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dc.contributor.authorZENTNER Michaelen_GB
dc.contributor.authorPOMEROY Georgeen_GB
dc.contributor.authorBARI Roberten_GB
dc.contributor.authorCOJAZZI Giacomoen_GB
dc.contributor.authorHAAS Eckharden_GB
dc.contributor.authorKILLEEN Thomasen_GB
dc.contributor.authorPETERSON Peren_GB
dc.contributor.authorWHITLOCK Jeremyen_GB
dc.contributor.authorWONDER Edwarden_GB
dc.identifier.citationProceedings of Global 2009 p. 2453-2459en_GB
dc.description.abstractProliferation resistance (PR) evaluations of nuclear energy systems provide a structured approach for assessing the value of both intrinsic and extrinsic barriers to proliferation. Ultimately, PR studies allow an evaluation of proposed safeguards, an identification of potential weaknesses or alternative safeguard approaches, and a basis for improving and enhancing safeguards. Decisions affecting the proliferation resistance of a nuclear energy system are likely to be made over the complete facility life-cycle, from concept selection, system design, system engineering, prototype development and evaluation, export arrangements, system performance reviews, facility operation, through needed system upgrades, and finally at facility end-of-life. Valid and useful information must be available to allow decision makers to make informed PR-related decisions at each step along the way, and it must be recognized that reevaluations are likely to be required over time as knowledge and circumstances evolve. To be useful, PR evaluations must be carried out following a standardized approach that has international acceptance and that provides consistent results independent of the analysts carrying out the evaluation. Proliferation assessment methodologies such as those being developed under the Generation IV International Forum (GIF) and IAEA¿s International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) provide the technical platforms for supporting overall evaluations, but their findings are unlikely to be directly used by decision makers. This situation arises because, while all PR evaluation approaches develop valuable information about the proliferation resistance of a nuclear energy system, a significant effort is still required to make results of PR evaluation usable and understandable to decision makers. This paper identifies a reference set of decision makers and other users who could be informed by the results of proliferation resistance assessments. Whether the INPRO, GIF, or another methodology is used, the need for useful, information about the PR of their systems must be met. The paper examines the information needs of different classes of decision makers, and describes some ideas on how the results of the various PR studies can be interpreted and presented to them in a more usable, understandable fashion.en_GB
dc.description.sponsorshipJRC.G.8-Nuclear securityen_GB
dc.titleInterpretation and Use of the Results of Proliferation Resistance Studies.en_GB
dc.typeArticles in periodicals and booksen_GB
JRC Directorate:Space, Security and Migration

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