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dc.contributor.authorJANSSENS Willemen_GB
dc.contributor.authorPEERANI Paoloen_GB
dc.contributor.authorBERGONZI Claudioen_GB
dc.contributor.authorWOLFART Eriken_GB
dc.contributor.authorLITTMANN Francoisen_GB
dc.contributor.authorMERCURIO GIOVANNIen_GB
dc.contributor.authorDECHAMP Lucen_GB
dc.contributor.authorRICHIR Patriceen_GB
dc.date.accessioned2015-01-24T01:41:35Z-
dc.date.available2015-01-23en_GB
dc.date.available2015-01-24T01:41:35Z-
dc.date.created2015-01-08en_GB
dc.date.issued2014en_GB
dc.date.submitted2015-01-08en_GB
dc.identifier.citationProc. 2014 IAEA Symposium in International Safeguards p. 134en_GB
dc.identifier.urihttp://www.iaea.org/safeguards/symposium/2014/home/eproceedings/sg2014_eproceedings_online.pdfen_GB
dc.identifier.urihttp://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC94271-
dc.description.abstractSafeguarding declared nuclear facilities is a main duty of the nuclear safeguards inspectorates. Depending upon the amounts of nuclear materials present (and physical/chemical form), a certain inspection approach (and corresponding dedicated techniques and equipment) is developed. This approach will be very different for an item facility compared to a bulk-material handling process, whereby in each case we strive to a maximum efficiency and effectiveness of the safeguards system. Traditionally these safeguards measurements are executed with independent, safeguards approved, measurement equipment, complementary to the existing plant equipment and focusing on a variety of nuclear material diversion scenarios (and statistical considerations) The innovative aspect of the Advanced Safeguards Measurement, Monitoring and Modelling Laboratory, AS3ML, subject of this paper, is that it aims to complement the above approach by providing an alternative method to monitor the process of sensitive facilities such as Gas Centrifuge Enrichment and Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing plants. It endeavours thus to enhance the “traditional safeguards measures” by the focus on and analysis of (other) process parameters, which a priority each individually might not have a highly significant value, but which, taken all together, might allow to get a very good insight in the proper operation (thrust building measures) or alternatively to the deviations from the “theoretical” values of the behaviour of a facility. The AS3ML is thus conceived as an R&D location, test bed, demo facility and training centre for innovative safeguards approaches where researchers, inspectors (and operators) can conceive and analyse different approaches (including competing technologies) for safeguarding nuclear facilities. Techniques and approaches, not currently used in routine safeguards applications, will be discussed including a reference to a recent achievement for a fully new way of safeguarding a plutonium storage location which is presented elsewhere in this symposium.en_GB
dc.description.sponsorshipJRC.E.8-Nuclear securityen_GB
dc.format.mediumOnlineen_GB
dc.languageENGen_GB
dc.publisherIAEA International Atomic Energy Agencyen_GB
dc.relation.ispartofseriesJRC94271en_GB
dc.titleAdvanced Safeguards Measurement, Monitoring and Modelling Laboratory (AS3ML)en_GB
dc.typeArticles in periodicals and booksen_GB
JRC Directorate:Nuclear Safety and Security

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