage of immigrants was calculated from data at municipal level collected by the Italian office of Statistic (ISTAT)[34]. A series of regressions were performed with the share of votes for the selected parties with restrictive views on migration as the dependent variable and the share of migrants as the main independent variable. The selected control variables consider some of the factors and features that, in the literature, are more recurrently associated with a higher propensity to vote for parties with strong restrictive views on migration: the change in the share of migrants; a low population density, as a proxy for a non-cosmopolitan/rural setting; the share of population living on a low income; the age structure of the population[35]. Figure 15 provides a visualisation of how some of these variables are distributed in the territory at LAU level.

From the maps, it is possible to note a strong regional characterisation of both the share of population in low income and the share of votes for parties in favour of restrictive measures on migration. This regionalisation of the vote may represent a bias when evaluating the effects of the presence of migrants through purely descriptive analyses or at higher level of spatial aggregation. It is therefore an indication of the need of adopting more refined statistical models, looking at the variation within regions at lower spatial level.

[34] ISTAT, Resident foreigners on 1st January 2018 - Citizenship: All municipalities available at http://dati.istat.it/Index.aspx?lang=en&SubSessionId=fb024409-2c41-4dd7-9dee-8b00d343dbc8; Demography in figures, http://demo.istat.it/index_e.html; Ministry of Economy and Finance, Income and main Irpef variables on a municipal basis, https://www1.finanze.gov.it/finanze3/analisi_stat/index.php?search_class%5B0%5D=cCOMUNE&opendata=yes .

[35] See the technical note in the Annex for detailed information on the data source.

Figure 15 Mapping of the main variables used in the model for Italy.



Sources: ZEIT ONLINE dataset on EP 2019; CHES 2014 and 2017; ISTAT for the share and change in the share of migrants; Ministry of Finances for the level of income. See Annex 2 for more details on data sources, coverage and definition of variables.

Figure 16 summarises the results of the performed regressions. The main finding from these models is that, after controlling for population density, low income and differences among regions (by applying regional fixed effects), there is no statistically significant association between the presence of migrants and the considered electoral outcomes. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the change in the share of migrants between 2011 and 2018 has a negative association with the vote for parties with restrictive views on migration. This result remains consistent throughout the different models and it goes in the opposite direction of similar analyses reported in the cited Italian news. This showcases how paramount it is to determine the relevant geographic unit of analysis, when investigating the influence of territorial factors.

By the same token, population density has in all models a negative effect, thus supporting the hypothesis that parties favouring restrictive measures on migration harvest electoral consent more likely in less densely populated areas[36]. Low income (measured as share of population with tax declarations < 10000 Euro in each LAU) has a positive and, in absolute terms, the strongest association with support for such parties. Notably, while the presence of migrants has no clear statistical significance when measured in isolation, the association becomes positive when combined with low income and negative at the increase of population density.

[36] Similar results for population density are confirmed when zooming further the level of analysis in the case of the Netherlands (see next paragraph).

Figure 16 Results of the regression for Italy[37]

Sources: for the dependent variable on voting ZEIT ONLINE dataset on EP 2019; CHES 2014 and 2017. The size of symbols is proportional to standardised coefficients estimated from two different models. The first column presents the results for a model including the main variable of interest of the share of migrants and additional covariates. The second column present the effect of the share of migrants in interaction with population density and low income. The standardised coefficients show the expected effect from each explanatory variable on the share of votes for parties favouring restrictive measures on migration in terms of standard deviation. See Annex 3 for more details on the regression models, data sources, coverage and definition of variables.

The 2010 National Elections in the Netherlands: A neighbourhood-level analysis of the vote for the PVV

One of the most frequently researched case studies about the relationship between ethnic minority density and support for parties opposing immigration regards the Netherlands and the Party for Freedom (*Partij voor de Vrijheid*, PVV). The reason is twofold. First, the Dutch data landscape is particularly favourable to perform spatial analysis of the electoral outcomes, in the light of the easy access to a wealth of sub-local level datasets – ranging from polling-station level electoral data, neighbourhood-level data on the local ethnic composition and of local socio-economic conditions derived from Statistics Netherlands (CBS), individual panel waves. Second, the party established by Geert Wilders in 2006, the PVV, runs upon a clear cut anti-immigration, anti-establishments, anti-cosmopolitan and euro-sceptic manifesto (Vossen 2011; W. van der Brug and Fennema 2007; Muis and Immerzeel 2016; Inglehart and Norris 2016) and has been able to achieve a stable, considerable share of support in national elections.

As briefly mentioned in Chapter 2, scholarly research yields different results on the sign of the relationship between the presence of immigrants and support for the PVV, stretching from a weak and conditioned positive association, especially in suburban environments (Savelkoul, Laméris, and Tolsma 2017; van Gent, Jansen, and Smits 2014) to a negative

[37] See Appendix for more models and formal statistical results.

one, even though in a non-linear way and the evidence is often cautiously presented as inconclusive (de Blok and van der Meer 2018; van der Waal, de Koster, and Achterberg 2013; van Wijk, Bolt, and Johnston 2018). This is not surprising, considering the diverse methodological approaches that these studies adopt in terms of data selection and combination, the geographic focus of their analysis and the electoral time of reference under scrutiny. Despite these differences, scholarship on this specific case shows with overall consensus that sub-urban, low educated, middle-class to low income citizens are most likely to report to vote or cast their ballot for the PVV quite independently from the presence of ethnic minorities in their residential environment.

These findings are confirmed by the only study that so far combines individual level survey data and register data and runs the regression models at different scales – 100by100m grid cells, 500by500m grid cells, four-digit postal code area and Municipality (Janssen et al. 2019). In addition, the paper convincingly demonstrates that likelihood to vote for the PVV is positively related with the presence of non-western immigrants at more aggregated spatial scales, but the relationship is inverted when tested at micro-scale level; however, even in the latter framework, a curvilinear effect is in place with higher propensity to vote for the PVV in residential settings where the presence of non-western minorities is 30-50 per cent. Importantly, the analysis shows that data measuring the categories of political dissatisfaction, urban conditions and poverty are the most reliable predictors of the vote for the PVV.

The rest of this section uses a unique dataset on the residential concentration of migrant communities at high spatial resolution combined with electoral outcomes at comparable spatial resolution to further analyse the relationship between the presence of immigrants and the voting for the PVV in the Netherlands. The empirical analysis combines data from multiple sources: the 2011 national census statistics on the resident population by country of birth and/or citizenship at the lowest possible geographical detail and harmonised into cells of 100m by 100m; data on the electoral results, originally harvested at the level of single polling station, for the national elections of 2010[38], when the party increased its votes to 15.4 per cent from 5.9 per cent in 2006; and a set of socio-demographic variables from CBS, including level of education, income, age at neighbourhoods level for the entire territory of the Netherlands.

[38] When the party increased its votes to 15.4 per cent from 5.9 per cent in 2006

Figure 17 Correlations of socio-demographic variables with share of immigrant resident and with share of votes for the PVV



Sources: Kiesraad for the electoral data; JRC-D4I for migration data; CBS for the other variables. See Annex 3 for more details on data sources and definition of variables.

Figure 17 visualises a number of simple correlations between socio-economic and demographic features (dots) respectively with the concentration of the migrant population on the vertical axis, and with the share of votes for the PVV in the general elections of 2010 on the horizontal axis. These descriptive analyses indicate four key points. First, (top left quadrant) a high presence of young (15-25), highly educated, single people living in urban contexts is positively associated with concentration of migrants and negatively with the propensity to vote for an anti-immigration party. Second, (top right quadrant) areas with more low income households, recipients of social benefits and social housing, are positively associated both with the share of immigrant residents and the propensity to vote for the PVV. Third, (low left quadrant) areas with high income are negatively associated with both concentration of immigrants and propensity to vote for the PVV. Finally, (low right quadrant) areas with a greater presence of elderly (45-65) and less educated people are negatively associated with the concentration of migrants but positively with a propensity to vote for the PVV.

It is important to underline that these correlations do not imply any causal inference about the motives behind the vote for the PVV. The correlations shown in the chart are considered independently for each socio-demographic variable and in respect of the two axes. However, they figuratively show the need to take a more fine-grained approach to investigating support for parties with anti-immigration platforms, including in the picture the interaction of economic/demographic change with varying cosmopolitan/localist influences (Gordon 2018).

Built upon this exploratory screening of the local contextual variables, the regression models reported in Figure 18 look at unravelling the links between the country's ethnic composition in 2011[39] and the percentage of valid votes for the PVV party at the 2010 Dutch general election. The regression covariates *Education Low*, *Income low*, *Age (15-24)*, *Population density* refer to neighbourhood-aggregated key figures from CBS for the year 2011. All the results across the different models remain statistically significant.

The first column of Figure 18 reports the results of a model, in which we introduced as instrumental variable the change in the composition and size of the ethnic minorities in the same territories between 2001 and 2011. We adopted this 'classic' regression technique (Card 2001), to mitigate the effect of unobserved and uncontrolled factors, including possible issues of endogeneity or reverse causality[40]. In fact, residential patterns of individuals are not a product of random circumstances, but they often are the outcomes of a selective sorting. For example, not only international migrants tend to migrate to ethnic enclaves, but also people's movement internal to the country or even within a city selects on political preferences of the area's population, its demographic composition, income, and population density (Tam Cho, Gimpel, and Hui 2013). The regression shows that the relationship between the share of non-Western migrants and support in the ballots for the PVV is consistently negative, when we control for the social, demographic and economic features[41].

The second and third columns of Figure 18 split the observations included in the model, according to the population density (high vs low) of the considered territory, as a proxy for an urban vs rural setting. As emerged in the case of Italy at municipal level for the EP 2019 elections, the same evidence holds here at the neighbourhood level for the Dutch general elections of 2010: parties favouring restrictive measures on migration obtain their support more likely in less densely populated areas.

[39] Main independent variable is the Non-Western share of residential population, defined as having a non-Western country of birth.
[40] It should be noted that the adopted technique comes with its own limitations when carrying out empirical work on immigration (Jaeger, Ruist, and Stuhler 2018; Lozano and Steinberger 2012).
[41] Models included in Annex 3 show that the same variable of Non-Western share of migrants has a positive effect when taken in isolation.

Figure 18 Results of the regression for the Netherlands[42].

Sources: Kiesraad for the electoral data; JRC-D4I for migration data CBS for the other variables.
Notes: The first column presents the results for a model including the main variable of interest of the share of migrants and additional covariates. The second and third columns present the same model for neighbourhoods respectively with low and high population density. The standardised coefficients show the expected effect from each explanatory variable on the share of votes for the PVV. See Annex 3 for more details on the regression models, data sources and definition of variables.

In conclusion, the regression confirms overall that the most relevant factors at work associated with a vote for the PVV, embedded at neighbourhood level, are a low level of education, a bad economic situation and a non-cosmopolitan residential environment. These findings corroborate similar results found in other MS (Riera and Russo 2016; Barone et al. 2016). In addition, it should be mentioned that some of the background work carried out in the preparation of the analysis showed that the described patterns are heterogeneous across municipalities with different sizes. While the impact of neighbourhood composition emerging from this analysis cannot be overstated, the findings support the argument in favour of adopting a micro-scale spatial approach in the investigation of the relationship between electoral outcomes and the residential patterns of immigrants.

[42] See Appendix for more models and formal statistical results.

Conclusion

The following key messages can be drawn from the case studies of Italy and the Netherlands:

- In both cases, a divide emerges consistently in the voting patterns along the urban/less populated line.
- In the case of the EP elections of 2019 in Italy, low population density and low income, more than the presence of migrants, explain the votes for parties with restrictive views on migration.
- The increase in the share of migrants between 2011 and 2018 in Italy, measured at municipality level, is negatively associated with the vote for parties favouring restrictive migration measures.
- The case of the 2010 general elections in the Netherlands confirms that economic and sociodemographic factors such as the age structure of the residing population, low education and low income explain the support for the local anti-immigration party more than the high presence of migrants.

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Annex 1

Table 1 List of standard and flash Eurobarometer consulted

Eurobarometer 91.5	June 2019	ZA7576
Eurobarometer 91.2	March 2019	ZA7562
Eurobarometer 90.3	November 2018	ZA7489
Eurobarometer 89.1	March 2018	ZA6963
Eurobarometer 88.3	November 2017	ZA6928
Eurobarometer 87.3	May 2017	ZA6863
Eurobarometer 86.2	November 2016	ZA6788
Eurobarometer 85.2	May 2016	ZA6694
Eurobarometer 84.3	Nov 2015	ZA6643
Eurobarometer 83.3	May 2015	ZA5998
Eurobarometer 83.1	February-March 2015	ZA5964
Eurobarometer 82.3	November 2014	ZA5932
Eurobarometer 81.4	May-June 2014	ZA5928
Eurobarometer 81.2	March 2014	ZA5913
Eurobarometer 80.1	Nov 2013	ZA5876.
Eurobarometer 79.3	May 2013	ZA5689
Eurobarometer 78.1	November 2012	ZA5685
Eurobarometer 77.3	May 2012	ZA5612
Eurobarometer 76.3	November 2011	ZA5567
Eurobarometer 69.2	May 2008	ZA4744
Eurobarometer 66.1	September-October 2006	ZA4526
Eurobarometer 60.1	October-November 2003	ZA3938
Flash Eurobarometer 356	August-September 2012	ZA5791
Flash Eurobarometer 427	September 2015	ZA6649
Flash Eurobarometer 472		2018

Figure 19. Trust in institutions in EU28



Source: Standard Eurobarometer, November 2011 - June 2019.
Note: Due to uneven coding in the original data, 'Don't know' are discarded. Weighted observations

Figure 20. Attitudes towards immigration from outside the EU by age when stopped full-time education



Source: Standard Eurobarometer, November 2014 - June 2019.
Notes: Displayed are proportions of respondents answering that immigration evokes very or fairly positive feelings, by the age when they stopped full time education. Due to uneven coding in the original data, "Don't know" are discarded. Weighted observations.

Figure 21. Salience of immigration, taxation, inflation at the country, personal, and EU level



Source: Standard Eurobarometer, November 2011 - March 2019. Notes: Due to uneven coding in the original data, "Don't know" are discarded. Weighted observation

Figure 22. Salience at the EU level, Austria to Greece



Figure 23. Salience at the EU level, Spain to Latvia



Figure 24. Salience at the EU level, Malta to UK



Figure 25. Percentage points difference in trust in the EU between cities and rural areas.



Source: Standard Eurobarometer, November 2011 - March 2019. Notes: Due to uneven coding in the original data, "Don't know" are discarded. Weighted observation

Table 2. Country regression models: Trust in the EU and salience of immigration at the EU level

	AT	BE	BG	CY	CZ	DE	DK	EE	ES	FI
Salience immigration	0.0718***	0.00457	-0.0549**	-0.0821***	0.0518*	0.0545**	0.0341**	-0.0125	-0.0261**	0.0515
	(0.0124)	(0.0157)	(0.0128)	(0.0141)	(0.0168)	(0.0137)	(0.00545)	(0.0111)	(0.00748)	(0.0226)
Female	0.00995	0.00577	0.00802	-0.00901	0.00800	0.0236*	0.0223	0.00997	-0.0261*	0.0287*
	(0.0103)	(0.00986)	(0.00507)	(0.0139)	(0.0116)	(0.00839)	(0.0157)	(0.0111)	(0.00982)	(0.00651)
Age 25-34	-0.0339	0.0423	0.0781	0.0686	0.0150	0.101**	0.152	0.0231	0.0746*	0.223**
	(0.0305)	(0.0285)	(0.0383)	(0.0388)	(0.0304)	(0.0270)	(0.0786)	(0.0343)	(0.0264)	(0.0310)
Age 35-44	0.0172	0.0788	0.132**	0.0251	0.0273	0.105**	0.228*	0.0609	0.0761**	0.259***
	(0.0397)	(0.0453)	(0.0311)	(0.0394)	(0.0383)	(0.0261)	(0.0617)	(0.0351)	(0.0257)	(0.0163)
Age 45-54	0.0360	0.120**	0.167**	-0.00677	0.0711	0.124***	0.259*	0.0517	0.0781**	0.266**
	(0.0438)	(0.0335)	(0.0290)	(0.0391)	(0.0450)	(0.0294)	(0.0722)	(0.0349)	(0.0266)	(0.0229)
Age 55-64	0.0332	0.0783*	0.182*	0.0171	0.0680	0.140***	0.238*	0.0540	0.0631*	0.255**
	(0.0501)	(0.0292)	(0.0495)	(0.0393)	(0.0439)	(0.0287)	(0.0690)	(0.0350)	(0.0234)	(0.0334)
Age 75+	0.000301	-0.0225	0.250*	-0.0182	-0.0688	-0.0226	0.0726	-0.0899*	-0.0576*	0.176**
	(0.0626)	(0.0255)	(0.0935)	(0.0503)	(0.0515)	(0.0296)	(0.0728)	(0.0384)	(0.0269)	(0.0262)
Household size: 2	-0.0540*	-0.00601	-0.00892	0.0137	-0.0135	-0.00159	-0.0139	-0.0166	-0.0108	0.0132
	(0.0234)	(0.0189)	(0.0136)	(0.0234)	(0.0148)	(0.00824)	(0.01000)	(0.0130)	(0.0135)	(0.00929)
Household size: 3	-0.0665	-0.0126	-0.0159	-0.0165	-0.0332	-0.00829	-0.0275*	-0.0109	0.000217	-0.0309
	(0.0353)	(0.0163)	(0.0208)	(0.0265)	(0.0197)	(0.0150)	(0.00637)	(0.0186)	(0.0235)	(0.0223)
Household size: 4+	-0.0880	-0.0416*	-0.0275	0.0173	-0.0635**	-0.00426	-0.0575*	-0.0286	-0.0107	-0.0422
	(0.0539)	(0.0168)	(0.0129)	(0.0256)	(0.0147)	(0.0168)	(0.0141)	(0.0180)	(0.0240)	(0.0337)
Perceived urbanization: small or middle town	0.0359	0.00592	0.0394*	0.0312	0.0263	-0.0175	-0.0137	0.0285*	-0.00960	-0.0171
	(0.0345)	(0.0277)	(0.0146)	(0.0166)	(0.0438)	(0.0155)	(0.0153)	(0.0132)	(0.0169)	(0.0105)
Perceived urbanization: large town	-0.0421	0.0155	0.0876	0.0151	0.0189	-0.0359	0.000751	-0.0259*	-0.00332	-0.0581
	(0.0531)	(0.0289)	(0.0559)	(0.0166)	(0.0361)	(0.0202)	(0.0275)	(0.0132)	(0.0173)	(0.0310)
Education: secondary	-0.0650	-0.0359*	-0.0581	-0.0742***	-0.0353	-0.0541***	-0.0130	-0.00922	-0.0630***	-0.0583
	(0.0568)	(0.0146)	(0.0380)	(0.0192)	(0.0339)	(0.0118)	(0.0236)	(0.0246)	(0.0121)	(0.0281)
Education: tertiary	-0.148*	-0.125***	-0.120	-0.136***	-0.103*	-0.124***	-0.0809*	-0.0574*	-0.0778***	-0.134*
	(0.0623)	(0.0177)	(0.0614)	(0.0223)	(0.0431)	(0.0140)	(0.0271)	(0.0250)	(0.0177)	(0.0248)
Occupation: manager	-0.0246	-0.0631	0.0248	-0.0535	-0.0391	-0.0912**	-0.0667	-0.0991***	-0.0324	0.00958
	(0.0147)	(0.0376)	(0.0348)	(0.0352)	(0.0236)	(0.0306)	(0.0414)	(0.0242)	(0.0361)	(0.0525)
Occupation: other white collar	0.0457	-0.0311	0.00971	0.00162	0.000383	-0.00424	-0.0134	-0.0648*	-0.000442	0.00858
	(0.0345)	(0.0224)	(0.0341)	(0.0300)	(0.0166)	(0.0269)	(0.0275)	(0.0285)	(0.0229)	(0.0348)
Occupation: manual worker	0.0274	0.0409	0.0564	0.0245	0.0563	0.0523**	0.0470	0.0291	0.0207	0.116
	(0.0159)	(0.0186)	(0.0317)	(0.0294)	(0.0267)	(0.0141)	(0.0248)	(0.0251)	(0.0160)	(0.0720)
Occupation: house person	-0.0406	0.0823*	0.0209	-0.0449	0.0493	-0.0162	-0.00709	-0.0569	0.0257	0.156
	(0.0430)	(0.0324)	(0.0560)	(0.0393)	(0.0497)	(0.0330)	(0.0815)	(0.0370)	(0.0274)	(0.0543)
Occupation: unemployed	0.137**	0.0646*	0.148**	0.0372	0.0967*	0.0727**	0.0693	0.164***	0.0717**	0.157
	(0.0302)	(0.0276)	(0.0301)	(0.0305)	(0.0367)	(0.0247)	(0.0332)	(0.0346)	(0.0202)	(0.0800)
Occupation: retired	0.0183	0.0565	0.115**	-0.0765*	0.0891*	0.0323	0.0406	0.0273	0.0279	0.103
	(0.0119)	(0.0254)	(0.0282)	(0.0345)	(0.0332)	(0.0259)	(0.0304)	(0.0270)	(0.0311)	(0.0714)
Occupation: student	-0.192**	-0.0764	0.00802	-0.128*	-0.0953**	-0.0808*	0.0210	-0.162***	-0.0742*	0.0456
	(0.0420)	(0.0365)	(0.0505)	(0.0499)	(0.0240)	(0.0360)	(0.0422)	(0.0419)	(0.0319)	(0.0943)
Observations	10093	10509	9181	4953	10006	15112	9722	8053	9862	9565
Adjusted R^2	0.122	0.070	0.068	0.072	0.056	0.087	0.052	0.054	0.050	0.054

*Notes: Regression coefficients of linear probability models. All models include time dummies (one for each Eurobarometer wave) and a constant term. The models also include regional dummies (except for CY, EE). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the regional level (except for CY, EE). *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< small 0.1. Reference categories for the covariates: Salience immigration (EU): not mentioned. Gender: male. Age: 15-24. Household size: 1. Perceived urbanization level: rural or village. Education: no or primary. Occupation: self-employed.*

	FR	GB	GR	HR	HU	IE	IT	LT	LU	LV
Salience immigration	0.0253**	0.0639***	-0.0224*	-0.0594***	0.0945	-0.00760	0.0179	-0.0270	0.0539***	-0.0387*
	(0.00873)	(0.00902)	(0.00949)	(0.0106)	(0.0412)	(0.0109)	(0.0136)	(0.0124)	(0.0146)	(0.0111)
Female	0.00807	-0.00660	-0.0108	0.0292**	0.0167	0.0158	0.00849	-0.0199	0.0256	-0.0171
	(0.0117)	(0.0122)	(0.00554)	(0.0101)	(0.00929)	(0.0107)	(0.0119)	(0.00990)	(0.0144)	(0.0118)
Age 25-34	0.0946***	0.102***	0.0315	0.0369	0.0291	0.0896**	0.0129	0.0815*	0.0300	0.0800*
	(0.0196)	(0.0129)	(0.0207)	(0.0224)	(0.0264)	(0.0277)	(0.0280)	(0.0285)	(0.0457)	(0.0240)
Age 35-44	0.112***	0.131***	0.0201	0.0444	0.0861*	0.0988***	0.0373	0.112**	0.0606	0.198**
	(0.0205)	(0.0132)	(0.0183)	(0.0229)	(0.0319)	(0.0271)	(0.0327)	(0.0301)	(0.0456)	(0.0310)
Age 45-54	0.107***	0.158***	0.0361	0.0264	0.0770*	0.0971***	0.0349	0.127***	0.0600	0.194***
	(0.0254)	(0.0193)	(0.0171)	(0.0232)	(0.0264)	(0.0276)	(0.0346)	(0.0213)	(0.0455)	(0.0193)
Age 55-64	0.107***	0.199***	0.0331	0.00950	0.0860**	0.0804**	0.0489	0.144***	0.0811	0.163***
	(0.0272)	(0.0291)	(0.0159)	(0.0251)	(0.0145)	(0.0293)	(0.0264)	(0.0288)	(0.0479)	(0.0233)
Age 75+	-0.0344	0.132**	-0.00955	-0.0124	0.0348	-0.0803*	0.131*	0.0774*	-0.102	-0.0595
	(0.0372)	(0.0386)	(0.0352)	(0.0376)	(0.0377)	(0.0356)	(0.0289)	(0.0284)	(0.0536)	(0.225)
Household size: 2	-0.0153	-0.0144	-0.0338*	-0.0687***	-0.0112	-0.0176	-0.0445*	-0.00883	-0.0273	-0.0129
	(0.0113)	(0.00917)	(0.0120)	(0.0162)	(0.0125)	(0.0158)	(0.0127)	(0.0133)	(0.0202)	(0.0199)
Household size: 3	-0.0280	0.00221	-0.0135	-0.0844***	-0.00625	-0.0106	-0.0514	0.00201	-0.0309	-0.00359
	(0.0188)	(0.0119)	(0.00990)	(0.0175)	(0.00945)	(0.0190)	(0.0314)	(0.0128)	(0.0242)	(0.0107)
Household size: 4+	-0.0652**	-0.0287*	-0.0360	-0.0884***	-0.0143	-0.0516**	-0.0805	0.0242	-0.0326	-0.00668
	(0.0208)	(0.0117)	(0.0178)	(0.0166)	(0.0243)	(0.0172)	(0.0394)	(0.0127)	(0.0231)	(0.0198)
Perceived urbanization: small or middle town	-0.0448**	-0.0302*	-0.0309	0.0167	-0.00221	0.0156	-0.0246	0.0271*	-0.00446	0.00567
	(0.0129)	(0.0105)	(0.0186)	(0.0116)	(0.0320)	(0.0128)	(0.0314)	(0.0120)	(0.0151)	(0.0257)
Perceived urbanization: large town	-0.0592**	-0.0306*	-0.0199	-0.0909***	-0.0104	-0.00668	-0.0941	0.0475	-0.0372	-0.0272
	(0.0156)	(0.0113)	(0.0322)	(0.0131)	(0.0497)	(0.0124)	(0.0658)	(0.0453)	(0.0233)	(0.0310)
Education: secondary	-0.0516*	-0.0563***	-0.0192	0.0000312	-0.00437	-0.0887***	-0.0946	0.0171	0.0521*	-0.0287
	(0.0197)	(0.0111)	(0.0143)	(0.0203)	(0.0169)	(0.0164)	(0.0451)	(0.0152)	(0.0236)	(0.0322)
Education: tertiary	-0.144***	-0.193***	-0.0870***	-0.0323	-0.0185	-0.197***	-0.154*	-0.0156	-0.0427	-0.0798*
	(0.0172)	(0.00842)	(0.0173)	(0.0227)	(0.0248)	(0.0178)	(0.0338)	(0.0196)	(0.0234)	(0.0272)
Occupation: manager	-0.104**	0.00408	-0.111*	0.0196	-0.00635	-0.0677**	-0.109*	-0.0387	-0.0338	-0.0342
	(0.0294)	(0.0291)	(0.0373)	(0.0280)	(0.0485)	(0.0242)	(0.0304)	(0.0256)	(0.0332)	(0.0190)
Occupation: other white collar	0.0145	-0.0198	0.00713	0.0766**	0.0168	0.0164	-0.00440	-0.00528	0.00933	-0.00110
	(0.0270)	(0.0260)	(0.0224)	(0.0256)	(0.0288)	(0.0262)	(0.0163)	(0.0179)	(0.0338)	(0.0198)
Occupation: manual worker	0.0384	0.0514*	-0.0155	0.101***	0.0356	0.0446	0.0869	0.0367	0.0481	0.0493*
	(0.0268)	(0.0167)	(0.0153)	(0.0244)	(0.0211)	(0.0240)	(0.0327)	(0.0296)	(0.0339)	(0.0165)
Occupation: house person	0.0427	0.0378	-0.0308	0.0991**	0.0501	0.0791**	0.116*	0.0496	0.0751	0.0180
	(0.0252)	(0.0373)	(0.0139)	(0.0362)	(0.0294)	(0.0261)	(0.0394)	(0.0527)	(0.0423)	(0.0128)
Occupation: unemployed	0.0616**	0.0403	0.0393	0.103***	0.119***	0.138***	0.221**	0.0502*	0.0745	0.0729**
	(0.0205)	(0.0293)	(0.0198)	(0.0267)	(0.0169)	(0.0279)	(0.0360)	(0.0189)	(0.0464)	(0.0113)
Occupation: retired	0.0332	0.0223	-0.0517*	0.0598*	0.0445	-0.0154	-0.00127	0.00754	0.0591	0.0378
	(0.0298)	(0.0267)	(0.0174)	(0.0279)	(0.0232)	(0.0260)	(0.0331)	(0.0347)	(0.0350)	(0.0257)
Occupation: student	-0.195***	-0.0612	-0.112**	0.00463	0.0667	-0.0224	-0.00887	-0.0687*	-0.0344	-0.109**
	(0.0484)	(0.0485)	(0.0277)	(0.0342)	(0.0887)	(0.0358)	(0.0440)	(0.0227)	(0.0563)	(0.0198)
Observations	9803	11470	10723	10144	10564	9430	9328	8912	4849	8969
Adjusted R^2	0.068	0.087	0.053	0.029	0.040	0.061	0.093	0.033	0.034	0.047

*Notes: Regression coefficients of linear probability models. All models include time dummies (one for each Eurobarometer wave) and a constant term. The models also include regional dummies (except for HR, IE, LU). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the regional level (except for HR, IE, LU). *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< small 0.1. Reference categories for the covariates: Salience immigration (EU): not mentioned. Gender: male. Age: 15-24. Household size: 1. Perceived urbanization level: rural or village. Education: no or primary. Occupation: self-employed.*

	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SE	SI	SK
Salience immigration	-0.00895	0.0296**	-0.00874	-0.0397*	-0.0987**	0.0505***	-0.0163	-0.00566
	(0.0147)	(0.00877)	(0.0150)	(0.0125)	(0.0201)	(0.00632)	(0.0161)	(0.0245)
Female	0.0624***	0.0221*	0.0503**	-0.00560	0.0165	-0.00656	-0.0272	0.0307**
	(0.0167)	(0.00825)	(0.0134)	(0.0219)	(0.0121)	(0.0152)	(0.0133)	(0.00524)
Age 25-34	0.0374	0.0413	0.0368	0.0544	-0.0156	0.0989**	0.0330	0.0466
	(0.0441)	(0.0433)	(0.0393)	(0.0233)	(0.0307)	(0.0228)	(0.0291)	(0.0219)
Age 35-44	0.0238	0.0731	0.0386	0.0200	-0.0168	0.145**	0.0504	0.0795
	(0.0436)	(0.0387)	(0.0406)	(0.0183)	(0.0241)	(0.0269)	(0.0354)	(0.0343)
Age 45-54	0.0917*	0.0888	0.0103	0.0439	-0.000556	0.140**	0.0510	0.0916
	(0.0436)	(0.0407)	(0.0533)	(0.0340)	(0.0302)	(0.0300)	(0.0426)	(0.0427)
Age 55-64	-0.0204	0.105*	0.0399	0.0244	-0.0131	0.186**	0.0778*	0.0933
	(0.0439)	(0.0414)	(0.0488)	(0.0339)	(0.0235)	(0.0379)	(0.0321)	(0.0298)
Age 75+	-0.144**	0.0160	0.0326	0.0866*	-0.0330	0.101*	-0.0343	0.0328
	(0.0490)	(0.0382)	(0.0640)	(0.0309)	(0.0424)	(0.0413)	(0.0363)	(0.0389)
Household size: 2	-0.0162	-0.0240*	-0.0682***	-0.0402	-0.00118	-0.0266	-0.0360*	-0.00759
	(0.0222)	(0.00971)	(0.0158)	(0.0194)	(0.0219)	(0.0151)	(0.0145)	(0.0134)
Household size: 3	-0.0320	0.00944	-0.0565*	-0.0376	-0.0320	-0.0257	-0.0437	-0.00945
	(0.0260)	(0.0130)	(0.0203)	(0.0191)	(0.0275)	(0.0163)	(0.0226)	(0.0184)
Household size: 4+	-0.0267	-0.0340*	-0.0638*	-0.00282	-0.0319	-0.0651**	-0.0461*	-0.0396
	(0.0265)	(0.0128)	(0.0252)	(0.0184)	(0.0243)	(0.0149)	(0.0194)	(0.0136)
Perceived urbanization: small or middle town	-0.0378*	-0.0137	-0.0485*	0.0333	0.0378	-0.0673***	-0.0431	-0.103
	(0.0161)	(0.00878)	(0.0220)	(0.0204)	(0.0294)	(0.00618)	(0.0227)	(0.0398)
Perceived urbanization: large town	-0.109***	-0.0384*	-0.0928*	0.0213	0.0482	-0.0987***	-0.111***	-0.0594
	(0.0205)	(0.0137)	(0.0322)	(0.0337)	(0.0439)	(0.00803)	(0.0163)	(0.0385)
Education: secondary	-0.0449*	-0.0858**	-0.0649	-0.0720**	-0.0652*	-0.0490	-0.0456	0.00154
	(0.0186)	(0.0227)	(0.0320)	(0.0148)	(0.0217)	(0.0218)	(0.0210)	(0.0422)
Education: tertiary	-0.0509*	-0.239***	-0.114**	-0.0826**	-0.0888*	-0.127***	-0.0832***	-0.0434
	(0.0253)	(0.0214)	(0.0304)	(0.0179)	(0.0320)	(0.0160)	(0.0140)	(0.0515)
Occupation: manager	-0.00400	-0.0660*	-0.0209	-0.0191	-0.0949*	-0.0490	0.0241	-0.0476
	(0.0410)	(0.0270)	(0.0300)	(0.0366)	(0.0315)	(0.0323)	(0.0351)	(0.0524)
Occupation: other white collar	0.00895	-0.0296	0.00670	-0.0256	-0.0761	-0.000331	0.0594**	0.00158
	(0.0438)	(0.0330)	(0.0260)	(0.0345)	(0.0497)	(0.0360)	(0.0179)	(0.0225)
Occupation: manual worker	0.0323	0.0520	0.0681*	-0.0133	-0.00789	0.0905	0.0805*	0.0367
	(0.0410)	(0.0357)	(0.0278)	(0.0421)	(0.0339)	(0.0414)	(0.0300)	(0.0431)
Occupation: house person	0.0477	0.0839*	0.0269	0.0855**	-0.00673	0.0175	0.0339	0.0633
	(0.0413)	(0.0345)	(0.0272)	(0.0120)	(0.0447)	(0.0614)	(0.0505)	(0.0265)
Occupation: unemployed	0.136*	0.0590	0.130**	0.117	0.0117	0.118*	0.126***	0.162**
	(0.0643)	(0.0303)	(0.0395)	(0.0463)	(0.0490)	(0.0444)	(0.0247)	(0.0257)
Occupation: retired	0.0415	0.0367	0.0178	-0.00660	0.00856	0.0421	0.0437	-0.00608
	(0.0408)	(0.0275)	(0.0256)	(0.0421)	(0.0408)	(0.0220)	(0.0273)	(0.0356)
Occupation: student	-0.0762	-0.203***	-0.0755	-0.0525	-0.0642	0.0267	-0.0828	-0.0767*
	(0.0601)	(0.0443)	(0.0503)	(0.0451)	(0.0407)	(0.0301)	(0.0382)	(0.0218)
Observations	4286	10167	9044	9854	9892	10030	10140	9896
Adjusted R^2	0.037	0.069	0.048	0.060	0.041	0.049	0.045	0.035

*Notes: Regression coefficients of linear probability models. All models include time dummies (one for each Eurobarometer wave) and a constant term. The models also include regional dummies (except for MT). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the regional level (except for MT). *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< small 0.1. Reference categories for the covariates: Salience immigration (EU): not mentioned. Gender: male. Age: 15-24. Household size: 1. Perceived urbanization level: rural or village. Education: no or primary. Occupation: self-employed.*

Table 3. Country regression models: Trust in the EU and attitudes towards immigration from outside the EU

	AT	BE	BG	CY	CZ	DE	DK	EE	ES	FI
Attitudes towards immigration: negative	0.246***	0.146***	0.176**	0.0592***	0.184***	0.217***	0.157***	0.132***	0.0688***	0.150**
	(0.0316)	(0.0199)	(0.0348)	(0.0168)	(0.0295)	(0.01000)	(0.00675)	(0.0138)	(0.0108)	(0.0190)
Female	0.0106	0.00952	-0.00215	-0.0186	0.00188	0.0178	0.0181	0.0115	-0.0237	0.0253*
	(0.0138)	(0.0105)	(0.00453)	(0.0147)	(0.0118)	(0.00942)	(0.0158)	(0.0119)	(0.0136)	(0.00700)
Age 25-34	-0.0352	0.0437	0.0507	0.0362	0.0189	0.105***	0.135	0.0112	0.0677*	0.206**
	(0.0381)	(0.0279)	(0.0318)	(0.0420)	(0.0302)	(0.0245)	(0.0839)	(0.0389)	(0.0295)	(0.0287)
Age 35-44	0.0134	0.0817	0.115**	0.00110	0.0191	0.0984**	0.215*	0.0351	0.0615	0.242**
	(0.0412)	(0.0389)	(0.0270)	(0.0423)	(0.0377)	(0.0249)	(0.0601)	(0.0395)	(0.0291)	(0.0233)
Age 45-54	0.0162	0.116**	0.140**	-0.0225	0.0566	0.110**	0.246*	0.0246	0.0675*	0.239***
	(0.0467)	(0.0294)	(0.0254)	(0.0419)	(0.0397)	(0.0276)	(0.0695)	(0.0392)	(0.0310)	(0.0183)
Age 55-64	0.00903	0.0766*	0.148*	0.00580	0.0437	0.135***	0.224*	0.0356	0.0467	0.246**
	(0.0514)	(0.0315)	(0.0404)	(0.0423)	(0.0381)	(0.0294)	(0.0708)	(0.0393)	(0.0277)	(0.0373)
Age 75+	-0.0356	-0.0212	0.212	-0.0117	-0.0867	-0.0199	0.0488	-0.124**	-0.0744*	0.162*
	(0.0630)	(0.0269)	(0.109)	(0.0538)	(0.0448)	(0.0319)	(0.0737)	(0.0428)	(0.0308)	(0.0299)
Household size: 2	-0.0509	-0.0141	-0.00878	0.0179	-0.0109	-0.00674	-0.0202	-0.0128	0.00307	0.0104
	(0.0258)	(0.0169)	(0.0129)	(0.0250)	(0.0152)	(0.00906)	(0.0111)	(0.0140)	(0.0168)	(0.0119)
Household size: 3	-0.0728	-0.0183	-0.0145	-0.0201	-0.0365	-0.0182	-0.0203*	-0.0126	0.0126	-0.0142
	(0.0381)	(0.0110)	(0.0196)	(0.0283)	(0.0225)	(0.0143)	(0.00701)	(0.0199)	(0.0250)	(0.0223)
Household size: 4+	-0.0924	-0.0375*	-0.0328*	0.0142	-0.0525**	-0.00395	-0.0575*	-0.0117	-0.00893	-0.0252
	(0.0565)	(0.0128)	(0.0120)	(0.0274)	(0.0127)	(0.0165)	(0.0187)	(0.0195)	(0.0241)	(0.0400)
Perceived urbanization: small or middle town	0.0410	0.0173	0.0263	0.0362*	0.0299	-0.00736	0.00753	0.0300*	-0.00658	-0.0143
	(0.0342)	(0.0346)	(0.0137)	(0.0176)	(0.0527)	(0.0192)	(0.0187)	(0.0143)	(0.0166)	(0.0162)
Perceived urbanization: large town	0.00159	0.0143	0.0834	0.0208	0.0304	-0.0333	0.0360	-0.0200	0.00117	-0.0438
	(0.0381)	(0.0289)	(0.0502)	(0.0177)	(0.0409)	(0.0197)	(0.0244)	(0.0142)	(0.0232)	(0.0307)
Education: secondary	-0.0569	-0.0335*	-0.0554	-0.0604**	-0.0297	-0.0448**	-0.0202	-0.0274	-0.0776***	-0.0513
	(0.0488)	(0.0126)	(0.0435)	(0.0205)	(0.0366)	(0.0135)	(0.0211)	(0.0264)	(0.0133)	(0.0274)
Education: tertiary	-0.112*	-0.109***	-0.126	-0.135***	-0.0891	-0.0719***	-0.0732*	-0.0707**	-0.0832***	-0.115*
	(0.0475)	(0.0191)	(0.0640)	(0.0237)	(0.0512)	(0.0128)	(0.0236)	(0.0268)	(0.0191)	(0.0230)
Occupation: manager	-0.000607	-0.0412	0.0181	-0.0487	-0.0460	-0.0929*	-0.0520	-0.0945***	-0.0335	0.0172
	(0.0240)	(0.0359)	(0.0382)	(0.0377)	(0.0249)	(0.0365)	(0.0363)	(0.0260)	(0.0384)	(0.0768)
Occupation: other white collar	0.0373	-0.0143	-0.00261	0.00986	-0.00253	-0.00946	-0.00362	-0.0692*	-0.00890	-0.00606
	(0.0391)	(0.0220)	(0.0287)	(0.0320)	(0.0172)	(0.0310)	(0.0237)	(0.0311)	(0.0286)	(0.0562)
Occupation: manual worker	0.00743	0.0559*	0.0304	0.0354	0.0678	0.0249	0.0372	0.0149	0.00861	0.0982
	(0.0199)	(0.0185)	(0.0195)	(0.0315)	(0.0297)	(0.0171)	(0.0285)	(0.0269)	(0.0201)	(0.0937)
Occupation: house person	-0.0686	0.115**	-0.0138	-0.0407	0.0283	-0.0555	0.0109	-0.0730	0.00399	0.131
	(0.0440)	(0.0266)	(0.0504)	(0.0417)	(0.0414)	(0.0352)	(0.0757)	(0.0396)	(0.0257)	(0.0671)
Occupation: unemployed	0.109*	0.0774**	0.119**	0.0458	0.0871	0.0409	0.0719	0.160***	0.0524	0.153
	(0.0370)	(0.0223)	(0.0234)	(0.0323)	(0.0392)	(0.0247)	(0.0317)	(0.0367)	(0.0270)	(0.105)
Occupation: retired	0.00570	0.0636*	0.0965**	-0.0708	0.0803	0.0142	0.0392	0.0383	0.00387	0.101
	(0.0186)	(0.0228)	(0.0198)	(0.0362)	(0.0344)	(0.0243)	(0.0229)	(0.0291)	(0.0362)	(0.0911)
Occupation: student	-0.170**	-0.0501	-0.0185	-0.115*	-0.0740*	-0.0607	0.0336	-0.140**	-0.0796*	0.0409
	(0.0451)	(0.0308)	(0.0666)	(0.0539)	(0.0250)	(0.0455)	(0.0488)	(0.0473)	(0.0337)	(0.110)
Observations	8655	9384	7639	4366	8691	12973	8251	6910	8172	8441
Adjusted R^2	0.162	0.087	0.085	0.065	0.070	0.125	0.074	0.064	0.053	0.072

*Notes: Regression coefficients of linear probability models. All models include time dummies (one for each Eurobarometer wave) and a constant term. The models also include regional dummies (except for CY, EE). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the regional level (except for CY, EE). *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< small 0.1. Reference categories for the covariates: Attitudes towards immigration from outside the EU: positive. Gender: male. Age: 15-24. Household size: 1. Perceived urbanization level: rural or village. Education: no or primary. Occupation: self-employed.*

	FR	GB	GR	HR	HU	IE	IT	LT	LU	LV
Attitudes towards immigration: negative	0.177***	0.218***	0.0796**	0.130***	0.145**	0.188***	0.301***	0.0779***	0.149***	0.0801**
	(0.0137)	(0.0162)	(0.0186)	(0.0107)	(0.0349)	(0.0112)	(0.0179)	(0.0119)	(0.0157)	(0.0167)
Female	0.0105	-0.00473	-0.00881*	0.0312**	0.00868	0.0136	0.0190	-0.0143	0.0205	-0.0220
	(0.0123)	(0.0113)	(0.00317)	(0.0109)	(0.00621)	(0.0114)	(0.0104)	(0.00896)	(0.0154)	(0.0164)
Age 25-34	0.0942***	0.0928***	0.0465	0.0371	0.0245	0.0894**	0.0379	0.0802*	0.0481	0.0972*
	(0.0221)	(0.0152)	(0.0209)	(0.0241)	(0.0355)	(0.0290)	(0.0259)	(0.0297)	(0.0482)	(0.0308)
Age 35-44	0.0963***	0.131***	0.0224	0.0479	0.0812	0.0839**	0.0521	0.0976*	0.0761	0.199**
	(0.0195)	(0.0171)	(0.0206)	(0.0246)	(0.0347)	(0.0282)	(0.0262)	(0.0373)	(0.0476)	(0.0404)
Age 45-54	0.0935***	0.141***	0.0399	0.0189	0.0719	0.0952***	0.0675	0.118**	0.0734	0.205***
	(0.0194)	(0.0199)	(0.0218)	(0.0251)	(0.0318)	(0.0287)	(0.0410)	(0.0259)	(0.0475)	(0.0252)
Age 55-64	0.0973***	0.181***	0.0376	-0.00893	0.0646**	0.0654*	0.0623	0.126**	0.0919	0.156**
	(0.0244)	(0.0281)	(0.0191)	(0.0270)	(0.0171)	(0.0308)	(0.0433)	(0.0331)	(0.0502)	(0.0262)
Age 75+	-0.0303	0.110*	-0.00692	-0.0558	0.0162	-0.104**	0.136	0.0478	-0.101	-0.0342
	(0.0395)	(0.0429)	(0.0489)	(0.0409)	(0.0421)	(0.0373)	(0.0506)	(0.0374)	(0.0564)	(0.236)
Household size: 2	-0.0112	-0.0195	-0.0384*	-0.0617***	-0.00718	-0.0354*	-0.0563**	-0.0195	-0.0345	-0.0188
	(0.0122)	(0.00938)	(0.0128)	(0.0178)	(0.0114)	(0.0167)	(0.0122)	(0.0130)	(0.0215)	(0.0201)
Household size: 3	-0.0161	-0.00594	-0.0201	-0.0858***	-0.00830	-0.0194	-0.0509	-0.00239	-0.0389	-0.0106
	(0.0133)	(0.0140)	(0.0114)	(0.0192)	(0.0126)	(0.0201)	(0.0339)	(0.0158)	(0.0257)	(0.0144)
Household size: 4+	-0.0531**	-0.0331	-0.0389	-0.0917***	-0.0123	-0.0547**	-0.0835	0.0224	-0.0293	-0.0196
	(0.0156)	(0.0153)	(0.0189)	(0.0182)	(0.0278)	(0.0181)	(0.0355)	(0.0182)	(0.0244)	(0.0227)
Perceived urbanization: small or middle town	-0.0508**	-0.0265*	-0.0357	0.0287*	-0.00782	0.0188	-0.0324	0.0231	-0.0135	0.00573
	(0.0143)	(0.0112)	(0.0201)	(0.0126)	(0.0355)	(0.0135)	(0.0294)	(0.0114)	(0.0162)	(0.0265)
Perceived urbanization: large town	-0.0532**	-0.0237	-0.0246	-0.0711***	-0.0185	-0.0272*	-0.100	0.0474	-0.0221	-0.0240
	(0.0164)	(0.0113)	(0.0332)	(0.0142)	(0.0583)	(0.0133)	(0.0751)	(0.0493)	(0.0252)	(0.0315)
Education: secondary	-0.0426	-0.0322*	-0.0173	0.0209	-0.00425	-0.0807***	-0.0789	-0.00346	0.0465	-0.0469
	(0.0205)	(0.0129)	(0.0136)	(0.0217)	(0.0212)	(0.0174)	(0.0454)	(0.0144)	(0.0250)	(0.0307)
Education: tertiary	-0.110***	-0.135***	-0.0796**	-0.0124	-0.0130	-0.173***	-0.130*	-0.0275	-0.0363	-0.0947*
	(0.0162)	(0.00960)	(0.0176)	(0.0244)	(0.0237)	(0.0189)	(0.0337)	(0.0172)	(0.0249)	(0.0238)
Occupation: manager	-0.0804*	-0.000318	-0.113**	0.0301	-0.00799	-0.0636*	-0.0715	-0.0344	-0.0307	-0.0414
	(0.0291)	(0.0230)	(0.0334)	(0.0306)	(0.0556)	(0.0257)	(0.0293)	(0.0279)	(0.0352)	(0.0300)
Occupation: other white collar	0.0101	-0.0264	0.000605	0.0805**	0.0223	0.00172	-0.00323	-0.00170	-0.00140	-0.00962
	(0.0294)	(0.0240)	(0.0188)	(0.0281)	(0.0345)	(0.0279)	(0.0103)	(0.0193)	(0.0358)	(0.0283)
Occupation: manual worker	0.0304	0.0288	-0.0272	0.0926***	0.0347	0.0312	0.0729	0.0452	0.0305	0.0379
	(0.0276)	(0.0162)	(0.0132)	(0.0267)	(0.0211)	(0.0256)	(0.0354)	(0.0342)	(0.0360)	(0.0191)
Occupation: house person	0.0420	0.00265	-0.0332*	0.0897*	0.0658	0.0696*	0.111*	0.0575	0.0453	0.0297
	(0.0285)	(0.0378)	(0.0119)	(0.0403)	(0.0277)	(0.0276)	(0.0271)	(0.0547)	(0.0448)	(0.0357)
Occupation: unemployed	0.0722**	0.0160	0.0388*	0.0904**	0.105**	0.122***	0.181**	0.0492*	0.0735	0.0618*
	(0.0228)	(0.0247)	(0.0165)	(0.0291)	(0.0224)	(0.0294)	(0.0283)	(0.0184)	(0.0483)	(0.0173)
Occupation: retired	0.0318	0.00757	-0.0570*	0.0561	0.0595	-0.00445	-0.0240	0.0107	0.0547	0.0306
	(0.0316)	(0.0270)	(0.0180)	(0.0304)	(0.0244)	(0.0276)	(0.0214)	(0.0376)	(0.0372)	(0.0316)
Occupation: student	-0.154*	-0.0474	-0.0918**	0.00992	0.0550	-0.0255	0.0337	-0.0679*	-0.0214	-0.108**
	(0.0584)	(0.0423)	(0.0279)	(0.0370)	(0.0966)	(0.0378)	(0.0326)	(0.0268)	(0.0603)	(0.0248)
Observations	8269	9917	9501	8586	9275	8089	7922	7830	4139	7822
Adjusted R^2	0.095	0.132	0.056	0.038	0.045	0.096	0.177	0.040	0.054	0.051

*Notes: Regression coefficients of linear probability models. All models include time dummies (one for each Eurobarometer wave) and a constant term. The models also include regional dummies (except for HR, IE, LU). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the regional level (except for HR, IE, LU). *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< small 0.1. Reference categories for the covariates: Attitudes towards immigration from outside the EU: positive. Gender: male. Age: 15-24. Household size: 1. Perceived urbanization level: rural or village. Education: no or primary. Occupation: self-employed.*

	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SE	SI	SK
Attitudes towards immigration: negative	0.113***	0.235***	0.162***	0.195***	0.0529*	0.192***	0.0917***	0.204**
	(0.0166)	(0.0115)	(0.0227)	(0.0169)	(0.0193)	(0.0109)	(0.0205)	(0.0221)
Female	0.0653***	0.00500	0.0409*	-0.00538	0.0199	-0.0288	-0.0317	0.0202
	(0.0179)	(0.00965)	(0.0172)	(0.0209)	(0.0160)	(0.0157)	(0.0164)	(0.00666)
Age 25-34	0.0301	0.0331	0.0234	0.0336	-0.0101	0.105**	0.0236	0.00129
	(0.0476)	(0.0594)	(0.0359)	(0.0343)	(0.0402)	(0.0275)	(0.0319)	(0.0370)
Age 35-44	-0.00162	0.0519	0.0221	0.0135	-0.0257	0.142**	0.0433	0.0407
	(0.0467)	(0.0524)	(0.0404)	(0.0260)	(0.0260)	(0.0286)	(0.0409)	(0.0440)
Age 45-54	0.0692	0.0680	-0.00871	0.0371	0.00282	0.104*	0.0431	0.0549
	(0.0469)	(0.0545)	(0.0459)	(0.0330)	(0.0267)	(0.0345)	(0.0460)	(0.0478)
Age 55-64	-0.0387	0.0975	0.0233	0.0249	-0.0164	0.154**	0.0626	0.0536
	(0.0469)	(0.0510)	(0.0440)	(0.0401)	(0.0299)	(0.0398)	(0.0350)	(0.0375)
Age 75+	-0.178***	0.0136	0.00671	0.0723*	-0.0434	0.0715	-0.0566	-0.0202
	(0.0526)	(0.0431)	(0.0556)	(0.0202)	(0.0452)	(0.0377)	(0.0416)	(0.0376)
Household size: 2	-0.0126	-0.0251	-0.0577**	-0.0309	0.00666	-0.0254	-0.0454*	-0.0168
	(0.0239)	(0.0133)	(0.0146)	(0.0192)	(0.0223)	(0.0138)	(0.0147)	(0.0164)
Household size: 3	-0.0371	0.00272	-0.0453	-0.0289	-0.0193	-0.0181	-0.0486	-0.0153
	(0.0278)	(0.0174)	(0.0221)	(0.0284)	(0.0295)	(0.0170)	(0.0241)	(0.0174)
Household size: 4+	-0.0362	-0.0313*	-0.0644*	-0.00731	-0.0341	-0.0574**	-0.0515*	-0.0495
	(0.0284)	(0.0134)	(0.0268)	(0.0183)	(0.0273)	(0.0153)	(0.0202)	(0.0175)
Perceived urbanization: : small or middle town	-0.0430*	0.00417	-0.0437*	0.0320	0.0430	-0.0602***	-0.0300	-0.0967
	(0.0172)	(0.0116)	(0.0193)	(0.0233)	(0.0375)	(0.00878)	(0.0235)	(0.0351)
Perceived urbanization: large town	-0.0821***	-0.0220	-0.0877*	0.0333	0.0569	-0.0852***	-0.107***	-0.0484
	(0.0222)	(0.0132)	(0.0334)	(0.0350)	(0.0398)	(0.0153)	(0.0233)	(0.0443)
Education: secondary	-0.0430*	-0.0810**	-0.0640	-0.0540*	-0.0623	-0.0512*	-0.0374	0.00178
	(0.0200)	(0.0184)	(0.0338)	(0.0125)	(0.0264)	(0.0211)	(0.0229)	(0.0323)
Education: tertiary	-0.0472	-0.205***	-0.113**	-0.0563*	-0.0885*	-0.102***	-0.0656**	-0.0452
	(0.0269)	(0.0192)	(0.0357)	(0.0158)	(0.0295)	(0.0168)	(0.0171)	(0.0439)
Occupation: manager	-0.0231	-0.0648*	-0.0164	-0.0139	-0.111*	-0.0333	0.0292	-0.0504
	(0.0427)	(0.0275)	(0.0303)	(0.0375)	(0.0320)	(0.0285)	(0.0271)	(0.0568)
Occupation: other white collar	-0.0200	-0.0419	-0.00205	-0.00911	-0.0686	0.0116	0.0690***	-0.0159
	(0.0463)	(0.0360)	(0.0229)	(0.0407)	(0.0538)	(0.0334)	(0.0155)	(0.0365)
Occupation: manual worker	0.00140	0.0409	0.0620*	-0.00156	0.00884	0.0821	0.0835*	0.0254
	(0.0429)	(0.0359)	(0.0267)	(0.0372)	(0.0399)	(0.0349)	(0.0279)	(0.0535)
Occupation: house person	0.0384	0.0498	0.0230	0.0756*	0.0113	0.0187	0.0447	0.0461
	(0.0430)	(0.0384)	(0.0254)	(0.0216)	(0.0577)	(0.0485)	(0.0526)	(0.0353)
Occupation: unemployed	0.0755	0.0419	0.102*	0.114*	0.00944	0.108*	0.132***	0.143*
	(0.0672)	(0.0307)	(0.0442)	(0.0342)	(0.0531)	(0.0341)	(0.0249)	(0.0400)
Occupation: retired	0.0259	0.0168	0.00491	0.00545	0.0283	0.0405*	0.0529	-0.0199
	(0.0426)	(0.0288)	(0.0240)	(0.0422)	(0.0483)	(0.0157)	(0.0275)	(0.0405)
Occupation: student	-0.0932	-0.209***	-0.0800	-0.0358	-0.0182	0.0366	-0.0802*	-0.0965
	(0.0639)	(0.0398)	(0.0453)	(0.0502)	(0.0475)	(0.0295)	(0.0342)	(0.0317)
Observations	3636	8911	7492	8140	8245	8865	8872	8644
Adjusted R^2	0.043	0.123	0.068	0.094	0.039	0.078	0.054	0.057

*Notes: Regression coefficients of linear probability models. All models include time dummies (one for each Eurobarometer wave) and a constant term. The models also include regional dummies (except for MT). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the regional level (except for MT). *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< small 0.1. Reference categories for the covariates: Attitudes towards immigration from outside the EU: positive. Gender: male. Age: 15-24. Household size: 1. Perceived urbanization level: rural or village. Education: no or primary. Occupation: self-employed.*

Annex 2

Table 4 Coverage of votes classified in the Chapel Hill survey in respect of total valid votes.

Country	Coverage EP election 2014	Coverage national elections	Coverage EP election 2019
BE	99%	96%	100%
SE	99%	99%	99%
RO	86%	87%	99%
AT	94%	94%	98%
FI	98%	98%	97%
DK	100%	94%	97%
UK	96%	98%	95%
MT		99%	92%
IT	98%	93%	92%
DE	91%	97%	90%
FR	84%	92%	89%
ES	89%	98%	89%
LU	92%	94%	89%
BG	93%	85%	88%
NL	98%	98%	85%
CY		82%	84%
PT	90%	96%	84%
PL	98%	99%	84%
HU	99%	97%	84%
EL		94%	78%
LV	91%	97%	78%
EE		99%	76%
CZ	87%	97%	75%
LT	93%	47%	72%
SI	67%	94%	68%
SK	80%	96%	68%
HR	93%	80%	64%

Table 5 Positioning of parties in respect of the two dimensions of Euroscepticism and restrictive measures on migration.

Country	Short Name	CHES survey	Euroscepticism	Restrictive on migration
AT	FPÖ	2014	5.7	9.5
AT	Grüne	2014	3.6	1.6
AT	NEOS	2014	4.0	3.4
AT	ÖVP	2014	3.2	6.3
AT	SPÖ	2014	4.5	4.4
BE	CD&V	2014	4.4	5.1
BE	cdH	2014	4.8	4.3
BE	ECOLO	2014	4.6	1.5
BE	FDF	2014	4.4	4.2
BE	Groen	2014	4.6	1.7
BE	MR	2014	4.2	5.8
BE	NVA	2014	5.5	7.6
BE	PP	2014	5.8	8.8
BE	PS	2014	5.1	2.3
BE	PVDA	2014	5.8	1.7
BE	SPA	2014	4.7	2.8
BE	VB	2014	5.8	9.6
BE	VLD	2014	4.6	6.2
BG	Ataka	2014	6.3	9.6
BG	BSP	2014	3.8	5.5
BG	DPS	2014	2.9	2.9
BG	DSB	2014	1.9	4.7
BG	GERB	2014	1.0	5.4
CY	AKEL	2014	4.1	2.8
CY	DIKO	2014	4.1	7.3
CY	DISY	2014	3.0	6.2
CY	EDEK	2014	3.4	6.7
CY	KOP	2014	3.7	6.3
CZ	ANO2011	2017	5.2	7.4
CZ	CSSD	2017	3.9	6.2
CZ	KDU-CSL	2017	3.0	6.4
CZ	KSCM	2017	6.1	8.7
CZ	ODS	2017	4.9	7.6
CZ	SVOBODNI	2014	6.0	7.4
CZ	SZ	2014	2.6	1.4
CZ	TOP09	2017	1.4	4.3
DE	AfD	2017	5.7	9.3
DE	CDU	2017	3.4	6.0
DE	CSU	2017	4.4	7.8
DE	DieTier	2014	6.4	1.3
DE	FDP	2017	4.4	5.7
DE	Grunen	2017	2.7	2.0
DE	Linke	2017	5.0	3.5
DE	NPD	2014	6.2	9.7
DE	Piraten	2014	5.3	2.1

DE	SPD	2017	2.3	3.9
DK	DF	2014	5.6	9.1
DK	EL	2014	5.9	1.5
DK	KF	2014	4.8	6.9
DK	LA	2014	5.4	4.7
DK	RV	2014	2.6	2.6
DK	SD	2014	4.3	5.3
DK	SF	2014	5.0	2.9
DK	V	2014	4.0	7.2
EE	EER	2014	3.2	4.9
EE	EK	2017	3.0	3.5
EE	ER	2017	1.6	5.3
EE	IRL	2017	2.7	7.4
EE	SDE	2017	1.3	2.6
EL	ANEL	2017	5.0	8.2
EL	KKE	2017	6.5	2.8
EL	ND	2017	1.4	7.2
EL	PASOK	2017	1.9	3.7
EL	Potami	2017	1.3	2.7
EL	SYRIZA	2017	3.7	1.6
EL	XA	2017	6.6	9.7
ES	C’s	2017	2.6	7.5
ES	CC	2017	3.6	6.3
ES	CDC/PDeCAT	2017	2.8	4.6
ES	EA/EH	2017	4.9	1.6
ES	EAJ/PNV	2017	3.3	4.5
ES	ERC-CatSI	2017	3.1	2.5
ES	Podemos	2017	4.2	1.7
ES	PP	2017	3.3	8.2
ES	PSOE	2017	3.0	3.9
FI	KD	2014	5.1	6.4
FI	KESK	2014	4.8	5.8
FI	KOK	2014	2.3	5.1
FI	PS	2014	5.7	9.1
FI	RKP/SFP	2014	3.0	2.0
FI	SDP	2014	3.9	4.2
FI	VAS	2014	5.0	2.9
FI	VIHR	2014	3.4	1.6
FR	EELV	2017	3.2	1.8
FR	FN	2017	6.2	9.9
FR	Insoumis	2017	5.4	2.8
FR	LR	2017	4.7	8.6
FR	MODEM	2017	1.3	5.8
FR	PCF	2017	5.7	3.6
FR	PRG	2014	4.1	4.3
FR	PS	2017	3.1	3.9
HR	HDZ	2014	2.2	7.2
HR	HSLS	2014	2.8	4.4

HR	HSP	2014	5.6	8.9
HR	HSP-AS	2014	4.5	8.8
HR	HSS	2014	3.9	7.9
HR	IDS	2014	1.1	2.1
HR	ORaH	2014	2.0	1.4
HR	SDP	2014	1.2	3.0
HU	Fidesz	2017	5.0	8.8
HU	JOBBIK	2017	5.1	8.8
HU	LMP	2017	3.3	3.5
HU	MSzP	2017	2.7	4.6
IT	FdI	2017	5.7	9.2
IT	FI	2017	4.5	6.7
IT	LN	2017	5.8	8.8
IT	M5S	2017	5.3	6.1
IT	PD	2017	2.2	3.5
IT	RC	2014	6.2	1.9
IT	SVP	2017	4.1	3.3
IT	UDC	2017	3.9	5.8
LT	DP	2014	4.3	4.6
LT	LLRA	2014	5.5	3.9
LT	LRLS	2014	2.0	3.5
LT	LSDP	2014	1.9	4.1
LT	LVZS	2014	4.6	5.9
LT	TS-LKD	2014	1.6	6.2
LT	TT	2014	5.1	6.7
LU	ADR	2014	5.8	9.3
LU	CSV	2014	1.4	7.2
LU	DL	2014	5.7	2.3
LU	DP	2014	3.4	5.8
LU	Greng	2014	3.2	4.3
LU	LSAP	2014	3.4	5.5
LV		2014	3.1	8.5
LV	LKS	2014	5.9	2.8
LV	LRA	2014	4.1	6.3
LV	NSL	2014	4.9	5.3
LV	SDPS	2014	5.0	3.2
LV	V	2014	1.2	5.5
LV	ZZS	2014	4.0	6.3
MT	PL	2014	3.5	6.8
MT	PN	2014	1.5	5.4
NL	50PLUS	2017	5.7	6.0
NL	CDA	2017	4.8	7.0
NL	CU	2017	5.5	5.3
NL	D66	2017	1.6	2.9
NL	GL	2017	3.0	1.8
NL	PvdA	2017	4.4	4.3
NL	PvdD	2017	5.4	2.9
NL	PVV	2017	6.1	9.5

NL	SGP	2017	6.0	8.3
NL	SP	2017	5.4	5.5
NL	VVD	2017	4.7	7.7
PL	KNP	2014	6.2	9.0
PL	PiS	2017	5.1	8.9
PL	PO	2017	1.0	4.5
PL	PSL	2017	3.5	6.3
PL	SLD	2017	2.3	3.9
PT	BE/O Bloco	2017	5.3	1.4
PT	CDS-PP	2017	3.0	6.1
PT	CDU/PCP-	2017	5.5	3.6
PT	PS	2017	1.9	3.4
PT	PSD	2017	2.2	5.5
RO	PMP	2014	3.0	5.0
RO	PNL	2014	2.8	4.7
RO	PSD	2014	4.0	5.5
RO	UDMR	2014	3.4	2.4
SE	C	2017	4.7	3.5
SE	FI	2017	5.2	1.2
SE	FP	2017	2.7	5.2
SE	KD	2017	4.9	6.9
SE	M	2017	4.2	6.6
SE	MP	2017	5.4	2.1
SE	SAP	2017	4.4	5.2
SE	SD	2017	6.2	9.8
SE	V	2017	6.1	1.7
SI	DeSUS	2014	3.8	4.5
SI	NSI	2014	2.3	7.3
SI	SD	2014	3.3	2.8
SI	SDS	2014	2.2	7.7
SI	SLS	2014	2.9	6.4
SI	ZL	2014	5.3	0.9
SK	KDH	2017	4.3	7.3
SK	Kotleba LSNS	2017	6.3	9.8
SK	Most-Híd	2017	2.7	3.8
SK	OlaNO-NOVA	2017	5.1	7.5
SK	SaS	2017	5.1	7.5
SK	SDKU-DS	2014	2.9	5.0
SK	Siet	2017	4.2	4.8
SK	Sme Rodina	2017	5.6	9.0
SK	Smer-SD	2014	3.0	7.8
SK	SMK-MDP	2017	4.3	4.6
SK	SNS	2017	5.3	9.0
UK	Cons	2017	4.8	7.0
UK	DUP	2017	5.3	7.6
UK	Greens	2017	1.8	2.0
UK	Lab	2017	4.8	4.3
UK	LibDem	2017	0.7	2.9

UK	Plaid	2017	3.2	3.3
UK	SNP	2017	1.7	3.1
UK	UKIP	2017	5.9	8.7

The data on positioning of parties was obtained from the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys 2017 and 2014. Whenever there was an evaluation for 2017 this was preferred in respect 2014. The original scores have been modified as follows: For the positioning on migration, the final score of each party was calculated as simple average of the scores assigned for the three questions 'Immigrate_Policy - position on immigration policy.', 'Multiculturalism position on integration of immigrants and asylum seekers (multiculturalism vs. assimilation)' and 'Ethnic_Minorities position towards ethnic minorities'. For the positioning on Euroscepticism, the scale of 'Position - overall orientation of the party leadership towards European integration' was inverted to 0 less Eurosceptic - 7 more Eurosceptic and weighted the basis of 'EU_Salience - relative salience of European integration in the party's public stance'.

Table 6 Local spatial Units with data about the share of migrants and voting in the EP 2019 elections

Country	Spatial units with data about the share of migrants	Spatial units with electoral data EP 2019	Type of spatial unit
AT		2094	LAU 2018
BE		563	LAU 2018
BG		265	LAU 2018
CY		329	LAU 2018
CZ		6257	LAU 2018
DE		401	NUTS3 2016
DK		99	LAU 2018
EE		79	LAU 2018
EL		325	MUNICIPALITIES
ES	8088	8121	LAU 2018
FI		310	LAU 2018
FR	2603	34828	LAU 2018
HR		556	LAU 2018
HU		3155	LAU 2018
IT	7832	7885	LAU 2018
LT		60	LAU 2018
LU		102	LAU 2018
LV		119	LAU 2018
MT		1	NUTS1 2016
NL	346	346	LAU 2018
PL		2477	LAU 2018
PT	2880	3092	LAU 2018
RO		3160	LAU 2018
SE		290	LAU 2018
SI		88	ELECTORAL CONSTITUENCIES
SK		2925	LAU 2018
UK	357	372	LOCAL AUTHORITIES DISTRICTS

The table shows the lowest level of spatial detail for the electoral data for the 2019 and 2014 EP elections obtained from Zeit Online. This level of detail corresponds in most EU MS to Local Administrative Units. This data was linked to the NUTS 1,2 and 3 classification and merged with data on the share of migrants from different sources (see table 4).

Table 7 Data sources for migration data used in the report

Definition	Lowest level of spatial detail	Reference years	Coverage	Sources
Citizenship	Country	2011-2018	28 MS	Eurostat migr_ctz, missing values are imputed using data from LFS and UNDESA
Citizenship	NUTS2	2011-2018	28 MS	LFS
Citizenship	NUTS3	2011		Eurostat – 2011 Census
Citizenship/Country of birth	Grid 100 by 100	2011	NL, IT, DE, ES, FR, PT, UK, IE	D4I
Citizenship	LAU	2011-2018	IT	http://demo.istat.it/
Citizenship	Grid 100 by 100	2001, 2011	NL	D4I

Annex 3

Table 8 Variables included in the regression models for Italy

Variable	Definition	Source
Share of votes	Share of votes weighted on the basis of the position of the party on immigration and Euroscepticism among the total of votes for parties classified by the Chapel Hill surveys	https://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2019-07/european-election-municipalities-eu-states-results-analysis-map
Share of migrants	Share of intra and extra-EU migrants classified by citizenship (2018)	http://demo.istat.it/
Share of extra-EU migrants	Share of extra-EU migrants classified by citizenship (2018)	http://demo.istat.it/
Change share of migrants	Percentage point difference between the share of extra-EU and intra-EU migrants in 2019 and 2011	http://demo.istat.it/
Population density	Weighted population density at 1 km² resolution. (reference year 2011)	
Low income	Share of population declaring an income below 10000 Euro (reference year 2017)	https://www1.finanze.gov.it/finanze3/analisi_stat/index.php?search_class%5B0%5D=cCOMUNE&opendata=yes
Age (>65)	Share of population over 65 years of age (reference year 2017)	http://demo.istat.it/

Table 9 Regression models for Italy – dependent variable: votes for parties with restrictive views on migration EP 2019

	Votes for parties with restriction on immigration EP 2019							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Share migrants	−0.016*						0.012	0.014
	(0.009)						(0.009)	(0.009)
Share extra-EU migrants		−0.015*						
		(0.009)						
Change share migrants			−0.041***				−0.051***	−0.059***
			(0.008)				(0.008)	(0.008)
Population density				−0.151***			−0.097***	−0.096***
				(0.008)			(0.008)	(0.008)
Low income					0.312***		0.269***	0.278***
					(0.013)		(0.014)	(0.014)
Age						−0.032***		
						(0.009)		
Share migrants:Population density								−0.052***
								(0.007)
Share migrants:Low income								0.034***
								(0.009)
Observations	7,781	7,781	7,681	7,884	7,722	7,816	7,577	7,577
Adjusted R^2	0.540	0.540	0.542	0.555	0.573	0.539	0.585	0.590
Note:								*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Models for 1 to 6 test the effect of the single variables. Model 7 includes a combination of the main variables and model 8 tests for interactions between the share of migrants, population density and low income. All models include fixed effects for NUTS2 regions. Variables are standardised by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation. The resulting standardised coefficients represent the change of the dependent variable in terms of standard deviations. The positive interaction term 'Share of migrants: Low income' in model 8 indicates that the higher the share of population in low income the greater is the effect of the share of migrants on voting for parties favouring restrictive measures on migration.

Table 10 Regression models for Italy – dependent variable: votes for Eurosceptic parties EP 2019

	Votes for Eurosceptic parties EP 2019							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Share migrants	−0.005						0.005	0.005
	(0.008)						(0.008)	(0.008)
Share extra-EU migrants		−0.004						
		(0.008)						
Change share migrants			−0.015**				−0.020***	−0.019**
			(0.007)				(0.008)	(0.008)
Population density				−0.058***			−0.028***	−0.030***
				(0.007)			(0.008)	(0.008)
Low income					0.164***		0.152***	0.154***
					(0.012)		(0.013)	(0.013)
Age						−0.061***		
						(0.008)		
Share migrants:Population density								−0.045***
								(0.006)
Share migrants:Low income								−0.003
								(0.008)
Observations	7,781	7,781	7,681	7,884	7,722	7,816	7,577	7,577
Adjusted R^2	0.635	0.635	0.634	0.634	0.645	0.636	0.647	0.649

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 11 Regression models for Italy – dependent variable: votes for parties with restrictive views on migration general election 2018

	Votes for parties with restriction on immigration National election 2018							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Share migrants	−0.009						0.005	0.008
	(0.008)						(0.008)	(0.008)
Share extra-EU migrants		−0.008						
		(0.008)						
Change share migrants			−0.034***				−0.044***	−0.056***
			(0.007)				(0.008)	(0.008)
Population density				−0.052***			−0.012	−0.009
				(0.008)			(0.008)	(0.008)
Low income					0.200***		0.198***	0.211***
					(0.012)		(0.013)	(0.013)
Age						−0.108***		
						(0.008)		
Share migrants:Population density								−0.059***
								(0.006)
Share migrants:Low income								0.055***
								(0.008)
Observations	7,843	7,843	7,743	7,958	7,784	7,878	7,639	7,639
Adjusted R^2	0.629	0.629	0.630	0.626	0.642	0.636	0.646	0.653

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 12 Variables included in the regression models for the Netherlands

Variable	Definition	Source
Share of votes for PVV	Share of votes for the PVV in the 2010 general election	https://data.overheid.nl/dataset/verkiezingsuitslag-tweede-kamer-2010
Non-Western share	Non-Western share refers to the share of residential population (Census 2011) having a non-Western country of birth i.e. AND,AUS,AUT,BEL,BGR,CAN,CHE,CYP,CZE,DEU,DNK,ESP,EST,FIN,FRA,GBR,GIB,GRC,HRV,HUN,IRL,ISL,ISR,ITA,JPN,LVA,LIE,LTU,LUX,MCO,MLT,NLD,NOR,NZL,POL,PRT,PYF,ROU,SMR,SVK,SVN,SWE,UMI,USA,VAT.	JRC https://ec.europa.eu/knowledge4policy/migration-demography/data-integration-d4i_en
Low education	The percentage of people having a only primary education and secondary education of the first phase.	CBS - Kerncijfers wijken en buurten 2004-2015, https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/maatwerk/2011/48/kerncijfers-wijken-en-buurten-2004-2015
Low income	The percentage of people with an income lower than 19200 euros.	
Age (15-24)	Share of population with age from 15 to 24	
Population density	Number of inhabitants per km^2	

Figure 26 Spatial processing of the data for the Netherlands



All the models for the Netherlands are based data at the level of around 8000 polling stations. The independent variables which are collected at the level of neighbourhoods (around 11800 Buurt) are joined to the polling stations through spatial processing (Voronoi polygons and dasymetric mapping).

Table 13 Regression models for the Netherlands – dependent variable: share of votes for the PVV general election 2010

	PVV vote share				
	OLS				*instrumental variable*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Non-Western share		0.095***		−0.101***	−0.182***
		(0.011)		(0.013)	(0.016)
Low education			0.260***	0.285***	0.306***
			(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Low income			0.173***	0.198***	0.218***
			(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Age (15-24)			−0.088***	−0.083***	−0.078***
			(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Population density			−0.080***	−0.055***	−0.034***
			(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Observations	8,012	8,012	7,605	7,605	7,605
Adjusted R^2	0.494	0.498	0.583	0.587	0.585
Residual Std. Error	0.711	0.708	0.642	0.640	0.641
Note:					*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Regression model 1 includes fixed effects for … local administrative units. The R squared o 0.49 represents the percentage of variance that can be explained by the overall characteristics of the local administrative unit. Regression model 2 tests the effect of the main variable of interest of the share of migrants. Regression model 3 tests the effect of the covariates of education, income and age only and population density. Model 4 includes the Non-Western share as main predictor of interest and the other covariates. The regression model 5 adds to the model the Instrumental Variable. The IV is constructed from the share of residents from non-Western countries in 2001. The share includes only the 10 most frequent communities. As in the models for Italy all variables are standardised by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation.

Table 14 Regression models for the Netherlands by population density – dependent variable: share of votes for the PVV general election 2010.

	PVV vote share	
	Low Pop Dens	High Pop Dens
	(1)	(2)
Non-Western share	0.085***	−0.286***
	(0.017)	(0.024)
Low education	0.324***	0.281***
	(0.014)	(0.021)
Low income	0.163***	0.316***
	(0.012)	(0.029)
Age (15-24)	−0.047***	−0.142***
	(0.014)	(0.022)
Observations	5,851	1,754
Adjusted R^2	0.643	0.511
Residual Std. Error	0.584	0.732
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Model 1 and 2 consider two different groups of spatial units respectively below and above the average population density. These models show that the effect of the presence of migrants has opposite signs depending if this is considered in areas of low or high population density. As in model 5 in previous table both models include fixed effects and an instrumental variable.

List of figures and tables

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