In this work, I explore the explanatory power of experimentally-elicited social preferences over self-reported support for redistribution. Social preferences are obtained by means of a simplified dictator game embedded in an online survey that also includes a questionnaire on preferences for redistribution, beliefs, inequality perceptions, and ideological positioning. I find that social preferences covary strongly with self-reported support for increased taxation. Besides, more generous social preference types are more likely to have favourable views towards specific welfare beneficiaries, especially those usually regarded as less deserving, such as migrants, the unemployed, or the poor. Some elements that correlate negatively with preferences for redistribution are being older than 65, having a right-wing ideology, believing that personal effort is the main driver of one’s economic position, and distrusting others; while being a parent or perceiving high inequality have the opposite effect. Social preferences help thus further understand public support for redistribution and the political feasibility of redistributive policies.
CABEZA MARTINEZ Begona;
2023-10-27
ELSEVIER SCIENCE INC
JRC135292
2214-8043 (online),
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214804323001386?via%3Dihub,
https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC135292,
10.1016/j.socec.2023.102112 (online),
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