


# The AfCFTA Tariff Offers

Current State and First Insights

---



JRC Working Papers on  
Economic Analysis of Policies in Africa 2024/1  
Boysen, O.

This publication is a Working Paper by the Joint Research Centre (JRC), the European Commission's science and knowledge service. It aims to provide evidence-based scientific support to the European policymaking process. The contents of this publication do not necessarily reflect the position or opinion of the European Commission. Neither the European Commission nor any person acting on behalf of the Commission is responsible for the use that might be made of this publication. For information on the methodology and quality underlying the data used in this publication for which the source is neither Eurostat nor other Commission services, users should contact the referenced source. The designations employed and the presentation of material on the maps do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the European Union concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

#### Contact information

Name: European Commission, Joint research Centre, Directorate D – Sustainable Resources  
Address: Edificio Expo, c/Inca Garcilaso 3.  
41092 Seville (Spain)  
Email: [jrc-d4-secretariat@ec.europa.eu](mailto:jrc-d4-secretariat@ec.europa.eu)  
Tel.: +34 954488318

#### EU Science Hub

<https://joint-research-centre.ec.europa.eu>

<https://datam.jrc.ec.europa.eu/datam/area/PANAP>



JRC135509

Seville: European Commission, 2024



The reuse policy of the European Commission is implemented by the Commission Decision 2011/833/EU of 12 December 2011 on the reuse of Commission documents (OJ L 330, 14.12.2011, p. 39). Except otherwise noted, the reuse of this document is authorised under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) licence (<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>). This means that reuse is allowed provided appropriate credit is given and any changes are indicated. For any use or reproduction of photos or other material that is not owned by the EU, permission must be sought directly from the copyright holders.

The European Union does not own the copyright in relation to the following elements:

Cover page illustration, © the Joint Research Centre (JRC), 2024.

How to cite this working paper: Boysen, O., *The AfCFTA Tariff Offers - Current State and First Insights*, European Commission, Seville, 2024, PANAP Working Paper No. 2024/1, JRC135509.

**Contents**

Preface ..... ii

Abstract ..... 1

1. Introduction ..... 2

2. Methods and data ..... 3

    2.1 The current AfCFTA tariff concession offers ..... 3

    2.2 Constructing AfCFTA modalities-compliant tariff schedules ..... 7

3. Results and discussion ..... 10

    3.1 Assessing the tariff offers ..... 10

    3.2 Past behaviour revealing stances regarding openness versus protection ..... 12

    3.3 Caveats ..... 13

4. Conclusions ..... 14

References ..... 15

Appendix ..... 16

List of abbreviations ..... 20

List of figures ..... 21

List of tables ..... 22

## **Preface**

The Pan-African Network for economic Analysis of Policies ([PANAP](#)) brings together academic, research and institutional partners that develop research on agro-economics and policy issues. It was established in 2019 under the aegis of the African Union (AU) - European Union (EU) partnership. The network is co-hosted by the European Commission - Joint Research Centre (JRC), the African Union Commission - Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy, and Sustainable Environment (ARBE), and the Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa (FARA).

PANAP aims to strengthen the liaison between researchers, scientists, and policymakers in Africa, and to stimulate their cooperation on selected topics linked to policy priorities that reinforce the stability and enhance the development of African agrifood systems. PANAP contributes to address scientific issues in the fields of agriculture and food security, with the aim of supporting effective policies and achieving sustainability of the agri-food systems and to enhance food and nutrition security. These efforts are in alignment with the Malabo Declaration Commitment 3, which aims to end hunger in Africa by 2025, as well as Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 1 and SDG 2.

This Working Paper series (JRC Working Papers on Economic Analysis of Policies in Africa) collects works to support continental, regional and national policymakers in Africa in designing, assessing ex-ante and evaluating ex-post the impacts of agricultural policies. It also includes works related to the construction and analysis of databases and description of model developments to provide evidence-based policy support to partner countries. The series serves the objective to share the knowledge produced within PANAP related to micro and macro data, models/economic tools, and to disseminate results and create a common knowledge base and practices on the topic of economic analysis of policy.

The main audience for this series is a diverse spectrum of stakeholders with a shared objective: to foster evidence-based policy decision-making in Africa. This audience encompasses statistical offices, researchers, modellers, data analysts, policy makers and other key stakeholders from both national and multilateral institutions.

## **Abstract**

The majority of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agreement signatories have submitted tariff concession offers, as published on the AfCFTA Secretariat's website. More than a year after the AfCFTA came into effect, it is time to take stock of these submissions and conduct a first assessment of the data with respect to members' stances towards fostering intra-African trade through openness on the one hand and maintaining protection against competing imports and revenues from import tariffs on the other.

Combining the offers with corresponding trade and tariff data, we find that there are both substantial data gaps and inconsistencies with the AfCFTA's trade liberalisation modalities and the trade classification standard. Constructing two tariff schedules, one which repairs the offers for compliance with the modalities and another that maximises the import tariff revenue retained as a benchmark, the study gauges each region's offer regarding the commitment to liberalisation versus protection.

The analysis confirms that the modalities require regions to liberalise strongly but most opt to liberalise even more and earlier than necessary. Stances towards freer trade differ markedly between regions. Some tend towards retaining all possible tariff revenues or corresponding negotiation space while others directly and strongly commit to liberalisation.

The constructed AfCFTA liberalisation categorisations are provided for download as input to update AfCFTA impact analyses with the latest information available on a likely AfCFTA tariff liberalisation agreement.

## 1. Introduction

The vision of a tightly integrated African continent began to be formalised with the foundation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 and then took shape over the decades, most concretely with the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (“Abuja Treaty”), which entered into force in 1994, and the adoption of the Agenda 2063 by the African Union (AU) in 2015 ([Lunenborg and Roberts, 2021](#)). One of the milestones towards this vision, comprising, among others, a common market and an economic and monetary union across the entire continent, is the establishment of a continent-wide free trade area, the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which is currently under negotiation.

Although the AfCFTA agreement became operational on 1 January 2021, the actual negotiations over concessions on import tariffs for trade in goods among AU member states (MS) are yet to commence. To this end, the majority of the AU MS have submitted their tariff offers, which have been made available by the AU-AfCFTA Secretariat on its website. This data could be highly useful for researchers and stakeholders that for years have been trying to gauge the AU MS ambition towards freer trade in the framework of the AfCFTA, and discover the magnitude of the potential social and economic costs and benefits of such a liberalisation. In the absence of the actual schedules of tariff concessions, such assessments have so far had to rely on crude assumptions about the overall level of ambition and the set of particular products each AU member might designate for liberalisation. While the modalities of the AfCFTA ([AU, 2017](#)) lay out the general rules of liberalisation, they leave substantial freedom for developing schedules in one direction or another.

Early studies assessing the AfCFTA’s trade liberalisation have assumed a complete elimination of intra-AU tariffs (see, e.g. [Mevel and Karingi, 2013](#); [Jensen and Sandrey, 2015](#); [Abrego et al., 2019](#)), whereas later studies ([UNECA, 2018](#); see, e.g. [World Bank, 2020](#); [Simola et al., 2022](#)) have utilised the agreed modalities to construct synthetic tariff liberalisation schedules based on the observation that import tariff revenue is an important source of income for many of the AU governments which they might therefore try to maintain as much as possible. Sometimes, import protection or liberalisation strategies are considered in addition, which aim at, e.g., fostering industrialisation or food security. Computable General Equilibrium Model-based ex-ante impact assessment studies generally find that the AfCFTA tariff reductions alone increase GDP by less than 1% (see [Simola et al., 2021](#), Table 1). Correspondingly, differences found in GDP impacts between alternative versions of AfCFTA tariff schedules are also very small ([Simola et al., 2022](#)). Nevertheless, this potentially masks widely varying impacts across schedules and countries on particular industries as well as on tariff revenue.

Another strand of literature deals with assessing the economic impacts of the preliminary tariff offers of individual negotiating parties.

Against this backdrop, this report analyses a current snapshot of the tariff concession offers data as available through the AfCFTA Secretariat’s e-Tariff Book website. It assesses the completeness and consistency of the AfCFTA’s agreed modalities and looks for indications regarding the level of commitment towards import liberalisation. It shows that, although the majority of AU member states are included in the submitted offers, this data still leaves great uncertainty around the final offers and schedules but indicates the strong liberalisation commitment of some member states and a strong stance towards maintaining the protection or negotiation space of others.

The constructed complete and AfCFTA modality-consistent product liberalisation categorisations comprise all Harmonised System tariff lines for all AfCFTA member states and are provided for download to feed into simulation models to facilitate the updating of AfCFTA policy impact analyses with the latest information available on a likely AfCFTA tariff liberalisation agreement.

## 2. Methods and data

The modalities for the AfCFTA tariff negotiations ([AU, 2017](#)) specify that least-developed countries (LDCs) and non-LDCs alike fully liberalise 90% of import trade with AU member states. They adopt a double qualification and an anti-concentration clause which limits not only the number of products excluded from liberalisation but also the value of the intra-AU imports affected by such products. Each imported product needs to be designated under one of three categories: non-sensitive (A), sensitive (B), and excluded from liberalisation (C). The rules for the three categories are detailed in [Table 1](#).

While the general rules of liberalisation are the same for LDCs and non-LDCs, the period over which a particular import tariff is linearly reduced to zero differs between the two. The schedule of tariff reductions commenced on 1 January 2021, regardless of the ongoing negotiations regarding the tariff concessions ([Lunenborg and Roberts, 2021](#)).

**Table 1.** Tariff line categories according to the AfCFTA modalities

Category	Label	Rule
A	Non-sensitive	Tariffs on at least 90% of tariff lines to be eliminated over 5 years for non-LDCs and 10 years for LDCs.
B	Sensitive	No more than 7% of tariff lines may be declared sensitive, non-LDCs liberalise over 10 years, LDCs over 13 years. The liberalisation start may be delayed to year 6.
C	Excluded	No more than 3% of tariff lines may be exempted from liberalisation. The total value of these imports must not exceed 10% of the value of all imports from within the AU.

Source: Own elaboration based on AU (2017).

The coding of products traded is internationally standardised for customs purposes through the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS) classification by the World Customs Organization. This forms the basis for international trade negotiations. However, the HS classification is revised periodically and the AfCFTA modalities do not specify which revision will be applied. The modalities determine that the import tariff rates used as a basis are those applied when the AfCFTA came into force, which was 2019. Limits on the intra-AU import values affected are assessed through a three-year import value average over either the period 2014 to 2016 or 2015 to 2017. Nevertheless, no authoritative source for the import value data is specified. The fact that the 2019 tariff data is likely reported in official statistics in the 2017 revision of the HS while the import value data in the specified year ranges is reported in the 2012 revision creates a problem for any negotiations needing to be resolved.

### 2.1 The current AfCFTA tariff concession offers

The tariff offers data retrieved from the e-Tariff Book website<sup>1</sup> comprises tariff schedules from 13 negotiating regions. According to the modalities, each MS submits an individual offer except for countries that are members of one of the four customs unions (CU) of the AU. As a CU imposes a Common External Tariff (CET) for all of its members, each CU submits a joint offer and negotiates as a bloc. Altogether, the current data set of offers covers 42 of the 54 AfCFTA signatory member states.

All schedules follow the HS classification. However, the schedules are based on differing HS revisions and use national sub-classifications consisting of codes with a length of between 8 and 10 digits, thus going beyond the 6-digit product codes that are internationally standardised through the HS. To still facilitate the comparison in this analysis, only the first six digits of all of the 8- to 10-digit product codes are retained in order to obtain the corresponding code of the standardised 6-digit HS classification. As sometimes national 8- or 10-digit sub-codes below the same 6-digit code are assigned to different AfCFTA categories, here we make the arbitrary choice to assign the most protecting category of those to the corresponding 6-digit code, with C being the most and A the least protecting category.

---

<sup>1</sup> Retrieved from <https://etariff.au-afcfta.org> on 17 October 2023.



[Table 2](#) provides an overview of the tariff offer data including the revision dates. The *TLs categorised* column indicates the number of HS 2017 6-digit lines categorised in each offer. A complete offer should categorise 5387 TLs. However, the schedules of Tunisia and Zambia include 6-digit codes which do not belong to the 2017 revision of the HS. In the case of Tunisia, these codes are in addition to all 5387 codes of the HS 2017 revision. Moreover, some of the schedules submitted are incomplete as they only include the category A codes or omit some codes.

Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco have submitted two tariff schedules, one for non-LDCs and LDCs each, which differ only by their phase-down periods (Egypt's schedule two is also missing some HS codes). As it is not clear how these second schedules enter the negotiations, the LDC-specific schedules are dropped from the analysis. In all offers analysed, all tariff rates associated with categories A and B correctly reach zero at the end of the phase-down period.

**Table 2.** Tariff offers available in the AfCFTA e-Tariff Book

Importer	Full name	TLs categorised	Revision date
COD	Congo (the Democratic Republic of the)	5387	26-10-2021
CEMAC	Central African Economic and Monetary Community	5387	26-10-2021
DZA	Algeria	5387	20-05-2022
EAC	East African Community	4731	21-07-2022
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States	4954	26-10-2021
EGY	Egypt	5387	26-10-2021
MAR	Morocco	4926	30-06-2023
MDG	Madagascar	5387	26-10-2021
MUS	Mauritius	5386	26-10-2021
SACU	Southern African Customs Union	4893	28-06-2023
SYC	Seychelles	5385	26-10-2021
TUN	Tunisia	5387	20-09-2022
ZMB	Zambia	4823	26-10-2021

Source: Own elaboration based on AfCFTA e-Tariff Book data.

To analyse the offers' compliance with the AfCFTA's modalities and the tariff revenue affected, the offer data is combined with import value and tariff data from the Market Access Map (MAcMap) database.<sup>2</sup> The tariff data reflects the year 2019 and employs *effectively applied tariffs* which assume that each import occurs under the most beneficial preferential tariff available to the respective importer. To avoid complications with differing HS revisions, we also use trade value data reported in HS 2017. Specifically, we use import value-weighted averages calculated over the years 2018 to 2020, although this year range is not in line with the modalities' specification. Correspondingly, all analyses below are based on the HS 2017 revision.

[Table 3](#) summarises the MAcMap trade and tariff data for each region in terms of the number of HS 2017 6-digit tariff line (TL) codes with an import value greater than zero (column *TLs import value > 0*), with tariffs greater than zero (*TLs tariff rate > 0*), and the average import value-weighted tariff rate across all products (*Avg. tariff %-rate*). Some interesting aspects stand out in the table. Some countries have a much narrower range of products imported from within the AU than others, as shown by the number of TLs with imports that varies from 1547 to 3912 of the 5387 HS codes. The number of TLs with a positive tariff rate ranges from 87 to 5365, indicating the widely varying degree of openness for intra-AU trade across products the regions are starting the negotiations from. The regions' import trade value-weighted average tariff rates range from 0.1 to 11.9%, showing strongly varying degrees of initial protection, where higher average tariffs are loosely associated with more TLs under positive tariffs, though not strictly.

<sup>2</sup> Data provided by CEPII, Paris, on 22 September 2023. See Guimbard *et al.* (2012) for the methodology.



**Table 3.** Summary of the MACMap intra-AU trade and tariff data

<b>Importer</b>	<b>TLs import value&gt;0</b>	<b>TLs tariff rate&gt;0</b>	<b>Avg. tariff %-rate</b>
CEMAC	2860	5362	11.1
COD	3520	5365	10.9
DZA	2559	3917	8.3
EAC	3875	3093	5.9
ECOWAS	3912	5326	9.7
EGY	1547	4356	1.4
MAR	2089	4235	1.3
MDG	2608	4570	4.3
MUS	3264	87	0.1
SACU	3090	1993	0.4
SYC	2197	337	2.0
TUN	1978	2531	1.0
ZMB	4144	1211	0.1

Source: Own elaboration based on MACMap 2019 data.

[Table 4](#) summarises the categorisations of the offers utilising the MACMap data. It must be stressed that the treatment of the tariff offer data and the sources of the trade and tariff rate data used for the present analysis likely differ from those used in official analyses. Therefore, the numbers shown here should be considered merely as indications. The category column (*Cat.*) also includes a category “none” for those HS codes which have not been categorised. Each CU is treated like an individual country with the intra-CU trade being ignored.

As an example, consider the CEMAC offer. CEMAC has assigned 153 TLs (column *Total*) to category C for exclusion from liberalisation, 367 to category B (sensitive) for delayed liberalisation, and 4867 to category A (non-sensitive) for immediate liberalisation. Looking at the category C row, 55 of the 153 assigned codes are without imports (column *Imp=0*), one has a tariff rate of zero (*Tar=0*) and 55 are associated with a zero import value but with a positive tariff rate (*Imp=0&tar>0*). The liberalisation of TLs with either zero imports or a zero tariff does not have a direct effect on tariff revenue as long as trade is not absent because of a high tariff rate (prohibitive tariff). In category C, 153 tariff lines correspond to 2.8% (*Tariff lines*) of the total of 5387 lines of the HS 2017 classification, which is below the 3% threshold allowed for category C according to the modalities ([Table 1](#)). But the total intra-AU import value affected is 13% (*Imp.val.*) and thus exceeds the 10% permitted by the modalities. The TLs assigned to category C cover 19.6% of the current total CEMAC tariff revenue (*Tar.rev.*), meaning that this share of revenue is retained even after the full implementation of the AfCFTA (neglecting second-round effects of the tariff reductions). Category B codes cover 6.8% of the TLs and thus comply with the 7% limit. Around 90.3% of codes have been categorised as A, which satisfies the minimum requirement of 90%.

**Table 4.** Original tariff offers as retrieved from the AfCFTA e-Tariff Book

Importer	Cat.	Number of tariff lines				% of total		
		Total	Imp=0	Tar=0	Imp=0&tar>0	Tariff lines	Imp.val.	Tar.rev.
CEMAC	A	4867	2393	24	2393	90.3	70.4	54.1
	B	367	79	0	79	6.8	16.6	26.3
	C	153	55	1	55	2.8	13.0	19.6
	none	0	0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0
COD	A	4812	1802	22	1786	89.3	47.5	38.9
	B	391	30	0	30	7.3	30.2	34.9
	C	184	35	0	35	3.4	22.3	26.2
	none	0	0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0
DZA	A	4840	2563	1385	2520	89.8	81.4	61.2
	B	399	187	76	187	7.4	15.9	31.6
	C	148	78	9	78	2.7	2.7	7.2
	none	0	0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0
EAC	A	4731	1381	2262	754	87.8	69.3	29.6
	B	0	0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	C	0	0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	none	656	131	32	130	12.2	30.7	70.4
ECOWAS	A	4954	1433	59	1433	92.0	84.2	67.7
	B	0	0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	C	0	0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	none	433	42	2	42	8.0	15.8	32.3
EGY	A	4871	3664	925	3251	90.4	81.9	80.5
	B	364	128	75	128	6.8	2.8	7.9
	C	152	48	31	48	2.8	15.3	11.6
	none	0	0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0
MAR	A	4926	3087	1018	3087	91.4	92.7	86.5
	B	0	0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	C	0	0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	none	461	211	134	211	8.6	7.3	13.5
MDG	A	4978	2633	701	2496	92.4	66.0	70.1
	B	292	114	91	114	5.4	13.8	4.9
	C	117	32	25	27	2.2	20.2	25.0
	none	0	0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0
MUS	A	4988	2065	4988	0	92.6	88.5	0.0
	B	252	42	209	26	4.7	6.6	2.2
	C	146	15	102	15	2.7	4.9	97.8
	none	1	1	1	0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Importer	Cat.	Number of tariff lines				% of total		
		Total	Imp=0	Tar=0	Imp=0&tar>0	Tariff lines	Imp.val.	Tar.rev.
SACU	A	4893	2212	3312	766	90.8	96.9	40.8
	B	0	0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	C	0	0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	none	494	85	82	85	9.2	3.1	59.2
SYC	A	5260	3119	5037	216	97.6	95.5	0.2
	B	22	3	8	1	0.4	2.3	6.0
	C	103	66	3	66	1.9	2.2	93.8
	none	2	2	2	0	0.0	0.0	0.0
TUN	A	4838	3195	2625	1855	89.8	84.2	57.5
	B	350	131	159	123	6.5	6.8	11.5
	C	199	83	72	83	3.7	9.0	30.9
	none	0	0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0
ZMB	A	4823	1050	3836	832	89.5	90.9	96.2
	B	0	0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	C	0	0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	none	564	193	340	192	10.5	9.1	3.8

Note. Inconsistencies with the AfCFTA modalities are highlighted in bold. Abbreviations denote cat.: category, imp: import value, tar: import tariff rate, Tar.rev.: tariff revenue. Source: Own elaboration based on the AfCFTA e-Tariff Book and MAcMap 2019 data.

The submitted schedules comprise either all categories (A, B, and C) or category A only. [Table 4](#) highlights that offer schedules comprising categories A, B and C are currently available for 11 countries, including the six CEMAC countries. Any inconsistencies with the AfCFTA modalities are highlighted in the table in bold. This indicates that, of these schedules, only those of Mauritius and Seychelles are immediately compliant with the modalities (only one and two codes are not categorised, respectively), according to our data. The offers of the EAC, ECOWAS, and SACU communities as well as those of Morocco and Zambia only include category A assignments. The category A offers of four countries fall short with less than 1% of the 90% of Tls required. Only the EAC's offer is missing 2.2%. Percentage deviations from the limits for Tls are also generally small for categories B and C. Larger violations of the limits are indicated for the category C intra-AU import value affected, where four regions have exempted import values of between 13 and 22.3%. Note that deviations from the compliance thresholds could be a result of different import values and tariff data or their HS revision applied in this study.

The number of Tls associated with positive tariff rates but with no imports ( $Imp=0 \& tar>0$ ) is also noteworthy. The fact that governments deliberately choose to still keep the tariffs on these products by categorising these as C indicates that these are special and that competition from imports is expected in case the tariffs on these lines are dropped. This hints at prohibitive tariffs. Peculiarly, Tls with a tariff rate of zero are also listed among almost all the submitted category C offers. No obvious explanation lends itself to this fact.

## 2.2 Constructing AfCFTA modalities-compliant tariff schedules

As most of the current offer schedules are either incomplete (only category A submitted or individual Tls missing) or inconsistent with the AfCFTA modalities, a comparison of the offers between AU member regions is not directly possible. Therefore, two synthetic complete and compliant schedules are constructed for each region as described below. The first schedule, the "repaired offer" modifies the submitted offer as little as possible. The second, the "tariff revenue-maximised" schedule, is a completely new schedule which is constructed with the goal of retaining as much tariff revenue as possible within the limits of the modalities.

Of the submitted offers, none were completely compliant with the AfCFTA modalities laid out in [Table 1](#) in conjunction with the trade and tariff data used here. Each was associated with at least one of the following issues:

1. HS codes remained uncategorised.
2. The list of codes assigned to a particular category did not comply with the corresponding AfCFTA modalities.

To make the offers compliant, the issues are “repaired” as follows:

1. The remaining HS codes are categorised such that the tariff revenue retained by the government is maximised while the limits of the modalities are respected.
2. The HS codes are selected from the codes of the affected categorisation such that the tariff revenue retained is maximised while the limits of the modalities are respected.

The tariff revenue is maximised by selecting from the set of unassigned codes through solving the associated optimisation problem, i.e. maximising the tariff revenue subject to the limits prescribed by the modalities in [Table 1](#). This also implies the temporal dimension so that the government aims at keeping the maximum tariff revenue as long as possible.

Without loss of generality, this optimisation problem can be decomposed into three hierarchical steps: First assign all non-pre-categorised codes to category A, then select from those codes the ones to maximise tariff revenue generated by category C, and finally maximising category B revenue by selecting from the remaining category A codes. Formally, this is specified as a combinatorial optimisation problem and solved using the CBC mixed integer programming solver via the R package *rcbc* ([Schumacher et al., 2023](#)):

$$\text{maximise } R_k = \sum_{i \in I} \tau_i \cdot X_{ki} \quad (1)$$

subject to the constraints

$$\sum_{i \in I} X_{ki} \leq \text{lim}T L s_k \quad \forall k \in K \quad (2)$$

$$\sum_{i \in I} v_i \cdot X_{ki} \leq \text{lim}V_k \cdot \sum_{i \in I} v_i \quad \forall k \in K \quad (3)$$

$$\sum_{k \in K} X_{ki} = 1 \quad \forall i \in I \quad (4)$$

$$\sum_{k \in K} \sum_{i \in I} X_{ki} = |I| \quad (5)$$

where  $X_{ki} \in \{0,1\}$ : binary decision variable whether to include TL  $i$  in category  $k$  or not;  $I$ : set of HS 6-digit TLs available for selection;  $K = \{A, B, C\}$ : set of categories;  $R_k$ : total tariff revenue from category  $k$ ;  $\tau_i$  and  $v_i$ : *ad valorem* tariff rate and import value of product  $i$ ; and  $\text{lim}T L s_k$  and  $\text{lim}V_k$ : upper limits on the number of TLs and on the share of import value from the AU affected in total AU import value corresponding to category  $k$ . The set  $I$  and the limits  $\text{lim}T L s_k$  and  $\text{lim}V_k$  need to be adjusted to account for any TLs already categorised.

Eq. (1) maximises the tariff revenue from the category  $k$  corresponding to the current hierarchical step. Eqs. (2) and (3) ensure that the number of tariff lines and the value of imports from within AU, respectively, must respect the limits specified by the modalities for category  $k$ . Each code must be assigned to precisely one category (Eq. 4) and the total number of assignments must match the total number of HS codes (Eq. 5).

Note that TLs with either a zero trade value or an import tariff rate do not contribute to the tariff revenue and are thus assigned to category A by the process. Such codes may, however, be freely assigned to categories B and C as long as the limits of 7 and 3% of the total HS codes, respectively, are respected. An exception is the category C codes which have a positive tariff rate but no associated import values. These are kept as category C, assuming these are particularly sensitive products and governments have made a deliberate choice here. However, TLs in the offer with a zero tariff rate are also kept in the category C list to stick closely to the offers submitted. Note that for the four CU regions, not the tariff revenue *per se* is maximised but instead normalised country averages, so that all countries have an equal, democratic weight in the bloc’s decision. Therefore, the resulting tariff revenue for the CU as a whole might not fully correspond to the actual maximum, i.e. the sum of the member states, as it appears in the statistics below.

The repaired offer schedules (see [Table 7](#) in the Online Appendix) reflect AfCFTA modalities-compliant schedules which deviate as little as possible from the original submissions while resolving any ambiguities such that the retained tariff revenue is maximised. Hence, this is the maximum tariff revenue attainable if the submitted offer is taken as given.

As a benchmark for the maximum level of protection that regions might achieve, additional schedules are created completely from scratch, which maximises the retained tariff revenue, subject to the limits prescribed by the AfCFTA modalities (see [Table 8](#) in the Online Appendix). Depending on the number of TLs and what share of trade value a country's tariff revenue is spread across, the modalities to exclude lines as being category C allow a country to retain high or low tariff revenue. Mauritius, Zambia and Tunisia could potentially retain the largest shares of their pre-AfCFTA tariff revenue if they try to maximise it using category C. However, these are also among the countries with the lowest average tariff rates and the smallest number of positive tariff lines to begin with, as shown in [Table 3](#).

### 3. Results and discussion

#### 3.1 Assessing the tariff offers

[Table 5](#) compares the number of TLs with positive tariff rates and the average import tariff rates between the *pre-AfCFTA*, *repaired offer*, and *maximum* schedules. The modalities limit the number of TLs exempted from liberalisation to 3% of all lines, equalling 161 TLs. This is a drastic reduction for most regions in the data which initially have thousands of TLs with positive tariff rates. Note that in the case of the *repaired offer* these are all TLs assigned to category C, which might include some with zero tariff rates or zero import value. In many cases, the *repaired offer* comprises less than 161 TLs and less than the *maximum* schedule, indicating that some candidate TLs for maximisation have already been committed to liberalisation.

**Table 5.** Comparison of number of lines with positive tariffs and average tariff rates between pre- and post-AfCFTA schedules


Importer	Lines with positive tariffs			Average import tariff %		
	Pre-AfCFTA	Repaired offer	Maximum	Pre-AfCFTA	Repaired offer	Maximum
CEMAC	5362	151	161	11.1	1.8	2.4
COD	5365	92	55	10.9	1.8	2.0
DZA	3917	148	161	8.3	0.6	3.0
EAC	3093	161	161	5.9	2.6	2.6
ECOWAS	5326	161	161	9.7	2.2	2.1
EGY	4356	119	161	1.4	0.2	0.6
MAR	4235	116	161	1.3	0.2	0.7
MDG	4570	77	161	4.3	1.0	1.6
MUS	87	146	46	0.1	0.1	0.1
SACU	1993	161	161	0.4	0.3	0.4
SYC	337	103	54	2.0	1.9	2.0
TUN	2531	127	161	1.0	0.3	0.9
ZMB	1211	32	121	0.1	0.0	0.1

Source: Own elaboration.

In theory, the modalities do not impose any limit to the average tariff rate retained. If a region obtains all its tariff revenue from a maximum of 161 TLs summing to less than 10% of the total within-AU import value, it could keep up its entire protection. In practice, most average tariff rates exhibit strong cuts compared to the pre-AfCFTA rates even with the *maximum* schedule. Only regions with very low pre-AfCFTA rates may keep the same level of protection under the AfCFTA modalities. The highest pre-AfCFTA average tariff rate is 11.1% whereas this drops to 3% with the *maximum* and 2.6% with the *repaired offer* schedules. Several regions have already committed to a much stronger reduction with their offers than necessary, above all Algeria, which would need to cut its rate from 8.3 to 3% but has already committed to decrease to 0.6% or less. Other regions, such as the EAC and ECOWAS, have kept the option to reach the *maximum* rate.

[Figure 1](#) provides additional detail on the category level. For each region and category, it compares the tariff revenue shares and import values covered by the assigned codes between the two constructed compliant schedules as well as with the originally submitted offers. The regions are ordered according to their category C offer as shown in the bottom-left panel. Specifically, they are ordered according to the share of import tariff

revenue that the region could manage to retain based on its repaired offer (orange bar) divided by the share that would be achievable with a tariff revenue-maximising schedule (blue bar), in decreasing order. This indicates how much the submitted offers – modified for compliance – already commit to liberalisation as opposed to keeping the options open in order to retain as much tariff revenue and protection as possible.



**Figure 1.** Comparing import value and tariff revenue coverage of the repaired offer and maximum tariff revenue schedules across regions and categories. The share contained in the respective originally submitted offer – where present – is marked by a diamond. Source: Own elaboration.

The category A panel on the top left-hand side shows the share of pre-AfCFTA tariff revenue affected by the alternative schedules. The blue bars represent the share of pre-AfCFTA tariff revenue that is subjected to reduction from day one of the agreement, even if the region aims to maximise its tariff at every stage. Accordingly, most regions could avoid any or most revenue-affecting liberalisation over the first five years (10 years for LDCs). Nevertheless, all regions except Mauritius and the Seychelles chose to commit a substantial share to immediate liberalisation, as the revenue affected by the original offers, depicted by diamonds, indicates. Some regions, such as Zambia, Algeria, or Egypt, demonstrate stronger commitment towards the reduction of intra-AU import barriers than others, as indicated by their high shares.

The share of pre-AfCFTA import value assigned to category A by the original offers (diamonds in right-hand side panel) exceeds the necessary by far in most cases. The comparison to the repaired offers also reveals that



these shares even need to be increased further in many cases to make the offers compliant. The blue bars in the category B tariff revenue share panel illustrate that if the governments were tariff-revenue maximising, they could postpone large shares of the liberalisation.

The category C panel provides a fuller picture of the commitment to liberalisation. Here, the orange bars indicate the maximum share of pre-AfCFTA tariff revenue still achievable taking the submitted offers as given. The blue bars represent the maximum share of tariff revenue retainable. Comparing the bars shows that Zambia, Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, and Tunisia have committed the dominant shares of their post-AfCFTA tariff revenue potential to liberalisation. While for Algeria, Egypt, and Tunisia this results from their category C lists submitted, for Morocco and Zambia it is an implication of their category A list submissions. Zambia and Tunisia could have retained over 95% of their tariff revenue but opted to liberalise strongly in their offers. Algeria is especially noteworthy because its pre-AfCFTA average tariff rate ranks among the highest, whereas Zambia's ranks among the lowest. The offers of the ECOWAS, EAC, Mauritius, and Seychelles still allow them to achieve over 90% of their respective revenue-maximising schedules. Mauritius and Seychelles have already fixed this in their category C offers. By contrast, the ECOWAS and EAC have not included category C offers and their category A offers maintain the flexibility for reaching those shares of retained tariff revenue.

The diamonds also illustrate how much the original offers have been altered by the compliance repair process and which category C offers exceeded the maximum import value share threshold of 10%.

### 3.2 Past behaviour revealing stances regarding openness versus protection

Past behaviour might give hints as to the stances of the regions with respect to being either openness- or protection-leaning. Therefore, we consider three potential pre-AfCFTA indicators: *Average tariff on AU imports*, *trade openness* (defined as value of imports and exports divided by GDP), *AU tariff share in tax revenue* (revenue raised on AU imports as a share of total government tax revenue), and one outcome *protectionism stance* index, which measures the share of the maximum tariff rate still attainable under the AfCFTA given the offer, see [Table 6](#).

The *tariff share in tax revenue* column reveals that the total revenue from import tariffs accounts for an important share of between 1.4 and 16.6% of total tax revenue, whereas the AU tariff share in that is largely modest with under 10% except for CEMAC and the Democratic Republic of Congo, whose shares are 13.1 and 41.9%. Correspondingly, import tariffs amount to less than 5% of the total tax revenue for all regions. Openness varies widely across regions, with Egypt as the least and the Seychelles the most open region. Finally, the protectionist index shows the full range of possible outcomes, from countries completely committed to liberalisation according to their offers (Zimbabwe) to countries keeping the maximum protection as an option (EAC, ECOWAS, Mauritius).

However, an analysis<sup>3</sup> of scatter plots and simple regressions between the three indicators of past behaviour and the protectionism stance index yield no substantial associations. This could result from the low number of independent observations, but it could also simply signal that other considerations were more important in the design of the offers.

---

<sup>3</sup> See [Figure 2](#) in the Appendix.

**Table 6.** Potential indicators for liberalisation- or protection-leaning governments

Importer	Tariff on AU imports	Tariff share in tax revenue	AU share in tariff revenue	AU tariff share in tax revenue	Trade openness	Protectionism stance
CEMAC	11.1	12.5	13.1	1.6	70.2	0.7
COD	10.9	11.7	41.9	4.9	55.2	0.9
DZA	8.3	--	2.9	--	51.8	0.2
EAC	5.9	8.0	4.0	0.3	34.7	1.0
ECOWAS	9.7	14.3	4.1	0.6	43.4	1.0
EGY	1.4	5.7	0.7	0.0	41.1	0.3
MAR	1.3	4.0	1.6	0.1	76.0	0.3
MDG	4.3	16.6	7.2	1.2	62.6	0.6
MUS	0.1	1.4	1.1	0.0	96.3	1.0
SACU	0.4	6.2	1.3	0.1	56.9	0.6
SYC	2.0	4.3	7.1	0.3	197.0	0.9
TUN	1.0	4.7	1.7	0.1	102.3	0.3
ZMB	0.1	7.1	1.1	0.1	68.8	0.0

Source: Own elaboration. Tariff on AU imports and AU share in tariff revenue are based on MACMap 2019 data. Tariff share in tax revenue and openness are based on the World Bank (2023) with the earlier being complemented with data from the OECD (2023) where missing. The AU tariff share in tax revenue is calculated from the other columns.

### 3.3 Caveats

Some limitations of the study deserve additional elaboration. Firstly, the above analysis ignores second-round effects which result from the tariff reduction, i.e. the adjustment of the economy to these shocks, such as the creation and diversion of trade. Amongst other effects, tariff revenue is not only lost directly through the abolishment of intra-AU tariffs but also indirectly because of trade that is diverted from non-AU regions for products where intra-AU substitutes get more attractive pricewise. Accounting for second-round effects requires an economic impact assessment model and corresponding data and estimates of parameters, which, in turn, build on strong assumptions and corresponding uncertainty around the results. However, while such an assessment provides important insights, the aim of the present study is an assessment of the status of the current offers and inferring information on the stances and ambitions of the submitting regions. Nevertheless, the constructed schedules also serve as estimates for the shocks the liberalisation will cause to the economies and can be used for further analysis in impact assessment models.

Secondly, the AfCFTA's schedules of tariff concessions are tightly intertwined with its Rules of Origin (RoO) as the AfCFTA's preferential tariffs only apply to products which meet the AfCFTA's RoO. Otherwise, the higher Most Favoured Nation (MFN) tariffs continue to apply, even to trade within the AfCFTA. The present analysis is limited by the data and cannot account for RoO. Correspondingly, some imports assumed by the above analysis as entering under AfCFTA tariffs might actually face the higher MFN tariffs. Hence, together with the assumption behind the *effectively applied tariffs* in the data used here, the tariff rates calculated should be regarded as lower limits of the actual tariff rates applied. The interconnectedness between the tariff concessions and the RoO is also reflected in the negotiations, which are both still in progress.

## 4. Conclusions

Even though the AfCFTA officially started in 2021, the tariff offer data retrieved covers only 42 of the 54 AfCFTA member countries. Moreover, those offers available from the AfCFTA secretariat's website exhibit considerable gaps and inconsistencies regarding either the HS trade classification standard or the AfCFTA modalities. This leaves ample room for manoeuvre before the actual negotiations regarding the tariff concessions can begin.

Nevertheless, the analysis of the current offer data snapshot together with import trade and tariff data and some sensible assumptions allows us to draw some first conclusions. Overall, the double qualification and anti-concentration clauses of the modalities require all regions to strongly reduce their import protection over the implementation of the AfCFTA. Where regions regularly charged tariffs on thousands of products before, this is reduced to a maximum of 161 afterwards. Likewise, average tariff rates reached a maximum of 11% before but stay below 3% afterwards. Only regions with little initial import protection are able to keep almost all of their pre-AfCFTA protection and thus tariff revenue but some of these have already committed to strongly liberalise. The offers of many regions show their commitment to liberalise more strongly and earlier than necessary. However, the offers of others are maintaining the option to keep as much protection as possible under the AfCFTA modalities, including some of the more protective regions and, noteworthy, the CUs EAC, ECOWAS, and CEMAC. This indicates the differences in stances taken by the regions regarding trade openness on the one hand and protection and tariff revenue on the other.

The lack of clear specification by the AU of the trade and tariff data to be used and for further details of the product coding standard create an unnecessary degree of uncertainty for the AU MS negotiators. Better data would also allow researchers to support policymakers with more precise information.

The constructed complete and AfCFTA modality-consistent product liberalisation categorisations for all AfCFTA member states are provided for download<sup>4</sup> to feed into simulation models for updating AfCFTA policy impact analyses with the latest information available on the likely AfCFTA tariff liberalisation agreement. Nevertheless, it is important to take into account the limitations revealed in the study when considering this data and its corresponding impact results.

---

<sup>4</sup> Available at [https://datam.jrc.ec.europa.eu/datam/mashup/AFCFTA\\_TARIFF\\_OFFER\\_ANALYSIS](https://datam.jrc.ec.europa.eu/datam/mashup/AFCFTA_TARIFF_OFFER_ANALYSIS).

## References

- Abrego, L., Amado, M., Gursoy, T., Nicholls, G. P. and Perez-Saiz, H. (2019) *The African Continental Free Trade Agreement: Welfare gains estimates from a general equilibrium model*. IMF Working Paper WP/19/124. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
- AU (2017) *Modalities for Continental Free Trade Area on tariff negotiations*. TI/CFTA/AMOT/3/ TIG/MOD/FINAL, Annex IV. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: African Union.
- Guimbard, H., Jean, S., Mimouni, M. and Pichot, X. (2012) 'MAcMap-HS6 2007, an exhaustive and consistent measure of applied protection in 2007', *International Economics*, 130, pp. 99–121. doi: [https://doi.org/10.1016/S2110-7017\(13\)60046-3](https://doi.org/10.1016/S2110-7017(13)60046-3).
- Jensen, H. G. and Sandrey, R. (2015) *The Continental Free Trade Area – A GTAP assessment*. Stellenbosch, South Africa: tralac – Trade Law Centre.
- Lunenborg, P. and Roberts, T. (2021) 'ECOWAS and AfCFTA: Potential short-run impact of a draft ECOWAS tariff offer', *Journal of African Trade*, 8(2). doi: [10.2991/jat.k.211011.001](https://doi.org/10.2991/jat.k.211011.001).
- Mevel, S. and Karingi, S. (2013) 'Towards a continental free trade area in africa: A CGE modelling assessment with a focus on agriculture', in Cheong, D., Jansen, M., and Peters, R. (eds) *Shared harvests: Agriculture, trade and employment*. Geneva: International Labour Organization and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, pp. 281–324. Available at: [https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ditctncd2013d2\\_en.pdf](https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ditctncd2013d2_en.pdf).
- OECD (2023). Revenue Statistics in Africa (customs and import duties, total tax revenue). OECD, Paris. Retrieved on 31 October 2023 from [https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=RS\\_AFR](https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=RS_AFR).
- Schumacher, D., Ooms, J., Yapparov, B. and Hanson, J. O. (2023) *Rcbc: COIN CBC MILP Solver Bindings*. Available at: <https://github.com/dirkschumacher/rcbc>.
- Simola, A., Boysen, O., Ferrari, E., Nechifor, V. and Boulanger, P. (2021) *Potential effects of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) on African agri-food sectors and food security*. JRC Science for Policy Report JRC126054. Seville, Spain: European Commission, Joint Research Centre.
- Simola, A., Boysen, O., Ferrari, E., Nechifor, V. and Boulanger, P. (2022) 'Economic integration and food security: The case of the AfCFTA', *Global Food Security*, 35, p. 100651. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gfs.2022.100651>.
- UNECA (2018) *African Continental Free Trade Area – Towards the finalization of modalities on goods*. Toolkit. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa.
- World Bank (2020) *The African Continental Free Trade Area: Economic and distributional effects*. Washington, DC: The World Bank. doi: [10.1596/978-1-4648-1559-1](https://doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-1559-1).
- World Bank (2023). World Development Indicators (export value, import value, GDP, government tax income, import tax income, exchange rate). The World Bank, Washington, DC. Retrieved on 31 October 2023 from <https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators>.

## Appendix

**Table 7.** Tariff offer-based schedules repaired for compliance

Importer	Cat.	Number of tariff lines				% of total		
		Total	Imp=0	Tar=0	Imp=0&tar>0	Tariff lines	Imp.val.	Tar.rev.
CEMAC	A	4869	2393	25	2393	90.4	73.6	58.0
	B	367	79	0	79	6.8	16.6	26.3
	C	151	55	0	55	2.8	9.8	15.8
COD	A	4934	1832	22	1816	91.6	59.8	48.7
	B	361	0	0	0	6.7	30.2	34.9
	C	92	35	0	35	1.7	10.0	16.4
DZA	A	5103	2750	1461	2707	94.7	84.2	61.2
	B	136	0	0	0	2.5	13.1	31.6
	C	148	78	9	78	2.7	2.7	7.2
EAC	A	4893	1512	2294	884	90.8	69.7	29.6
	B	333	0	0	0	6.2	20.3	26.1
	C	161	0	0	0	3.0	10.0	44.2
ECOWAS	A	4998	1475	61	1475	92.8	84.3	67.7
	B	228	0	0	0	4.2	5.7	10.0
	C	161	0	0	0	3.0	10.0	22.3
EGY	A	4904	3664	956	3251	91.0	87.6	80.5
	B	364	128	75	128	6.8	2.8	7.9
	C	119	48	0	48	2.2	9.6	11.6
MAR	A	5271	3298	1152	3298	97.8	95.1	86.5
	C	116	0	0	0	2.2	4.9	13.5
MDG	A	5018	2638	726	2496	93.2	76.2	70.8
	B	292	114	91	114	5.4	13.8	4.9
	C	77	27	0	27	1.4	10.0	24.3
MUS	A	4989	2066	4989	0	92.6	88.5	0.0
	B	252	42	209	26	4.7	6.6	2.2
	C	146	15	102	15	2.7	4.9	97.8

Importer	Cat.	Number of tariff lines				% of total		
		Total	Imp=0	Tar=0	Imp=0&tar>0	Tariff lines	Imp.val.	Tar.rev.
SACU	A	5060	2297	3394	851	93.9	97.2	40.8
	B	166	0	0	0	3.1	0.2	0.9
	C	161	0	0	0	3.0	2.7	58.2
SYC	A	5262	3121	5039	216	97.7	95.5	0.2
	B	22	3	8	1	0.4	2.3	6.0
	C	103	66	3	66	1.9	2.2	93.8
TUN	A	4910	3195	2697	1855	91.1	88.4	57.5
	B	350	131	159	123	6.5	6.8	11.5
	C	127	83	0	83	2.4	4.8	30.9
ZMB	A	5355	1243	4176	1024	99.4	98.1	96.2
	C	32	0	0	0	0.6	1.9	3.8

Source: Own elaboration.


**Table 8.** Tariff revenue-maximised schedules

Importer	Cat.	Number of tariff lines				% of total		
		Total	Imp=0	Tar=0	Imp=0&tar>0	Tariff lines	Imp.val.	Tar.rev.
CEMAC	A	4849	2527	25	2527	90.0	4.9	5.3
	B	377	0	0	0	7.0	85.1	73.0
	C	161	0	0	0	3.0	10.0	21.7
COD	A	4955	1867	22	1851	92.0	13.2	11.1
	B	377	0	0	0	7.0	76.8	70.6
	C	55	0	0	0	1.0	10.0	18.3
DZA	A	4849	2828	1470	2785	90.0	41.9	0.7
	B	377	0	0	0	7.0	48.1	63.1
	C	161	0	0	0	3.0	10.0	36.2
EAC	A	4849	1512	2294	884	90.0	50.3	6.2
	B	377	0	0	0	7.0	39.7	49.4
	C	161	0	0	0	3.0	10.0	44.3

Importer	Cat.	Number of tariff lines				% of total		
		Total	Imp=0	Tar=0	Imp=0&tar>0	Tariff lines	Imp.val.	Tar.rev.
ECOWAS	A	4849	1475	61	1475	90.0	18.3	13.3
	B	377	0	0	0	7.0	71.7	65.4
	C	161	0	0	0	3.0	10.0	21.3
EGY	A	4849	3840	1031	3427	90.0	36.8	0.5
	B	377	0	0	0	7.0	53.4	59.1
	C	161	0	0	0	3.0	9.8	40.4
MAR	A	4849	3298	1152	3298	90.0	32.3	0.5
	B	377	0	0	0	7.0	57.7	48.3
	C	161	0	0	0	3.0	10.0	51.2
MDG	A	4849	2779	817	2637	90.0	33.7	6.4
	B	377	0	0	0	7.0	56.3	55.9
	C	161	0	0	0	3.0	10.0	37.7
MUS	A	5341	2123	5300	41	99.1	97.4	0.0
	C	46	0	0	0	0.9	2.6	100.0
SACU	A	4849	2297	3394	851	90.0	91.7	1.5
	B	377	0	0	0	7.0	1.4	8.6
	C	161	0	0	0	3.0	7.0	89.9
SYC	A	5333	3190	5050	283	99.0	96.6	0.0
	C	54	0	0	0	1.0	3.4	100.0
TUN	A	4917	3409	2856	2061	91.3	79.5	0.0
	B	309	0	0	0	5.7	10.5	3.8
	C	161	0	0	0	3.0	10.0	96.2
ZMB	A	5200	1243	4176	1024	96.5	77.4	0.0
	B	66	0	0	0	1.2	12.6	1.9
	C	121	0	0	0	2.2	10.0	98.1

Source: Own elaboration.





**Figure 2.** Association of the protectionism stance revealed by the offers and indicators of past behaviour. Source: Own elaboration. The lines and shaded areas represent regression estimates for the line and the corresponding 95% confidence interval. The figures displayed at the top are the corresponding adjusted  $R^2$  and  $p$ -value of the overall F-test.

## **List of abbreviations**

AfCFTA	African Continental Free Trade Area
AU	African Union
CET	Common external tariff
CU	Customs union
HS	Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System
LDC	Least-developing country
MFN	Most favoured nation
MS	Member state
RoO	Rules of origin
TL	Tariff line

**List of figures**

**Figure 1.** Comparing import value and tariff revenue coverage of the repaired offer and maximum tariff revenue schedules across regions and categories. The share contained in the respective originally submitted offer – where present – is marked by a diamond. Source: Own elaboration..... 11

**Figure 2.** Association of the protectionism stance revealed by the offers and indicators of past behaviour. Source: Own elaboration. The lines and shaded areas represent regression estimates for the line and the corresponding 95% confidence interval. The figures displayed at the top are the corresponding adjusted *R*<sup>2</sup> and *p*-value of the overall F-test..... 19

**List of tables**

**Table 1.** Tariff line categories according to the AfCFTA modalities .....3

**Table 2.** Tariff offers available in the AfCFTA e-Tariff Book..... 4

**Table 3.** Summary of the MAcMap intra-AU trade and tariff data..... 5

**Table 4.** Original tariff offers as retrieved from the AfCFTA e-Tariff Book..... 6

**Table 5.** Comparison of number of lines with positive tariffs and average tariff rates between pre- and post-AfCFTA schedules..... 10

**Table 6.** Potential indicators for liberalisation- or protection-leaning governments ..... 13

**Table 7.** Tariff offer-based schedules repaired for compliance..... 16

**Table 8.** Tariff revenue-maximised schedules..... 17

## **GETTING IN TOUCH WITH THE EU**

### **In person**

All over the European Union there are hundreds of Europe Direct centres. You can find the address of the centre nearest you online ([european-union.europa.eu/contact-eu/meet-us\\_en](https://european-union.europa.eu/contact-eu/meet-us_en)).

### **On the phone or in writing**

Europe Direct is a service that answers your questions about the European Union. You can contact this service:

- by freephone: 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (certain operators may charge for these calls),
- at the following standard number: +32 22999696,
- via the following form: [european-union.europa.eu/contact-eu/write-us\\_en](https://european-union.europa.eu/contact-eu/write-us_en).

## **FINDING INFORMATION ABOUT THE EU**

### **Online**

Information about the European Union in all the official languages of the EU is available on the Europa website ([european-union.europa.eu](https://european-union.europa.eu)).

### **EU publications**

You can view or order EU publications at [op.europa.eu/en/publications](https://op.europa.eu/en/publications). Multiple copies of free publications can be obtained by contacting Europe Direct or your local documentation centre ([european-union.europa.eu/contact-eu/meet-us\\_en](https://european-union.europa.eu/contact-eu/meet-us_en)).

### **EU law and related documents**

For access to legal information from the EU, including all EU law since 1951 in all the official language versions, go to EUR-Lex ([eur-lex.europa.eu](https://eur-lex.europa.eu)).

### **Open data from the EU**

The portal [data.europa.eu](https://data.europa.eu) provides access to open datasets from the EU institutions, bodies and agencies. These can be downloaded and reused for free, for both commercial and non-commercial purposes. The portal also provides access to a wealth of datasets from European countries.

# Science for policy

The Joint Research Centre (JRC) provides independent, evidence-based knowledge and science, supporting EU policies to positively impact society



**EU Science Hub**

[joint-research-centre.ec.europa.eu](https://joint-research-centre.ec.europa.eu)



@EU\_ScienceHub



EU Science Hub - Joint Research Centre



EU Science, Research and Innovation



EU Science Hub



@eu\_science