Energy-Tax Reform with Vertical Tax Externalities
The paper is a general equilibrium analysis of an energy tax reform in a
federation, measuring the welfare effects and the vertical tax externalities.
Vertical tax externalities may arise when two government levels impose taxes
on common tax bases. We show how the magnitude and sign of the vertical
externality depend on the environmental goal, the tax-recycling scenario, the
initial local and federal tax shares, and the size of the federation. Simulations
illustrate the effects for a small European federation (e.g. Belgium) and a large
federation (e.g. US).
SAVEYN Bert;
PROOST Stef;
2008-11-25
MOHR SIEBECK
JRC42621
0015-2218,
https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC42621,
10.1628/001522108X312078,
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