We study the case of a Chinese industrial policy, implemented in Shanghai that makes it mandatory for car manufacturers
to share electro-mechanical performance and real time navigation data from their entire fleet of electric and hybrid vehicles
with local and central government authorities. This policy seeks to prevent fraud in state subsidies, reduce emissions,
assess the performance of New Energy Vehicles and strengthen the competitiveness of Chinese manufacturers of these
vehicles. We argue that economies of scope in data aggregation may provide traditional market failure arguments in favor
of government intervention and mandatory data pooling. Our paper illustrates how data access regimes could be used for
economic competition. The EU and China pursue similar data sharing and pooling policy goals that hinge on economies of
scope in data aggregation. However, they follow very different political processes to achieve these goals.
MARTENS Bertin;
ZHAO Bo;
2021-10-28
SAGE PUBLICATIONS INC
JRC124826
2053-9517 (online),
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/20539517211046374,
https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC124826,
10.1177/20539517211046374 (online),
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