Complete SIP message obfuscation: PrivaSIP over Tor

Anonymity on SIP signaling can be achieved either by the construction of a lower level tunnel (via the use of SSL or IPSec protocols) or by employing a custom-tailored solution. Unfortunately, the former category of solutions present significant impediments including the requirement for a PKI and the hop-by-hop fashioned protection, while the latter only concentrate on the application layer, thus neglecting sensitive information leaking from lower layers. To remediate this problem, in the context of this paper, we employ the well-known Tor anonymity systemto achieve complete SIP traffic obfuscation from an attacker's standpoint. Specifically, we capitalize on Tor for preserving anonymity on network links that are considered mostly untrusted, i.e., those among SIP proxies and the one between the last proxy in the chain and the callee. We also, combine this Tor-powered solution with PrivaSIP to achieve an even greater level of protection. By employing PrivaSIP we assure that: (a) the first hop in the path (i.e., between the caller and the outbound proxy) affords anonymity, (b) the callee does not know the real identity of the caller, and (c) no real identities of both the caller and the callee are stored in log files. We also evaluate this scheme in terms of performance and show that even in the worst case, the latency introduced is not so high as it might be expected due to the use of Tor.

KAROPOULOS Georgios;  FAKIS Alexandros;  KAMBOURAKIS Georgios; 

2017-10-02

IEEE

JRC89749

978-1-4799-4223-7,   

http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6980285/,    https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/handle/JRC89749,   

10.1109/ARES.2014.36,