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dc.contributor.authorJANSSENS-MAENHOUT GREETen_GB
dc.contributor.authorDELBEKE JOCHENen_GB
dc.contributor.authorCONTINI SERGIOen_GB
dc.contributor.otherCREEMERS Jorisen_GB
dc.date.accessioned2010-02-25T14:40:09Z-
dc.date.available2008-01-16en_GB
dc.date.available2010-02-25T14:40:09Z-
dc.date.created2008-01-16en_GB
dc.date.issued2007en_GB
dc.date.submitted2007-06-20en_GB
dc.identifier.citationThe 29th ESARDA Annual Meeting, Symposium on Safeguards and Nuclear Material Management p. 1-7en_GB
dc.identifier.urihttp://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC37690-
dc.description.abstractThe international nuclear security is strengthened by explicit import/export control of dual-use equipment. This paper reports on a methodology applying Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) to enhance this control by detecting changes in import behaviour. The methodology is applied to the import of a combination of components that might be used for the construction of Laser Isotope Separation (LIS) plants. The critical components that are necessary for the construction of a LIS plant are systematically described in a Tree structure. The Tree is analysed by the Fault Tree Analyser ASTRA developed in the safety domain. The fault tree can be analysed qualitatively or quantitatively. The qualitative analysis consists in determining the Minimal Cut Sets (MCS) and the Structural Components’ Importance Indexes. In our application an MCS represents the minimum number of components categories needed to install a LIS plant. The quantitative analysis is possible when probabilities can be associated with the components. In our case the probability of a component is linked with the probability of importing the corresponding components class. As a first tentative the probability has been defined as the ratios of the financial value of critical components’ export to one country to the financial value of the total export to all countries The evolution in time of the Top Event probability is obtained by analyzing real data from five year periods, in seven subsequent time frames, starting with the period 1995-1999 towards the final period 2001-2005. This technique demonstrates the monitoring potential based on import statistics changes in behaviour of a country with regard to imported LIS components. Advanced versions of this probabilistic method may provide customs services with a reduced watch dog list of sensitive components of LIS for a given country. It might also provide an effective tool that is of potential use for registering the capability of a country to setup LIS and for monitoring changes in import behaviour of this country with regard to LIS components.en_GB
dc.description.sponsorshipJRC.G.7-Traceability and vulnerability assessmenten_GB
dc.format.mediumPrinteden_GB
dc.languageENGen_GB
dc.publisherOPOCEen_GB
dc.relation.ispartofseriesJRC37690en_GB
dc.titleProliferation Sensitivity of Dual Use Equipment for Laser Isotope Separationen_GB
dc.typeArticles in periodicals and booksen_GB
JRC Directorate:Space, Security and Migration

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