Title: Energy-Tax Reform with Vertical Tax Externalities
Citation: FINANZARCHIV vol. 64 no. 1 p. 63-86
Publication Year: 2008
JRC N°: JRC42621
ISSN: 0015-2218
URI: http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC42621
DOI: 10.1628/001522108X312078
Type: Articles in periodicals and books
Abstract: The paper is a general equilibrium analysis of an energy tax reform in a federation, measuring the welfare effects and the vertical tax externalities. Vertical tax externalities may arise when two government levels impose taxes on common tax bases. We show how the magnitude and sign of the vertical externality depend on the environmental goal, the tax-recycling scenario, the initial local and federal tax shares, and the size of the federation. Simulations illustrate the effects for a small European federation (e.g. Belgium) and a large federation (e.g. US).
JRC Directorate:Growth and Innovation

Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.

Items in repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.