European Commission safeguards and non-proliferation R&D: 60 years of experience

Sixty years ago the Euratom Treaty was signed in Rome. Article 8 of the treaty announced the establishment of the Joint Research Centre by the European Commission to carry out research programmes and other tasks assigned to it by the Commission. Under Art 77 of the Treaty, the European Commission is tasked to set up a Nuclear Safeguards system to assure that both “ores, source materials and special fissile materials are not diverted from their intended uses as declared by the users” and that “the provisions relating to supply and any particular safeguarding obligations assumed by the Community under an agreement concluded with a third State or an international organisation are complied with”. For the implementation of article 77 by the Euratom Safeguards Inspectorate underpinning R&D has delivered significant contributions to the safeguards effectiveness and efficiency. This paper starts with a short historical overview of major R&D contributions by JRC to European safeguards. It will illustrate how over time new technologies found their way into safeguards, emphasizing that nuclear materials measurements, and associated reference materials, continue to constitute the core activity which still today present significant R&D challenges (from the particle level, through (milli)gram scale samples all the way up to bulk materials like MTR fuel plates and encapsulated spent nuclear fuel). Recent innovations in verification technologies, advanced sealing systems and integrated process monitoring will also be highlighted. The main part of the paper aims to demonstrate how Euratom Safeguards R&D, mostly in close collaboration with European (e.g. through ESARDA) and/or international partners (e.g. through collaboration with US-DoE, JAEA, etc) , continues to be more creative and inventive than ever developing new tools and approaches directly to the benefit of the Euratom Safeguards Inspectorate, the IAEA Safeguards Division and other international safeguards parties. Safeguards challenges continue to persist e.g. both at the front end of the fuel cycle (mining/ores) and the very back end (deep geological disposal). Understanding the impact of the spread of sensitive and/or dual-use technologies also merits further R&D as well as features of safeguards implementation like safeguards by design, acquisition path analysis and state level concept.

JANSSENS Willem;  ABOUSAHL Said;  LUETZENKIRCHEN Klaus;  MONDELAERS Willy; 

2018-02-19

Institute of Nuclear Materials Management

JRC107449

https://www.inmm.org/INMM-Resources/Proceedings-Presentations/Annual-Meeting-Proceedings,    https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC107449,