Title: Can rationing rules for common resources impact self-insurance decisions?
Authors: LEFEBVRE MARIANNE
Citation: Strategic Behaviour and the Environment vol. 3 p. 185–222
Publisher: Now
Publication Year: 2013
JRC N°: JRC72142
ISSN: 1944-012X
URI: http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC72142
DOI: 10.1561/102.00000029
Type: Articles in periodicals and books
Abstract: When users have ex-ante demands over a common resource and when resource size is not sufficient to cover all the individual demands, there is a need to establish a rationing rule. I test whether the choice of the rationing rule impacts the individual decision to self-insure, i.e. to invest in a secure alternative resource, instead of relying on a free but uncertain common resource. Four rationing rules, empirically relevant for water management, are compared using a laboratory experiment. According to Nash predic- tions, the investment in self-insurance is the same with the four rules. However, the experimental data show that agents' decisions are impacted by the rule. Coordination on the optimal self-insurance level is higher with the no allocation rule. However, total gains are higher with the constrained-equal awards rule, and their variability is reduced. Rules which are dened as a proportion of posted demands, such as the proportional and constrained-equal losses rules, induce sub-optimal levels of self-insurance.
JRC Directorate:Growth and Innovation

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