Title: Making or breaking climate targets: The AMPERE study on staged accession scenarios for climate policy
Authors: KRIEGLER ElmarRIAHI KeywanBAUER NicoSCHWANITZ Valeria JanaPETERMANN NilsBOSETTI ValentinaMARCUCCI AdrianaOTTO SanderPAROUSSOS LeonidasRAO ShilpaARROYO CURRAS TabareASHINA ShuichiBOLLEN JohannesEOM JiyongHAMDI-CHERIF MeriemLONGDEN ThomasKITOUS ALBAN GABRIELMEJEAN AurelieSANO FuminoriSCHAEFFER MichielWADA KenichiCAPROS PantelisVAN VUUREN DetlefEDENHOFER Ottmar
Citation: TECHNOLOGICAL FORECASTING AND SOCIAL CHANGE vol. 90 no. Part A p. 24-44
Publisher: ELSEVIER SCIENCE INC
Publication Year: 2015
JRC N°: JRC85430
ISSN: 0040-1625
URI: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0040162513002588
http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC85430
DOI: 10.1016/j.techfore.2013.09.021
Type: Articles in periodicals and books
Abstract: This study explores scenarios of staged accession from the current situation of regionally fragmented and moderate climate action to a global climate policy regime. The analysis is based on scenarios in which a front runner coalition – the EU or the EU and China – embarks on immediate ambitious climate action while the rest of the world makes a transition to a global climate regime between 2030 and 2050. We assume that the ensuing regime involves strong mitigation efforts but does not require late joiners to compensate for their initially higher emissions. Thus, climate targets are relaxed, and although staged accession can achieve significant reductions of global warming, the resulting climate outcome is unlikely to be consistent with a 2 degree target. The addition of China to the front runner coalition can reduce pre-2050 excess emissions by 20–30%, increasing the likelihood of staying below 2 degrees. Not accounting for potential co-benefits, the cost of front runner action is found to be lower for the EU than for China. Regions that delay their accession to the climate regime face a trade-off between reduced short term costs and higher transitional requirements due to larger carbon lock-ins and more rapidly increasing carbon prices during the accession period.
JRC Directorate:Growth and Innovation

Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.


Items in repository are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.